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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
HOW THE BALANCE OF POWER CONDITIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS
by
Kevin Modlin
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor
This dissertation explains how the balance of power influences the incidence of
international trade agreements. It shows the interaction of factors from the disciplines of
Economics, Politics, and International Relations. Specifically, it shows the influence of the
balance of power within three cases of trade agreements.
The following cases illustrate how states, when negotiating agreements, respond to power
competition. This influence of power within state relations is a social interaction but also one
where individual states respond. Some of those responses include trade agreements with other
states. Systems influence the decisions of negotiators involved in trade agreements. As the cases
illustrate, state leaders respond to the power dynamics of the parties involved in negotiations as
well as those outside the negotiations.
Therefore, this dissertation shines a light on an under-explored conditioning variable in
International Political Economy literature and points to examples where it is relevant in
influencing trade agreements. Also, it considers alternative explanations related to the occurrence
of trade agreements including hegemony, economics, and politics. It shows that the absence of the
balance of power variable would result in an incomplete analysis of why trade agreements occur.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Background:
In the years since the Cold War ended, the world has experienced more than a
tenfold increase in the number of trade agreements. This observation leads to questions
related to why international trade agreements happen, and why the quantity of trade
agreements has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War? Many disciplines,
including Economics, Politics, and International Relations, look within their respective
theoretical explanations to help understand this puzzle. These explanations are helpful
but are incomplete. Few of these approaches take the influence of the interactions within
the balance of power into account. This work addresses that oversight and explains how
the balance of power has a significant influence on the incidence of international trade
agreements, as reflected in state decision making.
This work also corrects for the under consideration of the influence of the balance
of power in International Political Economy literature that focuses on trade. Since the
balance of power plays an overarching role in this research, it will be necessary to start
by explaining how the idea is understood. This understanding is reached through
definitions and a review of history to help illuminate the various conceptualizations of the
balance of power.
The balance of power acts as a conditioning force that facilitates the formation of
trade agreements. Specifically, it performs as a salient force that pushes and pulls upon
states. That interaction conditions the dynamics of state relations, including the
occurrence of international trade agreements. The force is incorporeal, but the influence
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nevertheless is consequential on state relations. This force that states impose on each
other is continuous in its influence by how it constrains state policies. However, the
force remains outside the agency of specific units to control, but states can respond. As
this dissertation will explain, the influence of these state interactions plays a distinct role
in state decisions involving trade agreements. So, while the states exist in a system this
research explains that states develop trade policy in response to constraints.
The significance of this research rests on working to alter the omission in
international trade literature of the balance of power concept. As this analysis and cases
demonstrate, the balance of power is a distinct and vital component in understanding how
international trade agreements transpire. As a result, this research makes a significant
contribution to the knowledge of the occurrence of international trade agreements as
studied in international relations. Like other conditioning systems in the social order, it is
impossible to evade the influence of the balance of power on the incidence of trade
agreements.
Therefore, this work seeks to advance the understanding of a salient variable that
interacts in the social world and conditions the occurrence of trade agreements. The
series of ideas within this dissertation are nascent conjectures and not near the final
statement akin to those provided in a refined law. However, the process helps improve
concepts as patterns emerge through an analysis of the following cases, which examine
three trade agreements. The cases transpire under differing international conditions and
provide a lens to examine theoretical conclusions.
In short, the fundamental assumption of the dissertation is that the balance of
power is not only a byproduct of states’ interactions; it conditions trade agreements.

2

Regrettably, though, the relationship between the influence of system effects and
international trade is insufficiently researched. The influence of the balance of power has
received only scant attention in the International Political Economy literature. The
dissertation derives motivation from Robert Keohane’s appeal that the “suppression of
the ‘I’ in IPE,” is disheartening.1 This absence is particularly notable when it does not
address the consideration of the outbreak and evolution of international trade agreements.
Accordingly, the significance of this research rests on bringing the concept of the balance
of power into research in order to examine its effects on international trade agreements.
In this manner, this study will be complementing a rich body of literature in International
Relations involving agents and systems.
The following dissertation will test concepts to further advance the theoretical
reasoning in international relations around the development of international trade
agreements. For example, when examining a broad scope of trade agreements, patterns
emerge, showing the salient force of the power competition among states. The influence
of power among states impacts those present at the negotiating table and those who are
not. The influence of all of the states is part of the system dynamics that mold
international affairs.
When examining the occurrence of trade agreements, economists frequently focus
on economic conditions and incentives. Meanwhile, when political scientists examine
trade agreements, they often consider the political realm and agent motivations.2 In both

1

Keohane, Robert O. "The Old IPE and the New." Review of International Political Economy, 2009, 34-46.

2

As will be further elaborated on in this chapter the differences relate to ontological and epistemological
assumptions that have manifested in differences in the study of IPE as highlighted by Cohen, Benjamin J.
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cases, the emphasis is generally on domestic and multilateral relations of the parties
involved in negotiations. The International Relations discipline incorporates the
influence of institutions and their attendant international political processes, as
influencing trade agreements, especially within the World Trade Organization (WTO).
This emphasis can narrow explanations of trade agreements that focus on actors, nuanced
provisions, narratives, or processes. Nevertheless, these analyses provide some
explanations related to the occurrence of international trade and can support the testing of
more abstract theoretical conceptualizations of trade agreements. However, the findings
in this research suggest there should be further consideration of the balance of power and
its influence on social interactions.
Interaction among the respective states involved in negotiations, as well as the
influence of the international institutions, does not fully cover the scope of factors to
assist researchers in understanding why trade agreements occur. This dissertation asserts
it is the force of the balance of power, which helps account for previously neglected
explanations, across the disciplines, seeking to understand why trade agreements
transpire. For operational purposes, this research assumes the balance of power
conditions international trade agreements. However, this salient influence does not
remove or dismiss the significant causal influences of economics and politics, as explored
within those respective disciplines.

"The Transatlantic Divide: Why are American and British IPE so Different?" Review of International
Political Economy 14, no. 2 (2007): 197-219.
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Research Question: How do balance of power dynamics condition the outbreak
and evolution of international trade agreements?
Hypothesis: If the balance of power assists in explaining trade agreements, it
should play a distinct role in conditioning how negotiators respond to the international
power environment.
The following case studies cases show an awareness of the influence of balance of
power during trade agreement negotiations. This awareness of balance of power
dynamics manifests in the conditioning influence on the leaders and how those leaders
make choices while negotiating. The conditions include opportunities or constraints in
the global marketplace. Also, the diminished enmity among the negotiating states was a
precondition for the incidence of these trade agreements. The balance of power dynamics
reflect leader objectives throughout the negotiating process.
The following mechanisms show how the balance of power dynamics operate
within trade agreements:
1. New opportunities or constraints develop in the global market and intersect with state
relations
2. Diminished political enmity is apparent among the trading partners
3. Leader objectives are affected by power competition among states
4. Negotiating processes are influenced by and may reference international power
competition

5

With these four mechanisms in mind as the literature is reviewed and the cases
analyzed, there will be, when appropriate, references to the mechanisms and the salient
role they are playing in the trade agreements. This chapter will continue by elaborating
on the key points and how they interact in these relationships. Also, through this chapter
and succeeding chapters, several relevant concepts related to the research project will be
incorporated. These concepts will help illuminate some of the commonalities and
differences in the three cases that explain the development of trade agreements and the
conditioning influence of the balance of power.

Systems and Shadows:
An important concept for this research revolves around the understandings of the
International State System within the discipline of International Relations. As Kenneth
Waltz points out, the system encompasses the arrangement and interaction of the parts.3
Therefore, under this perspective, explaining the causes of international events cannot be
attributed to a single unit or group of units. The relational arrangement organizes relative
to each states’ respective capabilities. Therefore, the emphasis is on how these states
interact with each other and how their presence influences others. As a result, state
relations begin with an understanding of the concept of power. Often, Realism (and its
multiple theoretical variants) emphasizes material capabilities as a central element of
power. States share similarities, including the influence from the absence of global

3

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Boston, Mass: McGraw-Hill, 1979.117. 80.
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hierarchy.4 The structure accepts those states who work within and rejects states that
operate outside those norms.5 This claim does not suggest the structure, at its core, is
rules-based (which is also a structure) but that, in a competitive and sometimes
conflictual environment, states decline and sometimes cease to exist due to the actions of
other states. Those that are most likely to fall are those that do not learn and adapt to
their social environment.6
Therefore, the existence of one state influences the behavior of other states. This
interaction among states has evolved into a balance of power system that exists within the
international order and influences phenomena outside the order. The arrangement of the
balance of power system is constrained, positional, relational, and interactive. However,
while there is a consistent agreement regarding the importance of these influences, we are
not sure about the effects and interactions among these factors. The existence of a state,
according to Waltz, grants it status regardless of its size.7 This size in the system is
subject to constant change, resulting in uncertain relations and outcomes. Likewise,
objects influence each other continually in differing ways due to their respective
positions.

“Despite changes that constantly take place in the relations of nations, the basic structure of international
politics continues to be anarchic. Each state fends for itself with or without the cooperation of others. The
leaders of states and their followers are concerned with their standings, that is, with their positions vis-a-vis
one another” Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." International Security
18, no. 2 (1993): 44-79.
4

5

Waltz, 1979. 115

6

Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Hackett Publishing, 2008. 24.

7

Waltz, 1979. 96.
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Robert Jervis examines the interrelated and interactive effects, intended and
unintended, across the units in a system.8 Specifically, in System Effects, he denotes
differences between the understanding of stability and peace. Jervis draws inspiration
from Ashby’s conceptions of system stability as a means to recognize them.9 Therefore,
the existence of a system is not about preventing change. Instead, what shows the
existence of a system is the way it reacts to change. Thus, the system existence rests in
its durability or ability to return to the existing system. This systemic endurance can
happen through changes or shocks experienced by an individual or collective units.
Jervis also points out, “Aron and Hoffman argue that heterogeneous systems tend to be
unstable while homogeneous ones tend to be stable.”10
It is helpful to acknowledge that the study of science has extensive references to
the concept of the system. Jervis describes types of systems employed outside of the
International Relations discipline. Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions asserts there is a varied and cumulative nature to advancements in scientific
knowledge.11 Therefore, this understanding of knowledge development from its

8

Jervis, Robert. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1997. 94. Also, for other systemic theories Wallerstein views the world as composed of
multiple interacting systems, including the Modern World System, which stressed capital accumulation.
This created a relationship related to production that transcended political systems and states. Wallerstein,
Immanuel Maurice. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
9

Ashby, William. Design for a Brain: The Origin of Adaptive Behaviour. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2013. 54.
10

Jervis, 1997. 99.

11

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
1996. 52.
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condition or change is difficult because the weight of the knowledge is not fully known.12
However, the knowledge still acts as a force that affects the environment with stabilizing
and revolutionary consequences. Kuhn asserts that the perception of the observability
and linearity of knowledge development is mistakenly the result of the process of
teaching science.13 This construction of knowledge development can lead the student to
the misperception that the linear method is how knowledge develops.14 The assumptions
within these debates involve the question of whether knowledge accumulation and linear
development occur as a result of epistemic systems we often characterize as schools,
groupings, or communities.
Like other systems and phenomena, not all interactions studied in International
Relations are wholly observable. However, there are useful measures to indicate the
existence, changes, and our resulting perceptions of the effects, like with the International
State System. We can seek to explain the respective elements but understanding happens
through references to the whole. Similar to the cases in this dissertation, we often
experience the whole through the activity of some of the parts. At the same time, systems
involve agents who assert claims. It is often agents who internalize and respond to these
observations. It was agents within various epistemic communities who developed the
knowledge, although the community played an essential role in accepting or rejecting the

12

Ibid. 140.

13

Similar points about the challenges regarding the teaching through narratives are in Freedman, Lawrence.
Strategy: A History. Oxford: 2015. 432.
14

Kuhn, 1996. 138.

9

developed knowledge. Kuhn notes revolutions in thought include leading figures whose
ideas were accepted and built upon by future generations.15
In the early 1990s, Krugman16 wrote about the increased frequency of
regionalized trade agreements and the decreased activity at the international institutional
level. These institutions involved in guiding trade activity would be expected to play a
facilitating role in maintaining the workings of trade as well as the expansion of trade
agreements. He asserts that it is not sufficient to consider the frequency of trade, which is
due to the diffusion and adoption of norms regarding free trade. For Krugman, the unit of
analysis for theoretical explanations of trade is the state and the relations with other
states.17 However, references to Viner’s description of how exclusionary trade
agreements make the excluders less well-off hints at the existence of an exogenous
systemic force influencing trade.
Krugman argues that the reason why GATT and other institutions have been less
effective is due to the diminished position of the systemic leader (hegemon).18 Therefore,
under this diminished condition of leadership, there developed an increased role of new
economic actors. This shift in influence facilitated the development of more subtleties of
trade policies and the obfuscation of international trade rules. As a result, regional trade
becomes more attractive due to “both economic and political shadows.”19 This

15

Ibid. 6.

16

Krugman, Paul. "The Move Toward Free Trade Zones." Economic Review 76, no. 6 (1991): 5.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid.

19

Ibid.
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dissertation contends that these shadows are another way of describing power. It is
through the accumulation of power, as well as survival and interests among the states,
that the influence of these aims becomes systematized to form the foundation of the
balance of power system.
However, distinct interests develop with the formation of states. This
development is akin to change that occurs through a grouping of individuals, which
creates a system. Before they act in concert within the group, they also have their
respective interests. It seems most likely that some interests may have predated the
existence of the International State System, but some new ones emerge due to
competition for survival in the system. Butterfield sees balancing as a problem, where it
is the result of state formation and system formation.20 Each element reinforces the other.
Also, in both classical economic literature and Realist literature, there is an emphasis on
discussion of the concepts of absolute advantage and comparative advantage. The
literature review in the next chapter includes a discussion of these concepts as reflected
within the cases.
Another component relevant to the project involves understanding systemic
change. Gilpin’s typology of system, systemic, and interaction change provides a
theoretical groundwork for how relations among states may transpire.21 Change can be
related to expectations involving the occurrence of phenomena at the systemic level.

20

Butterfield, Herbert, and Martin Wight. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International
Politics. London: Allen & Unwin, 1966.
21

Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 40.
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Questions related to change and expectations are the focus of Dale Copeland’s work that
seeks to consider the economic influences and causes of war.22 He explains that the
factor that resulted in a military conflict was neither cooperation nor competition, but
rather an unexpected change in the relations between states. He asserts the expectations
of future trade relations between states stabilize or destabilize affairs.23 Copeland’s work
on expectations is similar to the contributions from Economists Muth and Lucas.24
Likewise, Thucydides discusses the influence of expectation when describing the ability
of Themistocles to foresee, “better than any the possible advantage and disadvantage in a
yet uncertain future.”25 According to Thucydides, this ability to anticipate the future was
a very rare trait among all the leaders in Greece during that time.

Trade Theories:
“Structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite
differences in the persons and states who use them.”26 ~ Kenneth Waltz

Before exploring the recent theoretical contributions regarding trade among states,
it is essential to consider the broad understandings provided by classical thinkers.

22

Copeland, Dale C. Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton University Press, 2014.

23

Ibid. 43.

24

Muth, John F. "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements." Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society (1961): 315-335.
25

Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Martin Hammond. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009. 68
26

Waltz, 1979. 117.
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Through an examination of the respective theoretical assumptions, a sustained
understanding of conditions that influence the incidence of trade agreements can be more
thoroughly understood. In the process, it will help to consider themes of power and
change through a reading of theory as well as history.
Classical thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, or Smith saw less of a delineated
distinction between the respective parts of governance and economy.27 Machiavelli
points out, “A Prince is exposed to two dangers, from within in respect of his subjects,
from without in respect of foreign powers.”28 He further links the two planes, when he
claims that when conditions abroad are settled, they will be the same domestically.29
Machiavelli argued that a Prince would need to employ prudence to balance the choices,
including sometimes selecting the least bad option.30
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Smith also saw the linkage of power and wealth.
This linkage is especially apparent in matters involving the state, security, economy, and
order. Smith says every state should have the “wherewithal to carry on foreign wars.”31

27

It should be noted that these classical thinkers use terms widely recognized within the disciplines most
often referenced by them, even though they are each from different centuries. Their works had influences
in different eras though from the current reader’s vantage point all the work seems a distant past.
Thucydides died around 400 BC and Machiavelli died in 1527. Smith passed centuries later in 1790.
28

Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. New York: Pocket Books, 2004. 88.

29

Ibid. 88.

30

Ibid. 109.

31

Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: 1776. 459.

13

Thucydides discussed how a revolt among allies is a means to cut their financial reserves,
which were a vital source of state strength.32

Endogenous and Exogenous Political Relations:
To illustrate the interaction of the variables of the International State System,
Politics, and Economics, work from Paul Kennedy and Kevin Narizny will be helpful.33
As Narizny asserts, a grand strategy for a state can be revealed not through a specific
plan, which is subject to variation, but instead through a pattern of state behavior.34
Narizny’s contribution includes his insights into how economic interest relates to state
interest and mirrors the Classical Realist points from Smith, Machiavelli, and
Thucydides. States have the choice of policies ranging from isolationist to imperialist on
opposite spectrums, with internationalist and interventionist in-between.35 According to
Narizny, these conditions interact with other mobilizers and constraints like societal
preferences including domestic politics and international politics.36 Therefore,
determining between the preeminence of domestic political interest relates to how the

32

Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Martin Hammond. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009. 58 “Also trouble arose between Athens and Megara (on the isthmus between Athens and Corinth), on
which Athens was imposing economic sanctions” Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by
Martin Hammond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. xiv
33

Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000. New York, NY: Random House, 1987. 421.
34

Narizny, Kevin. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. 10.

35

Ibid. 16, 164, 210.

36

Ibid. 16.
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state differentiates if the relations are in the periphery or core.37 The constraints include
international and domestic behaviors such as vote-seeking, socialization, ideational shifts,
and the formation of domestic political coalitions.
In assessing the different historic periods for the U.S. and Great Britain, Narizny
first examines the economic foundations for the relations between states (first the
periphery and second the great powers). To this point he asserts, “(1) all states must
make trade-offs in their security policy, (2) the trade-offs often have distributive
implications, and (3) almost all state leaders are selected by, or rely on the support of,
groups that are affected by these trade-offs.”38 Mearsheimer also argues that great
powers are always wealthy, but not all wealthy powers are great. He maintains that great
powers rely on wealth, population, and technology as a latent power which, for a state,
links to military power.39 Mechanism one as listed above considers these interacting
influences of the comingling of economic and political interests. Specifically, changes in
global conditions may either present opportunities or constraints and these interact with
political decisions including decisions to enter into trade agreements.
Median voter models consider the preferences of voters and the influence of the
median actor determines the outcome.40 Mayer applies this concept to the issue of trade

37

Ibid. 19.

38

Ibid. 23.

39

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. 2001. Ch.3.

40

Roger D. Congleton The Median Voter Model in Rowley, Charles K., and Friedrich Schneider. The
Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004.
http://www.credoreference.com/book/sprpubchoice.

15

by employing an economic model which is similar to research on factor inputs for
production.41 Meanwhile, Magee, Brock, and Young assert the voter tradeoffs in
preferences and information, as well as the influence of political parties, are the key
variables.42 The trade agreements may also be a source of strengthening for domestic
politics, which may improve domestic political predictability, which can be expected to
be favored by state leaders. For trade between states to occur within their framework the
political system (like the economic) will shift away from autarky. Levy also considers
the feedback effects in the political realm from the approval of bilateral agreements. He
then outlines how this previous event influences the consideration of future agreements.43
However, Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff assert that democracies follow the Kantian
design and engage in more trade.44
There was also a systemic change over time that favored authority and likewise
seemed to punish norm violators. Therefore, institutions like the WTO advance trade
norms. Trade norms from the WTO condition state behavior through rule enforcement,
policy direction, and their institutional presence. Rules make it costly to operate outside
the systemic norm. The incurred costs can be from either an organized or unorganized
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response. Keohane also talks about the costs of uncertainty being a motivator for
agreements, “since general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states more
predictable.”45 Similarly, Brodie argues that Thucydides makes the point that, “peace is
better than war not only in being more agreeable, but also in being very much more
predictable.”46
Breznitz and Wong present slightly different perspectives on the role of the state
in the economy.47 Both authors develop parallel and somewhat competing explanations
for understanding economies that have adopted state-driven models. These national
efforts have the objective of rapidly expanding technology sectors to boost the economy
as a whole. Breznitz examines the computer chip and related technology sectors within
Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan.48 Meanwhile, Wong also discusses Taiwan and adds South
Korea and Singapore.49 In these countries, the leaders of the Asian Tigers focused state
resources on biotechnology and faced poor results.50 Breznitz is somewhat more
optimistic about the role of the state in development and Wong is more pessimistic.
However, they generally agree with each other on how this growth happened and when it
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did occur. The authors follow the legacy of Hamilton and List in acknowledging that
because of power, there is an interaction of the political and the economic.51

Challenges Toward Theoretical Synthesis:
Considering the points made in the introduction, a research project such as this
should acknowledge the challenges in its design. The definition of the balance of power
system, while complicated, pales in comparison to knowing, understanding, and
measuring its influence. Nevertheless, we can observe its influence in its resistance and
conditioning of outcomes. Existing research will be incorporated, including how theories
explain the occurrence of trade. The emphasis in this dissertation will be on work from
International Relations theory and how it is employed to help explain the formation of
trade agreements.
Common ground for the cross-pollination of research opportunities appear in a
few key examples of study within International Political Economy. Two examples of this
theoretical synthesis are from Milner and Garfinkel et al. Milner gives an overview of
explanations involving trade within IPE literature that range from agent and system profit
motives to institutional facilitation of trade.52 Also, work from Garfinkel, Skaperdas, and
Syropoulos looks at security issues within economic trade questions and models. They
assert, “power matters for trade as critically as the traditional determinants of
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endowments, preferences, and technology.” With this in mind, they develop a
consumption model in a two-state scenario of trading guns or goods. In this abstraction,
they argue that a situation of parity in arms creates an environment of less insecurity,
relative to comparative advantages of the other state.53 Also, Mansfield considers the
interaction of global power distribution and its influence on war as well as peace.54
However, none of these works place the balance of power concept in puzzles related to
explaining the formation of trade agreements.
Throughout The History of the Peloponnesian War, readers of Thucydides see the
interplay of economics and politics, most notably in understanding alliance systems and
the rising and declining powers.55 Also, military tactics frequently take on economic
elements. Raids, sieges, and blocking trade are actions used to weaken a rival power and
influence decision-making by effecting the public treasury. Similarly, Adam Smith
speaks of security being the primary concern of the sovereign.56
However, since the creation of these classical works and the further development
of the respective disciplines, an enormous theoretical chasm has evolved. The theoretical
assumptions and the inherent tensions within the ideas deserve consideration. At the core
is the underlying notion discussed in IPE, within the classical Liberal economic theory
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and the classical Liberal political theory, that individuals are cooperative and frequently
engage with each other politically and economically. This thinking has carried over into
Neoliberal International Relations theory today.57 However, these theories are less reliant
on explanations related to exogenous influences to explain engagements in trade, like the
Neorealist conception of the balance of power. Instead, in Liberal theory there is a
dependence on assumptions related to humans as social beings. They explain how,
through human engagement, individuals become more malleable to others. Liberals
apply this assumption to explain state relations and also interactions among international
institutions.
Again, this dissertation asserts that another theoretical chasm related to
assumptions exists, involving the influence of anarchy and the International State System.
There are distinct differences in the hierarchy concept, between the domestic and
international, and how that concept informs theories. This is the result of different
assumptions regarding the influence of anarchy. As Waltz pointed out, “national
governments can manipulate system-wide economic variables. No agencies with
comparable capabilities exist internationally.”58
Furthermore, there is agreement regarding an ontological assumption within
classical economic Liberalism and Realism that individuals compete to survive. That
understanding, as well as the acknowledgment of the primacy of power in determining
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outcomes, shows areas of more evident interaction than sometimes acknowledged
between realism and classical liberal economics. Recognizing this complexity is
necessary. Otherwise, it could be overly simplistic to assume that classical liberalism in
economics carries the same assumptions as liberalism in International Relations. This
clarification is required to understand the theoretical foundations within a series of case
studies that consider the influence the balance of power has on the incidence of
international trade agreements.
Therefore, what seems to divide classical liberal economic thinking from the
classical Realist approach is less the impression on human behavior and the emphasis on
the pursuit of wealth and power. Instead, the result is on the unique attributes of the
different domains. Keohane notices intrinsic commonalities between the variants of
Realism within international relations theory and classical economics theory. 59 In both
disciplines, the individual is the central tenant of decision-making, relations,
measurement, and satisfaction. Furthermore, Keohane does not focus on individuals,
states, or economies being defined or experiencing self-actualization through the
interaction with others.60 In other words, he avoids the logical traps that can arise by
claiming altruism is for selfish reasons.
Instead, it is due to the self-help nature of anarchy in the International State
System that states are assumed to procure interests and security from others. This
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condition makes states less collaborative than how market firms behave within a classical
economic system. This different type of behavior is due to an underlying assumption of
the state compared to a market firm. The firm is more subject to the constraints and
hierarchies than what states are understood to be subject to in international relations.
There are overlapping points of agreement between classical Realism and
classical economics. They come from examining the pieces that are assumed to resemble
each other in name only when taken through the respective theoretical logic. Outside of
the differing understanding of hierarchy, there are direct links in assumptions regarding
human nature, sources of tension, gain, power, and in measuring change.
Gilpin argues that one of the challenges of Neoliberal Institutionalism is the
divergence between the authority within institutions and the broader understanding of
economic power.61 In After Hegemony, Keohane works to synthesize Realism and
Liberalism during a time after the oil crisis of the 1970s, a period which spurred the
formation of the IPE discipline.62 He does not perceive a grand divide between the
leading schools of thought.63 Keohane highlights the degrees of difference within the
theories that individuals may be described as egoist, but at the same time be considered
cooperative in reaching these individual goals. Keohane observes that, “harmony has
never characterized trade politics.”64
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Keohane’s argument for Neoliberal Institutionalism operates within the
cooperative realm. States, therefore, find it more efficient, or at a minimum less costly,
to bind themselves to mutually agreed upon rules.65 By reducing asymmetric information
and behavior (for example, the WTO or IAEA) through the bargaining process, a type of
order forms and commitments develop through the bargaining process. Bargaining
fosters commitments among states because of the incentive of reciprocity.66 This
thinking is similar to security arrangements as outlined by Jervis in, “deterrence theory it
is reputation, commitments, and others’ expectations that create interconnections.”67
There seem to be insoluble difficulties in achieving synthesis among these
theories and efforts employed to explain human interactions and trade. An effort of this
magnitude would face complications due to the necessity of ensuring the internal
consistency of the synthesized product as well as how it relates to each respective original
theory. This challenge is heightened by the human tendency to focus on inconsistencies.
Almost any outlined argument can be found to be inconsistent with any other related
argument. As Bertrand Russell explains, “no one has yet succeeded in inventing a
philosophy at once credible and self-consistent.“68 Therefore, any effort to synthesize a
theory involving trade agreements and the influence of international relations theories
would have multiple inconsistencies to confront. Without the dedication of a career’s
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work, almost any effort toward synthesis would likely result in an incomplete text.
Instead, this dissertation examines these ideas through case studies to consider their
relevance and how they contribute to the explanations of how trade agreements occur.

Contribution:
The contribution of this research is the emphasis on the balance of power’s roll in
conditioning the occurrence of trade agreements. The following cases demonstrate that,
while negotiating a trade agreement, states account for the power and interests of other
states. This awareness of the other states is not confined to the parties involved in
negotiating the agreement but includes a broad number of states. Historic accounts
reference an awareness of the influence multiple states have on trade agreements.
However, International Political Economy theories neglect the balance of power’s
influence on trade agreements. These cases show how the balance of power influences
the parties involved in the trade talks, issues under deliberation, and the anticipated
consequences of an agreement.
Therefore, the dissertation can show how theory within International Political
Economy can advance with the incorporation of the balance of power variable. The
balance of power has customarily been considered a security variable. However, it molds
a range of social phenomena, including (but not limited to) politics and economics, as
well. In fact, these cases show the salient causal role the balance of power plays in
influencing the incidence of international trade agreements.
There are few instances where scholars consider the effect of the balance of
power on trade activity. Specifically, the literature overlooks the influence of the balance
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of power on the formation of international trade agreements. This absence is noteworthy,
considering the opportunity within the discipline of International Political Economy to
allow each of the disciplinary constituent parts to contribute insights to help explain the
formation of trade agreements. There is an absence of the balance of power variable
within economics literature and separately in political science literature related to this
topic of trade and trade agreements. There is even an absence of the balance of power
concept within international relations explanations of trade agreements.
Some of this deficit may be due in part to the challenges just outlined regarding
internal consistency involving theoretical work across multiple disciplines. Even with
this caveat, considering the consequential ramifications of the balance of power on state
relations, it is puzzling why this concept is absent from the literature. Instead, as Krasner
points out, research within the discipline seems to focus on transnational explanations at
the expense of the concept of the state.69 Consequently, there is a deficit in the
incorporation of the influence of the system of states and how they condition phenomena
that would fall into the category of International Political Economy. Mansfield considers
the effect of differences in the distribution of physical power among states as an influence
on trade activity. He outlines how trade volume is affected by acute differences in the
international distribution of power.70
Some emphasize the power of a hegemon to develop economic systems favorable
to the hegemon. They cannot explain how empirically these economic systems rarely
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overlap with hegemony in trade policy. Furthermore, there are multiple empirical
examples where a hegemon may exert modest influence, as explained by the theorists.
The dependent variable of this research, the formation of trade agreements, is not
the most distinguishing aspect of this dissertation. Instead, the focus deals with the
independent variable, the balance of power, and the effect it has on the formation of trade
agreements. Researchers should emphasize the importance of understanding why trade
agreements seem less durable under multipolarity. The conclusion of the dissertation
analyzes the cases to explain how polarity conditions the formation of trade agreements;
with every increase in polar actor, there is a corresponding decrease in agreements. The
polarities within the balance of power shape the competition among states, which impacts
security. However, the differences in polarity also influence all state relations including
the reaching of trade agreements.
As a result, the incorporation of this concept will motivate deeper deliberation
about the influence of the balance of power in trade agreements and its further
consideration within the International Political Economy discipline. Perhaps, as a result
of the existence of unipolarity, the absence of robust power competition has led to this
under consideration in contemporary research. However, with the emergence of multiple
political power centers it is reasonable to expect research will reflect this shift in state
competition. With this in mind, the value in this research and future work is theoretical
but can also have practical influence, especially with the growth of China and the
resulting power competition.
The dearth of explanations on the influence of the balance of power may relate to
Krasner’s observation about the somewhat myopic focus of IPE literature. Existing
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academic research could be myopically focused because the explanations are internally
consistent. However, utilizing theories that are internally consistent has provided limited
explanations for the complex political, economic, and international dimensions of
relations. Within the core elements of the literature, there is an unresolved tension when
attempting theoretical synthesis. As mentioned above, because of these barriers to
synthesis this work will primarily focus on examining specific cases of trade agreements.
Therefore, examining empirics refocuses the reader on events to better test theories.
Consequently, understanding why trade agreements happen develops not just by theories,
but by how those theories comport with events.
The dissertation contribution shows, through cases, how the balance of power
influences the incidence of international trade agreements by conditioning the choices
available to leaders. By focusing on the balance of power variable, these cases show a
possible refinement for International Political Economy theories. As the methods section
will outline, theory will help contextualize the cases, and the cases will help test theory.

Methods:
Tension is sometimes created in science when a researcher tries to prove a theory
while also providing real-world applications. If the idea is to have real-world application,
it must also be subject to testing. As Popper notes, on the falsifiability of the research
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design, “irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.”71 This
research seeks to address this challenge by testing theory through relevant cases.
The dissertation will examine three cases to consider the existing theoretical
claims to help understand the phenomena of international trade agreements and the
balance of power influence. Also, the work will study some related questions to consider
the possibility of alternative explanations. Through that process nascent conjectures will
be provided to explain these phenomena. Precisely through these outlined methods, the
research will examine the factors that contributed to the formation of trade agreements.
The conclusion will consider these factors again and compare factors and derive patterns
related to these cases.
This comparative approach is utilized to examine the complexity of trade
agreements and to allow the consideration of theoretical explanations. Because the
research involves three cases, a comparative approach allows the opportunity to draw
inferences from each case. In addition, the opportunity exists for each case to reveal
patterns that contribute explanations about the formation of international trade
agreements. This approach forces a researcher to examine a case more closely. In the
same way theory is used as a means to shine a light on a subject, a different case can help
illuminate unnoticed patterns and push for thorough analysis. As Lim stresses,
comparison “can help open your eyes to the world.”72
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This approach presents opportunities and challenges. The opportunities include
thoroughly examining the claims within specific cases. However, while a case may be
able to falsify a theory component, it cannot falsify all other claims from a related theory.
The falsification would apply only to this case. On the other hand, if an idea faces
rejection in one example it is essential to consider that it could be rejected in other cases.
Therefore, researchers are confronted with a challenge when examining cases because of
the limitations associated with developing generalizable theoretical insights.
Given the dearth of existing explanations directly related to this area of research, it
is appropriate to build a foundation. This approach is necessary before seeking to make
broad claims related to the international state system and generalizable claims regarding
its influence on trade agreements. Because these cases are bound by specific periods it is
not possible to control for variables occurring in those periods. These dynamics include
technological change, the rise of institutions, changing norms, changes in domestic
political systems, and globalization. However, in each of the cases these circumstances
are relevant. Therefore, these conditions are referenced even though they are often not
part of the Neorealist paradigm.
Referencing relevant details does not confuse or diminish the influence of the
balance of power in explaining trade agreements. Therefore, because of the infrequency
of changes to polarity it is challenging to design research that detects all of the
differences. There are only some similarities among the cases to aid in determining a
difference. However, when reviewing the cases, general patterns emerge that are useful
for future theory building. At a minimum, researchers can determine if cases comport
with theoretical claims. As Peters explains, “eliminating possible causes is in itself a
theories of cause available.”73
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This dissertation’s tests relate to Popper’s scientific approach. Specifically, he
explains a theory must be testable to be scientific. He also outlines how a universal claim
can be refuted based on one experience or example.74 In, The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, Popper explains, “a positive decision can only temporarily support the theory,
for subsequent negative decisions may always overthrow it.”75
Therefore, Popper outlines four approaches to test a theory. First, he stipulates
the necessity of applying internal consistency checks. Second, according to Popper, the
logical character of the work should be determined to be empirical, scientific theory, or
tautological. Third, he calls for comparison with existing theories. This step determines
the tested theory’s references to research, whether it survives scrutiny, and if it will
advance scholarship. Fourth is testing the theory against empirical examples to
determine if it meets scrutiny.76 Therefore, these methods provide insight into getting the
respective variables to explain their influence. Each is likely to reveal some internal
validity but to face challenges with external validity.
Case selection for this dissertation was not determined at random though the
details and outcome of the research was unknown at the time of case selection. Each case
focuses on the bilateral negotiations of an agreement and the conditions the states operate
within. The agreements studied in the cases were negotiated in different time frames
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under different balance of power polarities. A central claim of this research is that the
cases reflect how the balance of power influences the incidence of international trade
agreements. Within most realist paradigms the main variation within the balance of
power is the number of polarities. So, the independent variable, the balance of power,
affects the dependent variable, the adoption of trade agreements. As a result, this
research develops a nascent conjecture that requires additional cases. It suggests that the
influence of polarity would mean for each increase in number of polar units there is a
decrease in the number of trade agreements. For this dissertation one case is presented
for unipolarity, one for bipolarity, and one for multipolarity. The selection of three cases
is similar to Breznitz, as well as Wong, and their respective comparative studies of statedirected technology development. This dissertation differs in its temporal scope as well
as its emphasis on conditions and agreements, rather than on internal state technology
developments. Although this dissertation also has three cases it does not benefit from a
counterpart to supply contrasting conclusions.
With that in mind there is a range of concepts and complexities that need
consideration in order to ensure consistency and testability of the research. First, while
this research utilizes theory to examine cases it cannot make generalizable statements
regarding the certainty of claims. However, it can provide direction on places to look.
Hall outlines how internal validity is a cohesive and supported argument that shows the
relationship between variables. Also, he explains that external validity is a case where
the explanation under similar circumstances (ceteris paribus) would repeat.77 Therefore,
the testing of these claims relates to the external validity of existing theory.
Hall, Peter. “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research” Mahoney, James, and
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge
77
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However, given the limited cases, this qualitative work will consider the internal
validity of its analysis. Goertz and Starr point to the Aristotelian origins of the necessary
logic that an event happens “only if” a specific variable exists.78 Therefore, when
applying these methods, the dissertation will test existing theoretical explanations within
these three cases. As a result, the dissertation will provide alternative explanations and
paths to theoretical development that is internally and externally consistent within the
confines of the examined cases.
We, therefore, can expect that the balance of power will be a necessary but not
sufficient variable in explaining the formation of trade agreements. This approach will
focus on the cases and highlight the opportunities for additional tests. Comparativist
approaches in case studies often look within cases at the agents and systems that
influence the area of study. As a result, this approach can neglect the influence of
exogenous factors where the concept of the balance of power would likely be an
influence on the other research programs. Therefore, “case studies provide guidance in
the revision and reformulation of analytic theory to account for a broader range of
phenomena. Indeed, analytic theory cannot do without case studies.”79
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Chapter Outline:
The following chapters will build from existing literature to show how the balance
of power influences the incidence of trade agreements. In order to explore the
importance of the balance of power, the next chapter considers how the idea has evolved.
The chapter also incorporates the history of the evolution of trade and trade agreements
and concludes with an analysis on how the concept intersects with the balance of power.
The subsequent three chapters apply these concepts while also examining cases of
trade agreements. Each case illustrates the balance of power variable. Each example
incorporates the different system types of multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity during
the time frame of the respective trade agreement’s adoption. Chapter Three, the
multipolarity case, looks at the early trade agreement between France and Britain in
1860. Negotiated by Cobden and Chevalier this agreement lowered French barriers to
trade with Britain. The bipolar case, Chapter Four, looks at the development of
MERCOSUR and focuses on the interactions between Brazil and Argentina that molded
the agreement. Chapter Five discusses a unipolar agreement involving the Russia and
China natural gas deal in 2014. The concluding chapter compares the insights from the
individual cases, with emphasis on the conditioning influence of the balance of power,
and considers further areas of research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

“The balance of power is the scale of peace.” ~ Thomas Paine80

“So the realm of strategy is one of bargaining and persuasion as well as threats
and pressure, psychological as well as physical effects, and words as well as deeds. This
is why strategy is the central political art. It is about getting more out of a situation than
the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.”

~

Lawrence Freedman81

Balance of Power Theories:
The various balance of power theories incorporate consideration of how the
number of great powers in the world influences the relations among states. The
variations of these types of explanations range: from the intuitive, to the agent-based
perspective, and to structural understandings. Even with a large volume of academic
literature, there is modest consideration of how this concept of balance of power
influences trade agreements. This chapter explores existing academic literature around
balance of power, trade, and in the specific examples where the concepts overlap. This
dissertation does not seek to be bold in terms of theory claims, but rather to more broadly
shine a light on this largely neglected subject.
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The beginning of the chapter will look at the relevant meanings of balance of
power, and the second half will look more closely at the ideas employed to understand
global trade. Before considering how the balance of power, in these three cases,
influences the incidence of trade agreements, it is essential to examine the various
meanings of the balance of power to reach a working definition.
First, a discussion of power helps illustrate these competing understandings of the
balance of power. Morgenthau argues that power is evident in human nature, and this
influence is similar to what he observes in state relations.82 Morgenthau assumes specific
laws govern interactions, which draw from his understanding of nature.83 Waltz, on the
other hand, draws different assumptions regarding state relations and highlights systemoriented explanations.84
For this research, the meaning of power derives from Robert Dahl, who suggests,
“my intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”85 Dahl’s
definition of power claims that intent is not the only determining criterion to detect the
presence or direction of power. Behind this contest of power are the explanations and
understandings which, as Edward Carr explains, function as an interaction between
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Classical Realism and utopian Liberalism.86 He also asserts that fundamentally, politics
is, “in one sense always power politics.”87 He explains that neglecting power results in
confusing the essence of the relations among states. As a result, the primary objective of
each state is to “maximize its share of world power,” and power helps the state survive in
a conflictual environment.88 Waltz agrees when he suggests that, in the system, states
position according to their power.89
Classical and contemporary writings emphasize the relationship between the need
for wealth to maintain power and the idea that power helps secure wealth. In The Twenty
Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, E.H. Carr asserts that the influence of power in the relations
among states was being neglected after World War I to the risk of peace and order in
Europe.90 Adam Smith contends in An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, that, “wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power.” However, those who gain
fortune may not succeed in gaining political power. Financial means may afford an
opportunity, but fortune does not necessarily convey automatically to a person.91 Child
contends the “profit and power ought to be jointly considered.”92 Placing them together
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results in a reinforcing and multi-causal logic that makes parsing out explanations
difficult, and perhaps unwise.
While these writings seem to be complementary and reinforcing, there are
challenges to this notion. There are examples in history of exceptions to the argument
regarding the significance of wealth and power. At the same time, throughout history, it
is often the case that the wealthiest states are the most powerful. A counter-argument that
state power is ineffective would be much more difficult to prove, especially when states
and humans continually pursue power.93
While Realists disagree on the specific measures, there seems to be a general
agreement regarding what constitutes a great power. There are three common
requirements for identifying a great power. These requirements include a sufficient sized
military to control substantial territory. Second, a military with adequate resources to
arm its forces and sustain a prolonged presence away from its borders must be available.
Also, it is necessary for there to be a strong economy. With this kind of economy, a state
can finance, innovate, and sustain itself for many years of military conflict. If any of
these fundamental elements do not exist, it is hard to claim that the specific state is a
powerful actor on the global stage.

“If we assume as the historians do that great men lead humanity to the attainment
of certain ends the greatness of Russia or of France, the balance of power in Europe, the
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diffusion of the ideas of the Revolution, general progress, or anything else then it is
impossible to explain the facts of history without introducing the conceptions of chance
and genius.”94 ~ Leo Tolstoy

Intuition:
In recent centuries, practitioners and political writers first chronicled cases about
the balance of power through vague allusions. The allusions are intuitive and do not
provide precise explanations for state relations.95 Interestingly, the concept of balance of
power developed through this intuitive discussion around cases that considered the
influence of state power relations instead of a generalized system. An evolutionary route
for ideas is critical because intuition can be the foundation of concept development that
refines through reflection and testing. Aaron Preston explains how both Locke and
Hume, “treat intuition as an immediate grasp of relations among ideas.”96
The concept focuses explicitly on how great powers influence each other and how
they sometimes organize in balance or imbalance. Not surprisingly this intuitive
development does not result in a distilled definition of these terms. Instead, the concept
is the result of agents thinking abstractly about these ideas in the context of their
environment as well as their preferences. With this subject, like others, it is helpful to
know where the intuition originates.
94
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Hume’s classic text on the balance of power makes universal claims regarding the
influence of apparent principles throughout history. Therefore, for the author, these
patterns are common sense and grasping the meaning was impossible to, “have escaped
antiquity.”97 In drawing inspiration from Thucydides, he asserts that Hiero’s relations
and arrangements with Carthage ensured his possession of Sicily. Therefore, as a result
of this executed plan, he preserved relations with Rome, thus improving balance and
safety for the interested parties. Hume argues that the balance of power can be grounded
in understandings of politics and prudence, which can successfully sustain lasting power
groupings.
Other writers who discuss the balance of power view it as an equal power
distribution that, “makes it impractical for the one to disturb the repose of the other,” says
the anonymous author of Europe’s Catechism.98 Fenelon in 1835 points to, “action by a
state to keep its neighbours from becoming too strong… beyond a certain limit changes
the general system of all the other neighbours.”99 Maintaining the relational process of
trying to preserve a balance, which involves moves to keep neighbors from getting too
strong, can relate to the security dilemma.100 Efforts to curtail the strength of another can
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often strengthen one's self, which others will seek to balance against in a dynamic
situation. At the same time, the preservation of the state is aided by the survival of the
system of states.
Eyre Crowe argues that the maintenance and pursuit of balance happen by a
state’s understanding of rivalry patterns as well as coordination among states to establish
formidable groupings of force. Therefore, this approach will check abuses among states
through the existence of an equilibrium, “by such a grouping of forces is technically
known as the balance of power.”101 As a result of this check, “no state shall be in a
position to have absolute mastery.”102 Through an analysis of additional theoretical
approaches, the understandings of the balance of power will enhance the research. This
process will aid in explaining the influence of the balance of power on the relations
among states and ultimately on international trade agreements.
The next two sections will focus on the classical and structural theories involving
the balance of power.

Classical Understanding:
The following section highlights agency-based explanations for the balance of
power. An agent is generally known as an individual. More specifically, the degree of
agency an individual possesses is a function of their ability to act in society. The
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structure is the influence of forces outside the agent that modifies their ability to act. The
differences between the points of emphasis in agent and structure contribute to
perspectives or levels of analyses within the International Relations discipline, and the
conceptualization of balance of power. These theories seek to explain phenomena by
emphasizing either the agent, the structure, or sometimes both.103
“The balance of power ‘refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is
distributed among several nations with approximate equality,’” as quoted in Hans
Morgenthau.104 The system is considered in balance if there are no major power wars,
and it is out of balance if there are major power wars.105 This point relates to Nicholas
Onuf’s observation that for Morgenthau, “operationally speaking, what must always be
calculated is power position.”106
Quincy Wright and Louise Leonard Wright explain that due to external pressures,
states must advance their power to ensure self-preservation. Because of these
considerations, states can and do ignore thoughts of law and social solidarity.107
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Therefore, peace may occur, but it would be from “incidental by-products.”108 However,
Edward Vose Gulick challenges some of the agency-based explanations. He asserts that
leaders expect the balance of power systems to continue and become complacent with the
arrangement. Instead, Gulick has an idealized image of leaders who should be alert and
maintain the order.109
Similarly, Wright talks about leaders who are pursuing stability and see the
management of the system as necessary. Therefore, leaders’ actions require “actively
willed and maintained,” postures to preserve the balance of power.110 The stability is
promoted by devices and by the degree of certainty held by states regarding their
environment and relations among states in the system. Jack S. Levy explains the great
powers are expected to balance and often do express their agency in their balancing
behavior against other great powers.111
Morgenthau maintains that “the balance of power found such a criterion, as we
have seen, in territory, population, and armaments.”

112He

explains that the balance of

power plays a role in facilitating stability in the power relations among states. However,
those relations are never stagnant and are always subject to continuous change.

113This
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those relations are never stagnant and are always subject to continuous change. 113This
change occurs in the competition and realignments of alliances.114
Morgenthau cites the history of relations among states where alliances are assured
less by agreement or bonds than instead by circumstances where states join for a time.115
Morgenthau claims that World War I and the decades before saw a shift in perceptions
from balance of power being a European conception to a global one. Also, Morgenthau
emphasizes the role of the holder of the balance. From an agency perspective, Britain
would be the arbitrator and would be independent in decision making. Therefore, under
this idea, Britain could exist inside and outside power games in continental Europe and
intervene with the weaker side.

116This

choice to join the weaker side in a conflict is an

expression of its agency to decide when to intervene. However, according to Morgenthau,
the choice to intervene and the choice of which specific side to favor is automatic.
117Morgenthau’s

explanation hints at systemic qualities that are conditioning the power

competition in Europe beyond the attributes of the individual states.
However, empirically, the balance of power competition among states exists, with
or without the presence of Great Britain. Morgenthau emphasized how Great Britain's
geography accorded its distinct relational flexibility.

118However,

this does not make the

pursuit of security or power unique. States that are near adversaries can be involved in
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balancing competition among other rival peers. As a result, it seems likely they would
seek outside influence from powers to improve their positions. Therefore, these states
engage in their own balancing choices. These conditions constrain the choices
Morgenthau outlined for the balancer and the states not engaged in balancing. Some of
the understanding behind these points may rest with Morgenthau's underlying assumption
regarding international relations; objective laws grounded in human nature show the
importance of power.
A byproduct of the balance of power arrangement, according to Stanley Hoffman,
was that it moderated aspirations and accomplishments of rulers in the past, “it restrained
violence (without curtailing wars). It provided enough flexibility to ensure a century of
global peace after the Congress of Vienna, despite drastic changes in the relative
strengths and fortunes of the main actors.”119
In order to transition toward other explanations of the balance of power and away
from agent-centered phrases like balancing, this text shifts toward structural
considerations. However, the number of conflicting explanations of balance of power
inside and outside of Realism may contest the assertion by Onuf that, “the Realist view of
world politics has the considerable virtue of consistency and simplicity.”120
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Structural Understanding:
By emphasizing the forces imposed upon agents and states, including the
International State System, the conception of structure within the balance of power
literature rounds out the understanding. Most widely known in the discipline are the
works of Kenneth Waltz, who emphasized the influence of this third image, the
international system of states, in Man, State, and War. Waltz further theorized the
structural conception of this state system in the Theory of International Politics. While
not denying the influence of agency in explaining relations among states, this section
examines the effect of the number of units that are known as great powers.121
The number of units influences a wide range of state relations, including conflict.
As this dissertation contends, the number of units also influences the occurrence of
international trade agreements. This is because many structuralists agree with the points
from Poincaré, who claims that the objects of study are unknowable.122 He argues that it
is not possible to correctly know objects due to perception and bias; consequently, we can
only infer. Therefore, what stands out are the interactions that, as a result, form the
structure, “and structure is what can be expressed by mathematical logic.”123 This line of
thinking contends that what is most significant is the relational aspects of research, “what
science gets right about the world is not its detailed ontology, but rather its structural
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features.”124
A challenge with this assumption is the difficulty in understanding structure in
isolation from assumptions about agents. Also, some of the challenges center around the
interpretation of structural perspectives and the difficulties posed by imprecise concepts,
terms, and interactions. Of course, this problem is not limited to a specific theoretical,
methodological, or ontological framework, but it is a challenge across the scientific
disciplines. Waltz points out, “structure is a useful concept if it gives clear and fixed
meaning to such vague and varying terms.”125
Therefore, the structural view of the balance of power system consists of the
influence states have on each other. The structure is broader than communicating the
actions and influence of agents, but also considers the factors that propel and constrain
actors within the state. These states seek to survive, while aware that they are imposed
upon by the influence and aims of other states. This is because “structure is not a
collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them.”126
The units perform similar roles in the system because of the need for survival and
their interaction with other states. As a result, these attributes allow for a degree of parity
among many of the characteristics of each state. Therefore, the states resemble each
other and possess “uniform” qualities where the functions of each of the states are
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similar.127 However, the, “individual unit acts for itself. From the coaction of like units
emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of them.”128 Waltz compares this
systemic order to groupings of market firms.129 He argues that when systems form, it is
not possible for a specific firm or a small grouping of firms to organize to change the
system arrangement.130 Concomitantly, as with all orders and systems, the distinction is
critically important.131
The International State System itself is unique because, as Boulding maintains,
there are general types of systems that make war or peace more likely. “The measure of
the strength of the system is the degree to which it can stand strain but, as the measure of
strain is the degree to which it can overcome strength, it is hard to get independent
measures of these characteristics.”132 Mearsheimer argues similarly, “that systemic
factors constrain aggression, especially balancing by threatening states.”133 Therefore,
power itself is a resource and a potential force when utilized. However, the unutilized
potential force molds the systemic environment where, as Boulding points out, “there are
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subtle differences between power and influence.”134
Mearsheimer is specific with what he considers the impact of power and says,
“military power is based largely on the size and strength of a state’s army and its
supporting air and naval forces.”135 He argues that states possess a latent power in the
form of economic resources. So, great powers need resources, technology, and a
population base for military forces.136 Brawley argues that there are intermediate
(procurement) and long-term (research and budgeting) economic dimensions toward
military power.137 However, Brawley concludes, “behavior of great powers is influenced
mainly by their external environment.”138
In the same way, the balance of power system is a composite of individual states
where the power relations have elements that are static while other elements are dynamic.
This is why previous authors have described the coexistence of the attributes that interact.
This is a similar idea to the coexistence of order and disorder in Bull’s Anarchical Society
or the different ideological sides for Carr.139
Waltz continues by explaining how firm decisions, “are influenced by their
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market, and how people’s behavior is molded by the offices they hold.”140 He
incorporates economic analysis of abstract units. Waltz recognizes the differences in
hierarchical arrangements between the assumptions within economics and international
relations where, “international politics is more nearly a realm in which anything goes.
International politics is structurally similar to a market economy insofar as the self-help
principle is allowed to operate in the latter.”141 The system tends to reward certain types
of behavior that conform to its fundamental rules and punish those outside those
guidelines. An agent who wants to survive would seek to learn and conform to the rules
while also possibly benefiting from those who exist outside the rules.142
Meanwhile, “the death rate among states is remarkably low.”143 However, states,
as we infer from their behavior, seem to fear death more than market firms due to the
different ramifications a demise would have. This means that incorporating exogenous
frameworks may help explain some but not all phenomena. There is perhaps nothing
fully comparable to the competitive nature states face because there may be nothing like
the death of a state in scope and magnitude. Therefore, states pursue a range of strategies
to address these different polar arrangements.
Because of balancing behavior, diverse types of systemic arrangements are
expected to form. These arrangements are organized based on the number of great
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powers that exist at a particular time.144 A great power, in a fundamental sense, is a
sovereign state which can sustain prolonged military operations well beyond its borders,
to project power and influence and not merely for defensive purposes. When one great
power prevails, it is a Unipolar system, and an arrangement with two great powers is
Bipolar. A system with three or more great powers is known as a Tripolar or Multipolar
system. As a result, different arrangements are expected to produce different systemiclevel outcomes because of the distinct influence each arrangement has on states. This
observation is like the understanding from Waltz, who argues that, “market structure is
defined by counting firms; international-political structure, by counting states.”145
Polar state relations are not expected to be harmonious regardless of the system
configuration. As a result, Sørensen suggests that, “in a bipolar system, with two leading
states signiﬁcantly more powerful than any of their competitors, these two states are
compelled to be rivals.”146 However, there are considerable differences among theorists
on determining the influence of different types of polarity. Bull makes the case that, a
simple balance of power is made up of two great powers, whereas a complex system
involves three or more great powers.147 Wright argues that, “stability will increase and
the probability of war will decrease in proportion as the number of states in the system
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increases.”148 When considering the critical role of state commitments, the authors
suggest that permanent alliances are not as stable. This is because the agreements and the
arrangements of non-parties have less ability to adjust to changing power dynamics.149
Wright contends that the durability of law in society is a critical factor and believes the
continuity of laws would enhance stability in relations.150 Therefore, this seems to
suggest that the power relations among states are more volatile than other orders,
especially those grounded in a hierarchy. Mearsheimer claims that, “power imbalances
that lead to conflict are still more likely in multipolarity than in bipolarity.”151 This is
because, within a multipolarity arrangement, the dynamic creates an environment where
miscalculation is more likely due to the state system version of inequality.152
Waltz, in particular, argues that the number of units influences the stability of the
system.153 When characterizing the types of polar arrangements Waltz views bipolar as
more stable, whereas for Morgenthau multipolar conditions are more stable.154 More
units increase the complexity of interactions. Therefore, complexity is associated with
influencing the stability of systems. However, complexity and the indicators we use to
explain complexity, including crisis, change, and disruption do not always result in
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instability. In the same sense, the absence of complexity does not necessarily mean
stability exists. Therefore, it is essential to understand the descriptive use of complexity.
It seems that at the balance of power system level, having multiple units would
shift the complexity of relations. It also seems likely that smaller shifts in power could
have a greater magnitude in changing the distribution of power. During the Cold War,
the rapprochement between the US and China was a significant event. It did not shift the
balance of power system and polarity but still was beneficial to the United States and
China. However, what would be the magnitude of a country of similar size and influence
to that of China if it were to shift in a multipolar system? Some of the answers to that
question rest both in the number of units in the system, but also in the power
concentration across those units. Discerning these differences will aid in determining if
alliance shifts influence relations or, more profoundly, alter them.
Even if simplicity exists, (often described as a Bipolar order) it is automatically
assumed to be more stable. Stability and simplicity are terms used interchangeably in
some literature. An individual can easily envision a condition where complex systems
are also stable at the macro-level while sometimes unstable at the micro-level.155 In the
same regard, simple social arrangements can be highly unstable. It is problematic to
assign the qualities of one characteristic of complexity on to behavior. This inference
may be due to the moment the conceptual explanations developed during the Cold War.
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These orders between the great powers were considered by some to be both simple,
because of the size, and stable due to the outcome. However, these understandings come
from different reference points.
Perhaps a link can be found to help understand this dynamic and determine the
influence the different types of complexity have in state relations. Research can advance
through noticing how polarities influence state policy, including the occurrence of trade
agreements. Different polar arrangements of the system may influence and therefore
limit the spectrum of choices available to states. Mearsheimer says this relationship of
polarity on state strategies exists, “the distribution of power tells us how much buckpassing is likely among the great powers.”156

Critiques:
There are theoretical and normative critiques of the balance of power concept,
which should be appropriately recognized. Some peace researchers find the study of
power akin to the study of evil. Therefore, they believe its study corrupts and obstructs
constructive steps to improve the human condition. These critiques highlight the points
from figures like Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, which infer the weak and violent
tendencies of human beings. These inferences provide the foundation for the critiques of
Classical Realism. This influence reflects Morgenthau’s assertion that alliances form not
because of norms but instead circumstances.157 Therefore, the operations and the
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relations within the balance of power are amoral.158
Interestingly, Liberals’ critiques of Classical Realism center around the influence
differences on the forces of power and norms have on global affairs. Therefore, the
debate focuses on discussing the optimal amount of power and norms that should be
employed. However, in other ways related to the assumptions under the agent and
structure debate, the grounds for criticism for Neorealism from Classical Realism could
be even more significant regarding how the world is perceived. Specifically, the different
conceptions of types of human behavior are distinct and important for the agent-based
theories. However, the differences may not be as drastic as the conceptual divide
between the degree of human influence relative to the structure.
However, what is probably even more troubling is to assert that individual human
beings do not possess the same level of influence as assumed by many Liberal theorists.
John Ruggie’s critique of Waltz centers on the employment of a structural theory of state
relations that suspends any understanding of humans.159 However, Wendt makes the case
that Neorealism is not entirely structural because of the importance of internal
measures.160 Theoretical critiques of systems-based studies claim that the complexities
and nuances of human nature and interaction are underutilized in structural research
programs. They will argue that any work that strips out these features neglects the
fundamental qualities of human beings and therefore, will fail to explain human
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interactions. Also, many Liberal theorists draw from Kant’s emphasis on the order of
states and how the composition of the states influences the relations and system of those
states.161
Some contend the pursuit or reliance on a balance of power system is unstable or
even the cause of centuries of major cataclysmic war. Boulding suggests the, “first great
fallacy is the ancient classic that peace is guaranteed by a balance of power.”162 President
Wilson argued in his Senate address that the world system must transform away from the
balance of power.163 He maintained in the address that, “the question upon which the
whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle
for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power?”164 He continued by
asserting something new must happen to move away from the terrible bloodshed of the
Great War. Some had explained that war was the result of power politics, but he
championed an alternative remedy in international agreements through the League of
Nations. Liberals and pacifists say the balance of power system is inherently unstable.
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They argue the system of states is based on competition, alliances, and imperialism that
facilitate militant sentiments. These elements make peaceful ends impossible.165
This section gave a sweeping overview of the necessary variables and concepts
that are incorporated in the next section that applies these understandings of the balance
of power to trade theory. The following section grapples with the history of global trade
activity, including agreements, and the theoretical explanations of these developments.

Trade History:
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion” Adam Smith in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations166

This section examines the history of trade as an idea and the development of the
phenomena of international trade agreements. This chapter section will emphasize the
relevant points to build around the central theme of the dissertation, while drawing from
the existing material for support. It will be organized into two areas that illuminate
economics and IPE literature concerning trade and how theory explains the phenomena of
trade agreements. Within the first section, there will be an analysis of the theory and
history of trade agreements in recent centuries, and the influence of the different balance
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of power arrangements.
As the above quote from Adam Smith illustrates, the non-directed or designed
interactions among peoples, economies, and states play a significant role in molding our
world. This text seeks to pierce through this veil of social interactions and show, through
a systems analysis, how these interactions take place through the act of international trade
agreements.
Within Oakley and Cohn, the two dominant academic textbooks for
undergraduate students in International Political Economy, both theory sections only talk
about the state as a major actor in discussing mercantilism.167 The individual or the class
system is the unit of analysis for Liberals and Marxists, and the state would be considered
a less important influence compared to mercantilists. For these theories, when
considering the interactions among states and economic behavior, Waltz's third image
disappears and state relations fade into the background.168 It seems these theories reduce
the role of state to state relations in these conceptual frames. The understanding of the
state is modified accordingly to serve a function within the different theories.
Furthermore, this is puzzling when considering the prominent role the state plays
in ordering economy and society within both of these theories. Interestingly, the study of
International Political Economy rarely gives weight to interactions among states. It is
difficult to conceive of any of these systems functioning without the existence of durable
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states, as well as the interactions within the system those states form.
Meanwhile, other theorists, most notably in the Realist schools, bring the role of
states to a more prominent position. For some of these theories, it is a question of
whether the state is either less observed or if it does not conform to theoretical
frameworks. The balance of power system is not an abstract space where events
transpire; it distinctively conditions outcomes. Also, trade within states is a different
phenomenon than trade among states. This work seeks to analyze that puzzling
difference through a series of points to penetrate the subject matter. These include the
influence of the balance of power on the formation of trade agreements.

International Political Economy History and Literature:
For over two centuries, there have been two major competing ideas regarding
the conceptualization and practice of international trade: absolute advantage and
comparative advantage. The concept of absolute advantage encourages the development
of domestic industry and the export of excess production. Within this idea, the state
correspondingly seeks to maintain a large stock of goods, capital, and money. In net, the
focus is on preserving wealth with the argument that exchange, unless it is domestic
excess, has a subtractive effect on wealth accumulation. Gilpin asserts, “economic
nationalists also believe that free trade undermines national autonomy and state control
over the economy.”169 As a result, economic nationalists argue that free trade leaves a
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state subject to the influence of the, “instabilities of the world market exploitations by
other, more powerful economies.”170 The economic nationalists suggest that
specialization of production leaves a state susceptible to the volatility of the market
forces outside the state, which results in an inherent vulnerability.171 Figures like List
and Hamilton are among the proponents of absolute advantage.
This zero-sum approach challenges the idea of comparative advantage, which
emphasizes mutual gains through interaction and trade across states. Instead of
encouraging holding onto wealth, it argues that the way to improve well-being is through
the exchange of goods, which incentivizes increased efficiency and output. In turn, this
would arguably benefit more parties than the absolute advantage approach. This
engagement with multiple parties across states means that all parties could realize
economic gains. Through this engagement, more goods are exchanged, and therefore
consumed. This is desirable to many who, regardless of state, are better off through the
extension of the respective individual and societal gains. Proponents of comparative
advantage include figures like Ricardo and Smith.
During different eras in history, the ideas of comparative advantage and
absolute advantage have each experienced cycles of favorability. This has resulted in
scenarios where states adopt mixed approaches where the concept of trade, in its
theoretical form, is neither an exclusively absolute advantage nor purely comparative
advantage.
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Some argue the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 in Great Britain was an example
of this mix. While the law draws from the ideas of comparative advantage, it applies to
specific sectors where the gains for Great Britain would be most significant. Meanwhile,
in the areas where trade would result in a greater expected domestic loss, the approach for
those sectors more closely resembled the idea of absolute advantage. This contest of
ideas and interests is what Gilpin considers when he highlights the differences between
liberals and nationalists over, “differing assumptions regarding the nature of the
international economic relations.”172
When reading through economic history, there is a definite ebb and flow between
comparative advantage and absolute advantage in the approaches to explaining and
advocating trade policy. Gilpin describes the phases of the world economy throughout
centuries that transform through military conflict. From the sixteenth century until the
end of the eighteenth century, the dominant idea was mercantilism.173 Following that
period, and the end of the Napoleonic wars, comparative advantage became the
foundation of the international market economy until World War I and World War II.
Also, as Krasner notes the global economic leader shifted in the late decades of the
nineteenth century from Britain to the United States.174 Describing the World War II era,
Eric Helleiner agrees with Gilpin’s assessment of the world war period and says it had
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the, “effect of encouraging a decisive shift away from liberal financial tradition in the
federal government.”175 Gilpin argues that after the economic chaos and trade
contraction during the global wars during the first half of the twentieth century, trade
expansion resumed during the Cold War.
Helleiner contends the movement of financial liberalization in the 1980s shifted
globally, particularly in the financial centers including Tokyo, London, and New York.176
As Helleiner argues, the liberalization of trade and liberalization of finance have an
uneven relationship.177 This unease is because of the tension in types of volatility in
capital flows, production, and politics. He points to Albert Bressand,178 who explained
how multiple “invisible hands” may work against each other.179
The 1990s and early 2000s experienced a shift in polarity from a bipolar system,
with the United States and the Soviet Union as great powers, to a unipolar world with the
United States as the sole great power. That shift also saw an acceleration in trade
agreement activity.180 Gilpin argues that this relationship is important, “my position is
that hegemons are necessary to the existence of a liberal international economy.”181
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Most recently the 2008 financial crisis, as first acutely experienced by the United
States and Europe, occurred during unipolarity. Through the late 2010s, the debate
continues that the world’s polarity could be shifting again from unipolar to another polar
configuration. A dominant academic discussion involves the possible emergence of a
bipolar order between the United States and China. This discussion connects to existing
measures of state power and expectations of future power, which lead to the conclusion
that a shift in the global order is on the near horizon.182
In looking at the topic of Economics and Balance of Power, Brawley argues the
relationship between Economic Theory and the International Relations Theory, including
the research on the balance of power, is underrepresented in the literature.183 He suggests
there is a linkage in policies when states are adopting balance of power strategies; they
may pursue different economic strategies depending on the circumstances. He asserts
that if states are engaged in external balancing, they may be more involved in trade than
if they are concerned with pursuing internal balancing. If this is the case, following
Brawley’s thinking, it could result in states pursuing more protective policies of domestic
economies.
Mansfield considers the intersection of war, polarity, and trade by suggesting
there is a nonlinear “U shaped” relationship between power concentration among states
and international trade.184 He asserts that the periods with the highest and lowest
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concentrations of global power have the most significant volume of international trade.
This is an inverse relationship compared to his argument that the highest and lowest
concentrations of power have the lowest incidence of war, which forms an “inverted U
shape.”185 Mansfield’s work is similar to this dissertation by looking at the international
power distribution influence on trade. However, he looks at the concentration of power
to correct for what he considers to be an overemphasis and debate in determining
poles.186
Those who favor an economic absolute advantage perspective, including
mercantilists as described by Barbieri and Levy, suggest that “the effect of trade on war is
small relative to that of military and diplomatic considerations.”187 Those who favor a
comparative advantage standpoint (depending on the degree of optimism) assert that
trade has spillover benefits. They argue that improved relations among states, including
the avoidance of trade war escalation, have exogenous benefits. They contend these
gains go beyond the commercial and influence broader state relations.
Perhaps the greatest empirical challenge to confront trade theory, including this
text, is the point from Barbieri and Levy, “contrary to both liberal and realist
expectations, however, there are numerous historical cases of trade between enemies
during wartime, and a preliminary quantitative study suggests that war frequently does
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little to depress the volume of trade between adversaries.”188 However, Joanne Gowa
contends, “free trade is more likely within than across political-military alliances.”189
Kindleberger places responsibility for the duration of the 1929 Depression on
British inability and the unwillingness of the United States to stabilize the world
economy. He argues they had tools available to maintain an open market, provide
countercyclical lending, and the resources to internalize financial crises from other states.
Instead, for Kindleberger, the leader of the system should be responsible for maintaining
an international public good and the power to, “pool sovereignties to limit the capacity of
separate countries to work against the general interest.”190 However, any power-sharing
arrangement between the two great powers would have been unstable and undesirable.
Therefore, under unipolarity, the state system has more ability to operate and engage in
trade than during the situations that internalize great power politics. He concludes that a
hegemon is a necessary precondition for ensuring an open market trading system.191
Krasner criticizes the tendency of IPE literature to focus on transnational activity.
He believes that emphasis is misplaced and is a detriment to fully understanding the
concept of the state. He argues the transnational approach is misleading because it does
not help understand states or the structure they operate within. Krasner asserts that a
state’s trade policies aim to maximize goals, which include wealth, stability, political
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power, and economic growth. He argues for a state the degree of trade openness interacts
with these goals. As a result, the goals can sometimes be in agreement but often are in
tension with each other. For example, he argues that large growing states would be
receptive to open trade because of the economic gains, increased political power, and
stability.
With these goals, Krasner concludes a state that is in decline may find reasons to
not trade due to lower economic gains and risks to stability. There can also be cases
where states grapple with the risks to stability in exchange for economic growth. He
explains that, for states, tension exists between trade openness and social stability.192
However, he also asserts the ability of larger states to adjust production factors make
them inclined to favor open trade. Therefore, the inherent tension between openness and
social stability is mitigated by domestic production flexibility.
In addition to considering domestic structures involved in trade, he examines the
structural elements of the international state system. Specifically, Krasner says, “a
hegemonic distribution of potential economic power is likely to result in an open trading
structure.”193 He suggests a closed trade system would be composed of a few unequally
developed large states. He explains that opening trade for these states would produce
modest gains compared to the risks of potential social instability. When considering
these state goals, Krasner explains how, when led by a hegemon, a different system
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arrangement forms.
Krasner argues the hegemon benefits economically and politically from an open
trade system as well as through fostering its existence. The gains for the hegemon of
wealth, growth, and influence would offset any risks of instability, primarily due to the
ability to adjust domestically to shifts in factor allocation. He also suggests that the gains
for smaller states are modest compared to larger states. However, the smaller states may
have fewer options other than comporting with the hegemon. For example, he explains,
“British military power was also a factor in concluding the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, for
Louis Napoleon was more concerned with cementing his relations with Britain than he
was in the economic consequences of greater openness.”194 However, he also suggests
that open trade can exist in a system of multiple small states that are also highly
developed.
Krasner’s typology of trade systems emphasizes policy choices primarily
determined by state size. However, state size often, though not always, involves a critical
component that is frequently overlooked by researchers, unless the state is a hegemon.
These approaches do not consider the continuous influence states exert on each other. On
the other hand, this dissertation argues that state power influences other states and takes
on economic and military forms. As a result, the power competition among the states
becomes a balance of power dynamic that can complement Krasner’s framework. The
distinction between a large state and a great power shows Krasner is emphasizing
economic power rather than military power. As explained at the beginning of the
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chapter, these two forms of power overlap frequently.
Krasner argues there are four primary goals for a state when it is considering
openness to trade. While less parsimonious, this concept would benefit from the
incorporation of a fifth variable that deals with security. By incorporating a state security
variable, the power competition among states gains prominence and improves
explanatory power involving the openness to trade. As a result, the state security variable
will interact with the other variables and better explain state considerations involving
trade and trade agreements. Also, Krasner examines only a few types of arrangements
among large and small powers when many more can and do exist. In Krasner’s
framework, other arrangements would create more divisive tensions within state goals
that would likely result in unpredictable outcomes.
In After Hegemony, Keohane explains how a hegemon has control over raw
materials, capital, markets, and production of high valued goods.195 He argues, “the
theory of hegemonic stability predicts that the more one such power dominates the world
political economy, the more cooperative will interstate relations be.”196 The eras of
British and American hegemony were examples of broad trade cooperation among states
on trade. Keohane explains how a close review of the 1800s, reveals that British
hegemony did not play a causal role in critical relations. As he explains, this influence is
causally weaker, including Britain’s inability from the 1870s to induce other continental
powers to engage in trade. However, Britain remained the center of trade ideas and
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finance. Even with its hegemony status contested, it would be the global leader in trade
volume relative to its economy for almost 90 years after the Corn Laws.
McKeown agrees with this challenge in defining a hegemon and determining its
influence. He considers the history of trade policy in Britain as well as America. He
argues that neither example sufficiently shows either state continuously overlaying its
policies with its economic power.197 Lake also sees distinct differences that complicate
theory development when examining these two periods of hegemony characterized as
Pax Britannica and Pax Americana.198 This is particularly important when developing a
theory around the idea of hegemony, which infrequently occurs in history. Also, as
Milner outlines, the hegemonic power does not automatically translate into significant
influence.199
Hegemonic stability is not definitive, according to Keohane. In part, this is due to
the decisions of secondary states to not defer to the hegemon. Also, Keohane brings in
the influence of military power, which is a missing component from Krasner’s article.
Keohane argues a symbiotic relationship develops between hegemony and cooperation;
however, with other polarities, a restrictive environment develops.200 He also thinks a
hegemon can develop durable institutions that resist these changes in polarity.
The significance of this dissertation is that it expands this literature to incorporate
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the prominence of state power in all of the balance of power types and the conditioning
influence it has on trade agreements. Therefore, this research scope differs with Keohane
and especially Krasner. The dissertation deemphasizes the significance of the hegemon
as a concept at the expense of considering other polar dynamics. Through cases, this
research will show how the balance of power system intervenes and often intermingles
with the conditions that facilitate trade agreements. Even though the research mentioned
above found challenges in the use of the hegemony variable due to variations in
outcomes, it is a useful concept to examine. It is helpful when reflecting on the balance
of power system to study how a hegemon operates compared to conditions that exist
under other polarities.
Many of the explanations are helpful but do not explain why a hegemon seems
significant in some cases but not in others. Instead, this research considers how the
balance of power and specifically the increase in polarity complicates state relations,
including reaching trade agreements. This influence of increases in polarity on state
relations makes it harder to sustain trade agreements due to power competition. The
record of power competition is reflected in the annals of state relations and within the
explanations employed in some International Relations theory. However, the
constraining effect polarities have on state relations may be less noticeable than the
singular actions of a hegemon. Most would agree that the hegemon can act because its
position is less contested. However, the shift from hegemony to additional poles suggests
that now this state power constrains the choices among the great powers.
Therefore, the other system types that internalize this competition for power have
a conditioning effect on all forms of state relations, including the incidence of
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international trade agreements. Kindleberger makes a similar claim and references both
political science and economic concepts of monopoly and duopoly as they operate in
economics. Like Waltz, he applies the logic of this concept of unit firms to international
political economy. Kindleberger concludes that one unit operates more freely, whereas
additional units (even allies like in his case of the U.S. and Britain) are unstable.201
Therefore, we can expect that, under different polarities of the International State
System, the arrangement will have a conditioning effect on the frequency of trade
agreements. Generally, it seems possible with the increase in the number of poles, a
corresponding decrease in trade agreements will result. This reasoning has to do with the
causal inference that different polarities have distinct outcomes involving the stability of
state relations. The indicator often used to infer systemic stability is a major war.
Outside of Unipolarity, there do not seem to be differences in the number of wars (or the
amount of suffering) between Bipolarity and other arrangements involving multiple
polarities. This has more to do with the expected costs (with or without conflict) that
firms and states face.
Firms face higher costs as they are involved in overlapping trade relations across
different types of risk that rise in complexity as the number of polarities increases. With
an increase in polarities, there are more costs to trade. This includes types of agreements,
transport costs, and different normative orders where these all compete with each other.
In most of these international cases the competition is of a zero-sum nature (unlike the
theorized market behavior) and therefore the result is costlier for states. This concept is
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similar to Waltz’s observations when he compared firm size and number in a market
place, as he studied polarity’s influence on international outcomes.202
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CHAPTER 3: COBDEN–CHEVALIER

“Those who are so fond of laughing at political economy, forget that they have a
political economy of their own; and what is it? That they will monopolise to themselves
the fruits of the industry of the great body of the community—that they allow the
productions of the spindle and the loom to go abroad to furnish them with luxuries from
the farthest corners of the world, but refuse to permit to be brought back in exchange
what would minister to the wants and comforts of the lower orders. This, in one word, is
the true reason why the mass of the people is at this time so wretchedly clothed and so
miserably fed.”203- Richard Cobden

“The story of Waterloo, indeed, is full of instances of quite neutral and normal
human contact between people who happened to be wearing different uniforms – of
British infantry lying for cover among Frenchmen wounded in the most recent attack and
asking their opinion of how the battle would end.”204 - John Keegan

The Second French Empire and Great Britain reached a consequential trade
agreement in 1860. The agreement is known for lowering tariffs on a range of goods
entering France from Britain. The following account explains the dynamic role of
compounding factors that influenced the developments that resulted in the agreement.
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Specifically, this chapter explores how economics, politics, and the balance of power
played a distinct role in influencing this early form of a trade agreement. This treaty is
significant because it serves as an example for some future agreements in subsequent
decades.
The nineteenth century, not just the twentieth, was an era of developing and
contesting ideas of economics and politics. These ideas inspired and provided
justification for the relations that took place within and outside the state. However, not
all ideas become accepted policy, especially when those policies must be mutually agreed
upon by states. This research asserts that the concept of tariff lowering trade agreements
needed to exist before a policy change would likely be possible.
This case, like the succeeding cases, explains how the concept of balance of
power is under-represented in International Political Economy literature. This research
contends that the interaction among the polarities in the balance of power plays a
significant causal role in the incidence and evolution of trade agreements. Therefore, any
explanation would be incomplete if it only focused on one of the influences that led to the
agreement. By examining the formation of this treaty, it becomes apparent that the
factors of economics, politics, and the balance of power all play consequential roles in
conditioning this trade agreement.
The 1860 commerce treaty was one of the first trade agreements of the modern
era. This agreement is about the negotiators, Cobden and Chevalier, who were seeking to
respond to the influence of industrial and agricultural change. The agreement is also
about the legacy of movements of Napoleon, Adam Smith, Malthus, and the balance of
power, which were conditioning influences on the commerce treaty.
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The factors of economics, politics, and the balance of power are necessary in
order to propel or disrupt an initiative like a trade agreement. Even though the chapter
discusses the agents involved in the development of this idea of trade agreements, the text
also considers the conditions the agents are operating within. Specifically, the chapter
explains how the factors contribute by forming the circumstances that led to the trade
agreement. This chapter examines the roles agents play in the evolution of an idea and
highlights how themes and conditions repeat as these agents respond to their
environment.

The Corn Laws:
The rejection of the Corn Laws, which restricted grain imports into Britain,
provided a useful precondition for Cobden and Chevalier’s talks. Also, as will be
explored, there is an influence from the legacy of the end of the Napoleonic Era and its
succeeding system, the Congress of Vienna. In 1815, Parliament approved a restriction
on the importation of grain into Britain. The adoption of this legislation was due to the
support of landowners, who made up a strong voting coalition in the House of Commons.
Without trade, grain prices, including the cost of corn, increased throughout Britain.
These increases in price were due to the highly restrictive clause that allowed the
importation of grain if prices were too expensive. This policy, though generally
supported at the time, was criticized by figures like Adam Smith.
In Smith’s work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,
he devotes a considerable amount of analysis on the price of corn. He viewed the
agricultural good through various levels of study. Within Smith’s writing, corn retains a
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base value due to its usefulness and the labor and capital employed in its production.205 It
was a universal economic commodity but also one that varied in price and supply. His
exploration of the variation in corn prices was an effort to examine many of the puzzles
regarding price, demand, and change that continue to draw theoretical inquiries. The
source of Smith’s curiosity with corn is unclear other than its general universal use.
However, his later appeals (as well as writings from Ricardo) to lower tariffs on corn
show this influence of intellectual curiosity and policy analysis.206
Cobden was deeply affected by these ideas and became an ardent proponent of
opening trade among states and repealing the Corn Laws. Cobden was active in the
movement through speeches and the dissemination of information. Through recently
reduced postage rates, he circulated writings that favored the abolition of the Corn Laws,
which borrowed language from the abolitionist movements against slavery.207 Cobden’s
objective was to incorporate this sentiment from the abolitionist movement to curry the
support of its members.208
In part due to Cobden’s movement, Parliament reconsidered the Corn Laws, and
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Prime Minister Peel led the repeal of the legislation in 1846.209 The movement was not
the only factor that contributed to this policy reversal. The coalition had broadened its
support among academics, manufacturers, and the public who argued that repealing the
Corn Laws would lower grain prices. As Stearns notes in this period, “approximately 70
percent of all working-class income had to be spent on food.”210 This concern was also
acute during a period of general political turbulence in the region and became inseparable
from the apprehensions about the rising number of famines in Europe and Britain. Also,
there was an expectation that this challenge would continue and become more acute for
those who were influenced by Robert Malthus.
In 1789’s, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Malthus argued that the
production of food would not keep pace with his projected population increases.211 This
environment and ideas contributed to actors seeking solutions in both France and Britain,
and this sparked a range of economic policies, including the Cobden-Chevalier trade
agreement.212 Therefore this commerce treaty was a result of the convergence of ideas,
interests, and conditions which became realized in the areas of economics, politics, and
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the balance of power. Significant conditioning events in 1815 included the beginning of
the Corn Laws in Britain, the end of Napoleon I’s reign, the beginning of the Congress of
Vienna, and the Holy Alliance formed by Austria, Russia, and Prussia.

Post Napoleon Systems:
Because the balance of power is under-considered as an influence on the
formation of trade agreements, it is beneficial to consider the history of state relations in
this period. This approach will illuminate how the relations and conditions preceding and
during the Cobden and Chevalier negotiations were significant. As this chapter will
explain, France’s leader, Napoleon III, was heavily influenced by the legacy of his uncle
Napoleon I. After the Napoleonic wars the Congress of Vienna met to organize its
conception of a new European order. Not surprisingly, the conference emphasized the
influence great powers have on each other and on smaller powers.
Specifically, the consensus among the great powers was to develop an allocation
of land and power in such a way that it facilitated balance among the states. The
readjustment throughout this century often came at the expense of smaller powers, some
of which, not surprisingly, decided to align from loose federations into states. These
efforts to balance power reduced conflict in this era. This policy also added new fissures
that contributed to the development of Prussia into Germany and the creation of Italy.
Napoleon III proclaimed, the “Empire means peace.” However, his wars can be noted by
historians for contributing to the unification of Italy and Germany. His acts influenced
the whole system of relations across Europe. As a result, what became two distinct
balance of power subsystems in Europe began to function more like a whole system.
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This system change (especially related to Italy) was occurring during Napoleon III’s
negotiations with Britain over the commerce treaty.
East and West regional subsystems guided great power relations in this era. The
Eastern European system was Russia, Prussia, and Austria and the Western European
system consisted of France, Britain, and Spain. Within the Congress of Vienna, state
relations behaved as if the ideological differences between East and West, “did not
prevent them from achieving a degree of policy coordination.”213 As Bullen notes,
“Prussia had annexed the Rhineland, Austria had gained large territories in Italy, while
long-standing French allies such as Saxony and Poland had been savagely dismembered.”
Also, Britain's navy continued its dominance unencumbered.214
This arrangement is similar to the point observed by Jervis that in, “the balance of
power, a number of restraints are evinced: no state gains dominance, wars do not become
total, unconditional surrenders are rare, the territory of losing states is not divided up
among the winners, and usually the loser is soon reintegrated into the system.”215
However, if there was a great power who lost in this new distribution, it was France who
lost allies, and the system was positioned to align against it. Therefore, part of Napoleon
I’s legacy is in this regional response and, “Europe’s need to constrain France.”216
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Though this new position was primarily the result of France’s own doing it conditioned
the environment where Napoleon III reached decisions.
Though France and Britain acted in concert with other states in the Crimean War,
the conflict loosened the Congress of Vienna system. Even with a weakened alliance
system, great power competition persisted. The end of the Congress of Vienna cleared
the way for the formation of the Crimean system. It challenged the previous collective
conception of state order that was established to address grievances through realism.
Deliberations started on the commerce treaty began on the after decades of
improving, though sometimes tenuous, relations between Britain and France. France and
Britain were allied with the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War against Russia. This
alliance was an effort to balance against Russian territorial encroachment as a system need
that also served the interests of the states. Britain was concerned that Russia would
weaken the Ottoman Empire and would be able to project influence into the Suez, which
was a principal shipping conduit from its colonies. France was seeking partners and took
on the mantel of protector of European Christians.
The Crimean War was arguably fought to preserve the balance of power system to
constrain an assertive power. As per the balance of power concepts outlined in the
Congress of Vienna, efforts were made to confront Russia. However, in so doing, other
elements became out of balance. This example shows the limitations among interacting
agents. Regardless of ability, an agent cannot know the full scope of the ramifications of
complex decisions and how those choices can reverberate in a system. Most importantly,
the conflict resulted in a split between the old partners in the Holy Alliance of Austria and
Russia. As a result, Austria was without a great power ally at a time of domestic
unraveling under the competing social movements.
79

Furthermore, as Van Evera explains, the balance of offense and defense shifted to
favor the offensive. He reasoned that changes in the period included lethal arms and rail
transport which helped the defensive. However, other developments, including mass
armies, favored the offensive. Therefore, a distinct influence came from the breakdown
of diplomacy where he argues, “Britain entered an isolationist phase that lasted into the
1870s, and Russia lost interest in maintaining the balance among the western powers. As
a result, diplomatic obstacles to continental conquest largely disappeared, giving
continental aggressors a fairly open field.”217

British and French Relations:
In the decades before the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between France and Britain,
both countries episodically, except during the Napoleonic War, sought to improve trade
relations with each other. These efforts never materialized. However, those discussions
outlined a series of issues and goods that would later constitute an agreement. Both were
seeking to return to the 1786 agreement where, “after some haggling, both the French and
British government declared their desire to abolish prohibitions and any duties levied
exclusively on Franco-British trade.”218 Dunham explains how this agreement covered
wine/spirits, textiles, pottery, iron, and glass.
The agreement emerged in an environment where some political and economic
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sectors in each state saw an opportunity. However, there were also social structures
within the states that were opposed. As a result, there were some protective provisions
for each state’s politically sensitive sectors. However, each granted the other most
favored nation status, excluding those sectors. Through this status, if a state in the future
adopts lower tariffs in a separate agreement with another state, those lowered tariffs
would be transferred to the terms of the previous tariff structure of other agreements.
For example, if France lowered its tariffs on grain from another state below that
rate offered under the agreement with Britain, this provision would apply. As a result,
they would be required under most favored nation status to lower the tariff on grain from
Britain by the new rate. However, both parties agreed to exclude existing trade
agreements that Britain had with Portugal and that France had with Spain. France had
fewer exports to Britain than Britain sent to France during the duration of the agreement.
However, the agreement was functionally short-lived.
As Dunham explains, “the commercial relations of France and England and the
whole tariff policy of France were changed radically by the wars of the French
Revolution.”219 Even though smuggling existed, Napoleon imposed restrictive trade
policies with Britain and its trade partners. The war decimated the economies and
peoples throughout the continent. It also upended relations between the treaty partners.
Landes explains that the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars brought, “destruction
and losses of manpower; political instability and a widespread social anxiety; the
decimation of the wealthier entrepreneurial groups; all manner of interruptions to trade;
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violent inflations and alterations of currency. Above all, they cut continental Europe off,
sometimes by formal restrictions, from active intercourse with Britain.”220 After the war,
Britain and France agreed to a navigation treaty in 1826. Also, by 1838 they began
discussions to address unresolved tariff rates, but they reached no deal despite years of
talks.
In 1842 France and Belgium held negotiations over a customs union, but the idea
failed without sufficient domestic support. This failure was due to the opposition in
France from the cotton sector and chambers of commerce while government, economists,
vineyards, and manufactures favored the change. After the French Revolution of 1848,
the shift in power in France moved the balance toward landowners and manufacturers.
The divisions resulted in a continuation of the existing tariff structure between Britain
and France. However, by this time, the tariff structure restricted certain goods
overlooked at the time of the 1789 negotiations. Decades later, these restrictions evolved
to have a constraining effect on the French economy. The ramifications from restrictions
on iron, coal, and machinery grew more acute over time for France. As a result, France
saw “slow progress” during the Industrial Revolution relative to its neighbors.
These relations between the states negotiating this commerce treaty also reflect
the personal experience of its leaders. In 1846, Napoleon III escaped his imprisonment at
Ham and fled to Britain, where he wrote Napoleonic Ideas about his uncle and The
Extinction of Poverty. His latter text focused on policies the government could employ to
alleviate poverty. Decades later, when he lost the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and
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revolutionaries overthrew his government, he fled to Britain. He died there three years
later.
Cobden spent years in France building relationships among political economists.
As a result, some British criticized him for understanding France better than Britain, and
some questioned his loyalty to his homeland. As this text shows his devotion to an idea
clouded his perceptions and relations in France as well as Britain.
Cobden was more famous and therefore was subsequently more frequently
recorded in history than his trade negotiating partner, Chevalier. Dunham argues this
influenced an overstatement of the role Cobden played relative to Chevalier. Say’s
academic discussions of Adam Smith exposed Chevalier to the ideas of capitalism. Say
and Chevalier merged elements of capitalism with ideal revolutionary theories to
transform society through their studies of political economy.221

Treaty Negotiations:
In 1852 Chevalier received an appointment as a member of the Conseiller d’Etat,
where he promoted tariff reforms. Chevalier first sought to reduce general tariff rates for
goods entering into France but failed to get support from the government. This failure
led him to conclude he needed to seek an alternative path on trade policy. He suggested a
measure where the Emperor could solely approve a treaty involving commerce without
needing consent from other political or economic institutions. After the proclamation of
the Second French Empire, the Senate, in a special session, conferred upon the Emperor
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the power to make commercial treaties. Under this act, a commerce treaty could have the
force of law within France without the approval of any other government body other than
the Emperor.222
This new French power would prove useful for negotiating the treaty in light of
the continued divisive politics around tariff policy in France. This French power gave the
Emperor unitary bargaining influence to negotiate with Britain. Meanwhile, Britain had a
more cohesive political and economic establishment in support of lower tariffs.
However, as will be elaborated, this unitary ability in France did not automatically clear
the way for relations with Britain. Many free trade advocates like Cobden found a future
trade agreement to be unnecessary because they had unilaterally lowered tariff rates
substantially.223 At that level, some could reason that any negotiated change would lead
to higher tariff rates than existed before. However, the different apparent negotiating
objectives between the two states did not complicate the friendship between Cobden and
Chevalier.
Six years after their meeting in 1846, the pair started correspondence including
trade. Within Cobden and Chevalier’s letter exchanges, they spoke of the intertwined
possibilities of improving political and economic relations. They both saw improved
trade relations as a panacea to address many social ills. This perspective grounded their
thinking and shaped their arguments to their respective leaders. Chevalier assumed a
simple outline of what the arrangement would entail in the earlier stages of their talks.
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He suggested, “it would not be necessary for you to give us special and exclusive
advantages, nor for us to give any to you.”224
However, after the two senior figures framed the negotiation terms, Chevalier’s
role was downgraded because of Napoleon III’s level of activity. This reassignment was
also due to the “personalized power structure,” of Napoleon III, as pointed out by Jack
Thacker.225 It is easy to see this personal influence would further mold the perceptions of
the family name in Europe. As a result, in France, the treaty would be known as the
Cobden Treaty. In part, this was also because Chevalier did not always record or
publicly assert his role.
Most importantly, this designation was because of the unpopularity of the deal
within France. Drawing this distinction was a means to be dismissive of the agreement
by emphasizing the British role. Also, Cobden stressed his role in persuading Napoleon
III to accept a trade treaty despite French economic and political pressures.
These abstract discussions started to form when Cobden met with Napoleon III
and began their informal trade deliberations in 1859. They agreed that the most effective
political mechanism for France to consider the agreement would be through the
commerce treaty. Also, Napoleon III explained to Cobden his concern with an agreement
due to the scope of opposition among sectors of the French economy and the Senate.226
Cobden had the sense, perhaps due to his ardent support for tariff reduction, that
Napoleon III had overstated his concerns. Napoleon III asked Cobden what he would do
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if he were in Napoleon III's position. Cobden said he supported a reduction in tariffs
across the board but underscored the importance of reducing tariffs on iron, which would
have the maximum effect on improving France’s economy.
This result is not surprising due to the considerable degree of changes in France’s
policy compared to Britain. In other words, there were various forms of leverage in the
deliberations. Readers can conceptually organize trade deliberations as an interaction of
both power and leverage among the interested parties. Under a realist frame, one of the
purposes of power is to exert leverage on others. However, power and leverage rarely
function in absolute terms. Empirically those with considerably more power are seldom
able to exercise their preferred degree of leverage to produce all of their desired
outcomes. At the same time, those with modest power can sometimes exert considerable
leverage in circumstances when employing power with strategic effect. Part of this is due
to the competitive relations among states but also due to the conditioning influence of
international anarchy, which makes power more desired but sometimes insufficient to
accomplish specific ends.
Leverage is a useful tool in the political negotiations in agreements, and some of
its most effective forms involve the influence of factors exogenous to the process. For
example, appeals that each state makes to economic factors and interests often carry
leverage as well as the influence of states outside the process, including the balance of
power. This approach is akin to political claims of having hands tied while negotiating
and seeking to exert leverage in the process. It is harder for a politician to claim their
hands are tied when they are known to exert influence. However, efforts toward
consolation may be more convincing when a negotiator effectively claims a factor is
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outside their hands to control. This process may require a flexible disposition when
negotiating a position. Realizing this is important because a leader who claims too
frequently their hands are tied can see their power diminish, either due to perceptions of
weakness or actual weakness in state management. Therefore, the process is multilayered
in its dimensions.
Britain was in a stronger economic position than France, which was not
experiencing the Industrial Revolution to the same degree. For example, most of
France’s iron was wood smelted, which is less efficient than coal smelted iron. Britain
also had more cohesive economic and political support for lower tariffs, as driven by the
economic and political ideas of the time. Britain’s recent robust economic growth was
associated with the repeal of the Corn Laws. As a result, that provided validation for the
proponents of this policy. However, as noted, Britain was experiencing this growth as a
result of its policies and not through trade agreements. This improved condition satisfied
the general society who saw little need for future agreements with other states. As
Bhagwati and Irwin explain, free trade proponents were concerned that, “insisting on
reciprocal tariff reductions abroad would only serve to make the task of free traders abroad
more difficult by implying that free trade was really in the British interest rather than their
own.”227 Therefore, the absence of general national interest for a commercial treaty was a

domestic challenge for Cobden.
However, it was also potential negotiating leverage, if Britain chose, so they
could appeal to the national constituency. The general disposition towards favoring
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lower tariffs could have given Cobden leverage. However, it did not because he was
philosophically grounded in a belief in unrestricted trade. Therefore, even though they
had the power, they may have had less leverage because there was less flexibility in
deviating from a specific trade policy to meet a perceived middle point with France.
Reaching a median compromise point of tariff rates would be contrary to the goals of
Cobden and his allies and therefore was a form of tying hands. This was because they
could always revert to the existing policies of low tariffs. Therefore, the British objective
was to change France’s tariff structure.
France also had a spectrum of leverage and influence it could exert on the
negotiations. Napoleon III, though imbued with considerable unique power, was still
influenced by the sentiments and interests within France. The proponents of the ideas of
free trade persuaded him. Napoleon III sensed a need to change to prevent France from
economically slipping behind others in Europe. Therefore, even though he sensed a need
to adjust, the change would be occurring on his terms. Furthermore, because of his
unitary position, of not needing outside approval, he had a better bargaining situation.
Britain also had to come to terms with Napoleon III's constraints and had to
accommodate them. Therefore, though Napoleon III’s economy was in a worse situation
(France was one third the size of Britain’s per capita industrialization),228 he had the
leverage to negotiate. In some ways, the sector Napoleon III had the greatest power over,
the approval of the treaty, gave him a different form of leverage. Britain knew they had
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to satisfy the concerns of Napoleon III and not the reservations of other French centers of
power. Not surprisingly, these dynamics played out throughout the deliberations, which
were propelled by the existence of power and the application of leverage. Therefore, in
part because of Napoleon III’s position, he had to publicly acknowledge the influence of
forces of the balance of power. Napoleon III used this approach as a form of tying hands
while he negotiated the trade agreement with Britain. At the same time, his efforts to
gain leverage from trade talks with Britain and Napoleon III’s appeals to international
issues will be analyzed.

Cobden’s conception of trade:
Free Trade! What is it? Why, breaking down the barriers that separate nations; those
barriers, behind which nestle the feelings of pride, revenge, hatred, and jealousy, which
every now and then burst their bounds, and deluge whole countries with blood; those
feelings which nourish the poison of war and conquest, which assert that without
conquest we can have no trade, which foster that lust for conquest and dominion which
sends forth your warrior chiefs to scatter devastation through other lands, and then calls
them back that they may be enthroned securely in your passions, but only to harass and
oppress you at home. 229

It is not clear if Napoleon III and Cobden shared similar idealized views of trade,
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even though both were reformers. Cobden would speak in political and economic terms
of the agreement and would discuss the residual benefits of improved relations among the
two states. However, the correspondence and the ideas of the time, as espoused by
Cobden and Chevalier, idealized the spillover benefits of adopting the trade agreement.
Napoleon III may have assumed this was a sincere belief as well as an effort for more
direct bilateral ties. On this front, Napoleon III likely expected he had distinct leverage
over the others who believed in an agreement. As will be outlined, this calculation, as
well as the conditioning influence throughout the balance of power, influenced the
components, evolution, and adoption of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty.
These complex interactions show this interplay of agency and structure as well as
how leverage and power influence the final agreement. Dunham explains how Napoleon
III favored trade with Britain with geopolitical objectives in mind. In addition, the
Emperor was seeking support for his policies in Italy and Prussia and saw a trade
agreement as a means to build that relationship with Britain.230 Napoleon III also
believed that his uncle’s overthrow was due to his opposition to Britain.231
During treaty negotiations, general agreements were reached to meet specific
tariff rates and time tables of the changes. Also, there was a strategy on the proper
ordering of formal considerations of the agreement. Napoleon III even suggested that the
Queen and he share the stage for an announcement of the commerce treaty adoption.232
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However, suddenly he switched his stated objectives and suggested a postponement of
negotiations until after Britain and France reached an alliance to address the affairs of
Italy.233 Napoleon III's consideration of Italy involved his side agreement to annex Savoy
and Nice as well as general support for Italian unification, both a net loss to Austria.
Britain’s policy and relations, both with Italian provinces as well as Austria, differed with
Napoleon III. Britain rebuffed the offer. Napoleon III’s consideration of this possible
leverage appears again during the final treaty deliberation.

Finalizing the Commerce Treaty:
Even though Napoleon III perceived there was universal support for the
commerce treaty within Great Britain, there were divisions. Some of the division was the
result of expectations of reciprocity with France, whereas others favored a general trade
policy not grounded in reciprocity at all. These sentiments became exacerbated by the
delay in information and consideration of the treaty. As the negotiations became public
knowledge, British Members of Parliament raised concerns. In part, this was due to not
being involved in the negotiations, but also the sentiment among the British was that they
were conceding more on tariff rates than the French. The negotiators, therefore, returned
to deliberations. As a result, they adjusted the time schedules of when tariff rates would
change, and which goods would be affected. Interestingly, in this case, this modification
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seemed to temper the opposition to the treaty in both states. Fortunately for the
negotiators, the act of flexibility improved the political chances of the agreement.
Dunham argues the, “attempts made to conclude another treaty, from the fall of
the First French Empire to the foundation of the Second, failed because neither the
French nor the British Government was sincerely anxious for their success and because
the French Government throughout that period lacked the power to control the
protectionist Chambers.”234 The author concludes that even if a deal had been reached
earlier it would have likely been restrictive and had little effect.
The goods that featured prominently in the discussion included linens, iron, and
coal. For example, the assessment of wine and spirits were at the respective rate
equivalent tax on domestic beverages based on alcohol content.235 In that way, the tax on
imported alcohol occurred when it entered either France or Britain but was not taxed
again on the alcohol. Thus, this created general parity for domestic and imported alcohol
for consumer prices. This was to the benefit of France’s export of wine, which was
growing in popularity in Britain. However, the French were less interested in alcohol
from Britain.
The agreement included no restrictions on coal imports or exports for either state.
According to Dunham, this created more unease during the debate in parliament than any
other issue.236 This was because Britain would be exporting most of its coal to France

234

Dunham, 101.

235

Dunham, 99.

236

Dunham, 100.

92

while France’s coal shipments to Britain were minuscule. The British feared this would
create a vulnerability in its relations with post-Napoleonic France. The agreement also
listed items for further discussion and settlement on a tariff schedule. The schedule
included Britain’s low across the board tariff and France’s lower but still average 30%
tariff, which would drop to 25% after four years. These tariff ceilings could be
negotiated later to lower levels between the parties through subsequent treaties. While
tariff rates were high for several goods, it was an agreement between the two states when
one had been elusive for decades. It also lowered tariffs on many goods and provided a
mechanism for further revision. Therefore, “it replaced the decadent system of
prohibitions that was slowly choking all desire for progress.”237 Also, the treaty would
last for ten years and could be extended year to year unless one of the parties gave twelve
months notice and withdrew.238
During the discussion, words of agreement and harmony between France and
Britain were expanded upon by figures in addition to Cobden-Chevalier. Napoleon III, in
a letter to Persigny, remarked, “this morning I saw [Prime Minister] Palmerston and
[Foreign Secretary] Russell. Both consider that it will inevitably unite indissolubly the
two peoples through the bonds of mutual prosperity.”239 However, during British
consideration of the treaty, a rumor spread about the possibility that Napoleon III
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intended to annex Nice and Savoy.240 This shifted debate in the House of Commons and
Lords as speculation mounted with the questioning of Napoleon III's aims.241 Gladstone
explains the complexity of these overlapping concerns, which were prompted by the
actions of Napoleon III.

“While we complained of her demand for Savoy and Nice, we were open to the answer
that it was the consequence of proceedings in Italy which we had with all our might
favoured and encouraged; and while we cherished warlike emotion in the country by
these complaints, we also applied the most powerful stimulus to its trading instincts and
its peaceful spirit by pushing forward persistently the arrangements for giving effect to
the commercial treaty. The complication was extraordinary, the opportunities for
criticism abundant; but it cannot be doubted that a great balance of good was gained.242

The opposition party in Britain felt constrained from prolonging division over the
commerce treaty. They did not want to slow down the issue because they did not want to
address it should they ever be in the majority. Instead, the opposition found more
significant political gains in criticizing Russell’s reform bill. These calculations make
further sense due to the distinct realignment in party philosophies and actors in Britain as
a spillover from the repeal of the Corn Laws. So, a closer examination of internal
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Parliamentary dynamics reveals a more complex set of explanations for considering
notions of power and leverage. Gladstone solidified sufficient support for his budget and
as a result, shifted focus away from Napoleon III’s policy on Italy. As Chancellor of the
Exchequer, he rose from his sickbed and gave a budget speech which included the tariff
treaty. Parliament gave him roaring support, and this response improved support for
Cobden-Chevalier in British public opinion.243
After the agreement, Chevalier included provisions in the legislation that allowed
the French government to provide loans to affected manufacturers. Even though
Chevalier favored less restrictive trade, he also advocated a more significant government
role in supporting industry and addressing public welfare. He and Napoleon III agreed
on these ideas, and as a result, these efforts helped them recover support from the sector
who loathed the commerce treaty.244 This policy was intended to facilitate the export of
goods but also was more resoundingly supported by the public than the treaty. The
industries that were most critical of the changes in tariff rules modernized their
production and experienced profitable returns. This adjustment was also favorable timing
for France due to the dearth of production in the United States during the Civil War. As
called for in the treaty, the follow-up Enquete saw further reductions in specific tariff
rates. This development came as a surprise to Cobden.245 Therefore, the agreement had
ramifications both in the policy realm but also in the policy replication realm. This
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commerce treaty resonated among other states where this policy contributed to the
opening of an international trade norm emergence.246 Perhaps as a result of the norm
changes, there were tariff reduction talks a few years later between Britain and Austria.247

The Balance of Power and Cobden-Chevalier
As referenced throughout this chapter, the negotiation of the treaty of commerce
was not isolated from the influence of great power competition. First, this section will
consider the history of this relationship and the interlocking relations within Europe that
conditioned the dynamics around and within the agreement. Second, it will examine in
the abstract how the use of the provision Most Favored Nation status relates to the
balance of power.
During the nineteenth century, the post-Napoleonic era spanned three periods that
conditioned the relations among states. The Congress of Vienna and Concert of Europe
most famously characterize eras during which the European balance of power system
functioned under a concept of balancing through alliances. This arrangement facilitated
responses to domestic revolutions. It also allowed for coordination among European
great powers in settling into a new order after the wars of Spanish Succession and
Napoleon I. This dynamic in Europe faced complications due to the shifts in alliances
that overlaid nation-states with royal lineage.
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What stands out in examining the nineteenth century is the under discussion of a
system in European order that operated approximately from 1856 to 1870. It is important
to consider the order that existed after the Crimean War and before the Franco-Prussian
War, because this is the time frame of the commerce treaty negotiations. This postCrimean War system was also grounded in alliances (and the absence of alliances) that
outlined relations, and this research argues that it interacted with the consideration of the
Cobden-Chevalier Treaty
Did Napoleon III believe Chevalier and Cobden’s arguments that trade would
solidify the political and cultural bonds between France and Britain? He may have been
persuaded enough to agree to the treaty with conditions. It could be that his efforts to
intervene or appeal to Britain for support on Italy policy was an effort to test the degree
of the links that existed between the two states. While Britain ends up favoring the
commerce treaty, they did not support efforts beyond those favored by Napoleon III.
Napoleon III designed a test to gauge British will and to determine if actions, especially
alliances, were in line with the platitudes surrounding the trade deliberations. The British
rejected Napoleon III’s alliance request. Napoleon I's nephew introduced a sense of
worry into the British system that his Italian intentions would interrupt the trade
relationship. Napoleon III did not experience any positive externalities due to trade
deliberations during Parliament’s debate. However, both matters were considered
important and potentially intertwined. British leadership worked to untangle the links in
accordance with their interests. This example provides insight into the balance of power
considerations that were prominent on both sides of the Channel.
While not taken as seriously, some opposed the agreement over concerns with the
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British coal trade with France. This argument was an example of a case that intertwined
the consideration of politics, economics, and the balance of power. These critics feared
the possibility of going to war with France because a Napoleon was its leader. Therefore,
under the treaty, they reasoned that France would receive British coal exports with no
duty. They concluded that under the treaty, Britain could be forced to provide coal to
France in a hypothetical war against Britain. Leaders in Parliament countered the
argument and said any war between the two sides would suspend trade activity and
agreements between the two. Concern about a possible war between the two sides was a
subtle underlying issue. Though this concern was not cohesive across the government, it
influenced British procurement and fortifications.
This approach is an example of how a state can have a mix of seemingly
conflicting sentiments in their policies and relations. In this case, the adoption of a
consistent policy regarding British relations with France never happened. Interestingly,
during this time, Cobden was able to persuade Napoleon III to lower travel restrictions
into France. This complex sentiment influenced the debate around iron. While the
British economy was stronger, its navy was larger, and its production of iron was more
significant, it was nevertheless behind France in the advanced armament of naval vessels.
This imbalance in armament resonated more in Britain than France. Meanwhile, Cobden
became frustrated because he saw trade activity among states as a panacea to resolve
tensions.248 Furthermore, he worried these naval tensions would spur a vicious cycle in
British and French relations and jeopardize the trade treaty.
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“Napoleon III was starting to engage on a foreign adventure. He wanted to rid Italy of
Austrian rule by use of arms. The British opposed his military measures, despite their
recent use of force in Crimea. The treaty was used to hold British neutrality, as much as
or more than to stimulate growth in France.”249 Charles Kindleberger

Kindleberger's argument that the trade talks had the intent of holding British
neutrality is problematic. This is challenging because the war with Austria began June 4,
1859, and ended with the armistice treaty on July 12, 1859. Furthermore, the
arrangement over Napoleon III’s claims on Savoy, with his secret deal with the Piedmont
in the Plombières Agreement, was in 1858. The potential discussion Napoleon III had on
trade with Britain did not begin until after the war. The earliest possible point to
influence this dynamic came with private correspondence between Cobden and Gladstone
on September 5, 1859.250 How could neutrality be maintained for a conflict that had
ceased hostilities? Furthermore, the one actor most reluctant to engage in trade talks at
this time was Napoleon III.
Also, a prolonged conflict with Austria, unlike the recent secession of hostilities,
would have knowingly exposed France to likely threats from a growing Prussia. This
systemic interaction underlies all these considerations of war and trade. Furthermore, in
this period, most free trade proponents in Britain would have been content with France
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withdrawing. This position was because, as explained above, they preferred policies
where states chose to unilaterally lower tariff rates. Because Napoleon III’s legislature
had a history of not agreeing to this, Napoleon III had no other alternative than a
commerce treaty. Britain was helping Napoleon III lower tariffs.
If he wanted to lower tariffs, that would not necessarily shift military alliance
relations with Britain. Action over low trade flows is different from interrupting high
trade flows. Marshall argued Britain was not overly exposed to any hypothetical action
by Napoleon to restrict trade. This claim from Marshall was because there are no British
exports, “which other countries need so urgently as to be willing to take them from her at
a considerably increased cost.”251 Furthermore, this case challenges the rationale of
Hegemonic stability theory. Britain was more economically powerful relative to France,
but it had few tools through economic ties to exert that power.
Instead, what was significant was that Napoleon III was seeking military
alliances. His Second Empire faced exposure to the growing strength of his neighbors
and the burden of distrust his family name carried. Therefore, Napoleon III had increased
difficulty in solidifying alliances. These diplomatic moves with Britain appear to be an
effort to resolve the challenges streaming from the absence of a great power alliance.
Instead, Napoleon III sought to use the relationship with Britain to influence the spoils of
victory over Austria and the developments in Italy. Each step of Napoleon III's wavering
support for the treaty was to test the possibility of relations with Great Britain. It was
also possibly a test of their general attitude towards him and his designs to annex Savoy
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and Nice. He was willing to gain this territory either through agreements or possibly by
force. Napoleon III tested the British sentiment in its relations toward Austria as well as
the firmness of British policy regarding Italian unification.
In early January 1860, Napoleon III was engaged in multiple diplomatic and
military paths. He seems to be exploring the limits and intentions of his neighbors while
negotiating Cobden-Chevalier. He asked for support from Britain in a conflict with
Austria over the northern Italian provinces. Britain declined Napoleon III’s offer. British
leaders rarely moved away from a position of “splendid isolationism,” and for nearly ten
decades only the crisis in Crimea sufficiently rustled leaders from this position.252
Britain’s approach to maintaining the balance of power system focused on the
preservation of the system, which in turn helped Britain’s security. They achieved this
objective through a general disposition that avoided passivity or over engagement.
Instead, British leadership evaluated state interests before determining the degree of state
engagement.
Simultaneously, Napoleon III met with the minister of Austria, Metternich,
expressing sorrow for the loss Austria faced in their recent conflict. Surprisingly, he
offered to participate in a coalition with Austria to help acquire eastern lands.253 It seems
Napoleon III was pursuing British support to attack Austria at the same time he was
offering sympathy and an alliance with Vienna. Austria did not take his offer seriously
nor did Britain. In this balance of power system where Austria and France had no
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alliances, the evolution of relations between the two is not surprising. At the same time,
they also faced limitations. Austria would have known that acquiring land to its east
would have created a permanent fissure with Russia. This would have further
exasperated the balance of power which could have drawn a response from Russia, the
Ottoman Empire, Prussia, and Britain. All these trials for Austria would be at a time of
domestic challenges and their poor recent military performance against France. As noted,
Austria would begin trade talks with Britain a few years after Cobden-Chevalier. Austria
also may have been seeking ways to improve relations with Britain. An agreement with
Austria from an economic or political perspective was a low priority for Britain. France
and Austria had few alternatives other than turning to Britain for improved relations.
This narrow list of alternatives is particularly important considering their tenuous
relations with the other great powers and each other. French ties with Britain and
Austrian relations with Britain improved. However, there were no security guarantees
through alliances.
There are additional considerations necessary in order to examine the influences
on Napoleon III's overtures to Britain. Also, British neutrality would not be sufficient for
Napoleon III’s objectives. This appears to be another example of what was known as
“Napoleon’s erratic policy.”254 Alternatively, this can be seen as an attempt by Napoleon
III not only to test either party but also to develop a ruse to undermine Austria, with the
help of Britain. Napoleon III assumed the treaty of commerce he was negotiating with
Britain afforded him with potential leverage. He believed this relationship had changed
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through this diplomatic relation that had not existed before, when hostility existed
between the two states. However, Britain’s rejection was due to France’s recent conflict
with Austria and also with an eye on the recent upset to the balance of power. If Britain
sided with Napoleon III, it would be to the net loss of Austria and, depending on the
outcome, could be a net benefit for France, as well as Russia. The rationale for the
Crimean War that had upset the Congress of Vienna system would be further undermined
by a stronger Russia and a weaker Austria, which had been of principle concern years
earlier. This deft move by Britain forestalled French action and sustained trade talks
during a complicated relationship with France.
It may be immaterial whether Napoleon III accepted the arguments made by
Cobden and Chevalier, that increased trade would improve relations. It is likely at a
minimum that he thought that they believed in lower trade restrictions. Therefore, the
negotiations were useful for his ends in annexing Savoy and Nice while also exploring
ways to engage within the balance of power system. Furthermore, trade with Britain and
Austria began after Cobden-Chevalier, which shows the spread of the trade agreement
norm. Interestingly, Britain is responsible for introducing both the norm of unilateral
tariff reduction as well as treaties of commerce. These two norms were conceptually, and
in practice, in tension with each other. The remainder of this century would be about
how these trade provisions overlapped the relations throughout Europe and the
unraveling that occurred in the following decades.
While the economic decline placed considerable political pressure on European
states to change policy, these overlapping practices, along with most favored nation
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status, proved to be politically inflexible during a time of deep economic crisis.255 This
mix of conditions led to the unraveling of agreements, including Cobden-Chevalier. This
unraveling preceded Britain's decline in relative power. While the British were
proponents of this conception of trade policy, they did not cause the replication, nor did
they control its unraveling across Europe. Britain chose to never exert sufficient leverage
in these circumstances, though it had considerable power, and it continued its policy of
unilaterally reduced tariffs. Instead, it is the interaction across the balance of power
system that facilitated trade agreements and in this case, led to their demise.
Trade treaties were more challenging to negotiate around the limits of the balance
of power. Therefore, it is not surprising that this trade language would unravel before the
formal unraveling of the balance of power system in Europe. This is due to alternative
forms of logic in the different operating principles of balance of power and trade
agreements. There is a minimal logic of expected state behavior within the balance of
power that states work in concert to curtail the rise of another state. However, from a
state perspective, a similar form of logic related to trade agreements did not exist.256
Therefore, while the two systems coexisted, they did not operate within the same logic.
Part of this is due to the absence of a trade agreement focused institution but even more
an absence of general understanding among states. This general understanding of
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practices and links involving trade never existed even though, according to theory,
Britain would have benefited from it. As Gilpin argues, “the actual or threatened cutoff
of trade, finance, or technology can be a potent means of leverage of other states. The
ability of the hegemon to exercise its power through the mechanisms of economic
interdependence contributes to its governance and management of the international
market economy.”257
Cobden-Chevalier included language adhering to the principles of most favored
nation status. This provision deserves close examination regarding how it relates to the
balance of power. When a state agrees to this arrangement, they are binding themselves
to a potential range of other state choices who also would accept these terms. Therefore,
the agreements influence the relations among those states as they focus on expected
linkages with other states. As a result, they are intertwined by this agreement to other
states while simultaneously always reacting to power relations. In short, through this
legal mechanism, states are disincentivized to increase tariff rates. This provision is not
subject to modification or the potential of withdrawal through dissatisfaction or when a
trade agreement expires. Thus, for states, there was insufficient operating logic regarding
trade agreements and no mechanism to change the Most Favored Nation status. This is
due to the binding nature of the Most Favored Nation status across states.
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Conclusion:
The negotiation and adoption of the Cobden-Chevalier treaty illustrate the
dominant influence of the balance of power in the agreement. This influence is evident in
Napoleon’s approach to the commerce treaty with Britain. He pursued the treaty while
he sought objectives that seem to create tension with that pursuit. This tension includes
his relations with individual states, including Britain. Britain’s policy evolution on trade
agreements was a test for Napoleon III. Britain also faced the challenge of shifting its
policy away from unilateral tariff reductions to a policy of trade agreements. These
exchanges relate to the mechanisms described in the introduction. The balance of power
dynamics are influencing the objectives of leaders as well as the negotiating process.
Most acutely throughout this case, we see the interaction of two states who were
considering the broader implications of their relationship and reaching a trade agreement.
Both states considered how this trade agreement would affect bilateral relations and
dynamics within the balance of power. Specifically, this reflects the policies and
relations each had with Austria. This choice was critical because Austria was in a weak
position. It lacked allies at a time when the Eastern and Western European subsystems
were collapsing into one European system with the formation of Italy and later Germany.
Also, the case outlines how the issue of France’s annexation of Savoy and Nice
influenced British consideration of the trade treaty, even though they accepted the
annexation. Britain accepted in part because it favored the final product of these
exchanges, which resulted in the formation of an Italian state. These conditions also
reflect in the mechanisms that explain the improving relations between the states as well
as an international power environment that is permissive for this trade relationship.
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This work also accounts for the agency of the actors and their understanding of
power and leverage which, when best understood, are concepts mainly outside the
influence of the negotiating agents. Napoleon learned he did not have sufficient leverage
over Britain during the trade negotiations to persuade London to agree to a military
alliance. Britain concluded the negotiations over the trade agreement were not sufficient
to leverage over France’s policy in Italy. However, bilateral agreement and disagreement
happened frequently between France and Britain during these negotiations, as factors
exogenous to tariff rates sometimes rose to prominence. This change of events has more
robust causal influence than suggesting the decisions were solely the result of agentbased dispositions like Napoleon III’s affinity for the Italian people.258
Gladstone explained this period and the agreement by focusing on the changes in
France under Napoleon III’s rule. He wonders, is it, “not by a strange irony of fortune
that the same Napoleonic rule should have conferred on France the greatest material
benefit it has ever received, and entailed on it the most ruinous reverse it has ever
suffered?”259 While many factors influenced the relations that merged into the CobdenChevalier trade agreement, it would be incomplete to consider these factors without the
inclusion of the influence of balance of power dynamics. Balance of power
considerations propelled France’s interest in the agreement as well as British concerns
during its deliberations. As this chapter explains, the balance of power did not just
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mildly condition this agreement. The logic and influence of this system left an indelible
mark on the negotiations, provisions, and debate surrounding the Cobden-Chevalier trade
agreement.
The next case examines a trade agreement reached over a century later. While the
region and agents are different when looking at MERCOSUR, the significance of the
balance of power variable is reflected in conditioning the agreement.
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CHAPTER 4: MERCOSUR

Introduction:
This chapter examines the factors that contributed to the formation of
MERCOSUR and the primary actors of the agreement, Brazil and Argentina. Behind this
work is the broader research question: Why do bilateral/multilateral trade agreements
transpire? In effect, this is a question related to a broader puzzle about the conditions and
causes of change in state relations. This is because for an event to transpire, we look to a
change in circumstances and connections to be the impetus behind the phenomena. This
research questions some of these assumptions regarding the influence of change in
affecting the social world. The project seeks to measure this change that incorporates the
influence of Economic, Political, and International State System factors to determine the
probability of reaching decisions. This section will focus on the consequences of change,
with an emphasis on the key factors that help explain the incidence of trade agreements
and the importance of the balance of power variable.
Change is a constant in world politics. The condition of a state’s political
systems, ideas, technology, relations, capabilities, interests, and its very existence are all
subject to change. It is a dynamic and fluid condition. As a result, some realists argue
that states pursue power to help secure against and manage threats to their existence by
improving domestic capabilities and seeking to balance against rivals. Ikenberry asserts
that change is a constant phenomenon revealed over the centuries and, because of its
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noncyclical tendency, it is difficult to infer patterns and develop lessons.260 Wendt
argues that change is not sufficiently covered within Neorealism to explain major events
because of the continuity of power competition due to anarchy.261 While almost all
individuals regard change as something that is part of the world, there are in fact events
that are inside or outside the realm of expectations.262
Gilpin in War and Change in World Politics explains this change in the forms of
the system, systems, and systemic.263 Therefore, if everything is changing in the world,
events on the international political stage can be categorized within one of these
groupings. He says systemic change, “involves the replacement of a declining dominant
power by a rising dominant power.”264 System change happens regularly through
ongoing interactions among states.265 On the other hand, systems change rarely occurs
because it involves the foundation of the international order.266 An example of systems
change is the adoption of the Treaties of Westphalia.
The following section considers the meaning and consequences of change. It
extends these into a framework that serves to study the influence of politics, economics,
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and the International State System on the formulation of international trade agreements.

Background on MERCOSUR:
Keohane argues that states willingly cede some element of control through
agreements in exchange for the opportunity to make relations among states more
predictable.267 A simple reading of International Relations dominant schools of thought,
Realism and Liberalism, is they both seek to grapple with explaining change and how to
manage it. Liberalism often focuses on how, through processes of state relations, the
interaction can increase certainty and gains, while Realism often focuses on risks and
costs.
In 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción, the MERCOSUR agreement
was reached between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.268 Many scholars trace
the group’s origin to 1985, which started the process of formalizing relations between
Brazil and Argentina. The trade agreement followed the trend of other common market
initiatives269 from that era. The objectives included lowered trade tariffs, and it eased the
flow of workers between member states.
It is also worth noting that this relationship among parties does not have a single
hegemon providing security and gaining militarily. Rather, MERCOSUR is more like in
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the European Union (EU), with the dominance of France and Germany, and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Russia and China.270 The economic relationships
between the members of MERCOSUR are closer to the SCO than the EU. Within the
grouping, Argentina and Brazil have played a similar role to the primary actors in the EU
in the formation of its institutional predecessors.
However, the agreement is unique in its scope in allowing for unilateral
protections of industries and products, and the agreement increases tariffs on goods that
enter from outside the group. This arrangement makes MERCOSUR a modified
common market that is conditioned by political caveats. Also, the organization is a
security subgrouping that focuses on cooperation among member states. What role did
balance of power dynamics, in addition to economic and political conditions, play in the
relations between Brazil and Argentina that led to the formation of the Mercado Común
del Sur (MERCOSUR)? This chapter hypothesizes that changes in internal (political and
economic) and external factors (balance of power) in Brazil and Argentina were the
significant conditions that led to the formation of MERCOSUR. Furthermore, it
highlights the significance of the international factors to illustrate how the absence of this
variable would render an incomplete analysis of the conditions around the formation of
MERCOSUR.
Based on theoretical and historical grounds, this chapter posits that if interstate
relations are stable, then states are more likely to trade. From this observation, stable
relations are not a cause, but instead broadly a common condition that results in the
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adoption of trade agreements. Stability in state relations is also a measurable
phenomenon as observed through the history of the balance of power. Also, work from
scholars like Boulding and Kupchan suggest that trade is not the condition for stable
relations but that stable relations facilitate trade.271 This agreement relationship seems to
be the case with MERCOSUR since tensions between the states were in decline before
the agreement. This was also facilitated by the regional influence of the long peace in
South America. Certainly, within South America, the low volume of trade between the
states could not be considered a cause of its general stability, as some trade and peace
theorists like Bearce suggest.272 In Economics and Balance of Power, Brawley argues
that these multilayered relationships among states are under-represented in the
literature.273 He suggests that there is a linkage in policies and when states are hard
balancing they may pursue different economic strategies depending on the circumstances.
He asserts that if states are engaged in external balancing, they may be more involved in
trade than if they are concerned with pursuing internal balancing, which could result in
states pursuing more policies protective of domestic economies.
Also, improvements to general security predated implementation of any trade
agreements, though there was discussion among elites about developing a common
market in South America as early as the 1950s.274 Brazil (1948), Chile (1949), Peru
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(1951), and Uruguay (1953) were early members of GATT, which was more than a
voluntary indicator of a willingness of the states to lower trade barriers. Other states
followed in membership with Argentina (1967), Columbia (1981), Venezuela (1990), and
Bolivia (1990). While not the primary focus of this work, this “seed planting” of ideas
deserves further exploration of how this and other agreements sometimes take time to
develop.275 This idea of trade was a seed that germinated among the regional states as
there were foundational changes in the balance of power system from bipolar to unipolar
that occurred before the adoption of the agreement.
In effect, the following sections look at three factors and the respective changes
within security (including politics), economy, and the international state system. Next, a
review of existing literature will help position this work in the proper context.

MERCOSUR Literature:
Economic matters are the most prominent factor considered by most scholars
when examining MERCOSUR. A minority of the academic literature examines the issue
from security and political perspectives. However, there is a profound absence in the
academic literature when it comes to considering the influence of the balance of power on
the incidence of trade agreements. This may be due to the focus within academic
disciplines toward identifying explanatory conditions and influences. This approach is
not a criticism of each of these pieces that constitute the whole. It is necessary to know
each of the factors that will be displayed to enhance the explanatory power of the
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research and to develop this interdisciplinary theory further. Observing each of these
factors (political, economic, and balance of power) aid in viewing the whole. In the
interdisciplinary study of IPE there is no “or” qualifier between “I” “P” “E” but instead
some “and” where the theories and methods in the respective disciplines are incorporated
into the conceptualization and explanation of research. However, doing so invites
challenge regarding internal consistency, as addressed in the first chapter of this
dissertation. Therefore, what is presented may require a sacrifice in factor parsimony to
observe how no explanation sufficiently describes how trade agreements happen.
However, the inclusion of the balance of power variable in this case will illustrate how its
absence results in an incomplete explanation related to the evolution and incidence of
international trade agreements, including, MERCOSUR.
Gardini traces MERCOSUR back to the bilateral relations between Argentina and
Brazil and believes examining the common shared attributes of each state explains the
cooperative relationship between the two, which is mainly due to democratic systems.276
Coutto asserts, “the settlement of the Itaipú-Corpus controversy paved the way for an
alternative approach to bilateral relations.”277 Gardini also appropriately considers Brazil
and Argentina as the dominant actors in the creation and maintenance of MERCOSUR.
This argument justifies considering the prominent role played by these two actors in the
formation of this common market. As Wise points out, “Argentina and Brazil represent
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more than 95 percent of MERCOSUR’s combined GDP.”278 On the other hand, Tulchin
and Espach disagree and point to the relative dominance of Brazil’s economy during the
development and duration of MERCOSUR.279 Some could question the Tulchin and
Espach assumption, because of the role a state the size of Argentina can play in
consensus building with neighbors. Argentina’s involvement facilitated the inclusion of
Paraguay and Uruguay, who may not have joined MERCOSUR if Argentina had not been
involved.280 This follows a pattern of bandwagoning, as described by Mearsheimer and
other realists, but within the economic realm.281
An examination of the history of Argentina and Brazil reveals two prominent
cycles, economic and military, that overlay and interact throughout their respective
national histories. While some would appropriately assert that other factors like politics
are prominent, historically the military in Brazil and Argentina has been the domestic
political force. In many circumstances, the military intervenes in times of domestic
turmoil. This power to intervene is akin to Schelling’s concepts of the power to hurt,
intervene, and compel.282 When an element is more powerful than others within a
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society, it exerts positive and negative influence. A coup or even the threat of one was
not distant from the minds of civilian leaders within states where the most influential,
stable, resourced, and sometimes popular institution is the military. This influence
reveals itself more clearly when looking at each state's history and the prominent role the
military has played in each state.
Thomas Schelling also makes the point that, during a military conflict, deterrence
and compulsion are hard to tell apart.283 The military has played a dominant role in the
strength and weakness of Brazil and Argentina. While Schelling was looking primarily at
military strength dealing with external threats, the militaries of Brazil and Argentina
applied this concept in a domestic political fashion. As Resende-Santos points out, “the
Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement is puzzling also because it occurred under conditionssuch as military rule-that are usually assumed to militate against international peace and
cooperation. It occurred during a time when military regimes engaged in state terror at
home and aggressive nationalism in foreign policy.”284 David Mares points to a violent
contemporary history, just short of war within Latin America, that has the potential to
escalate because the most powerful political elements within Latin America are the
respective militaries. Therefore, he asserts states employ the military both domestically
and internationally in shows of force that usually end diplomatically.285
A brutal example of indirect influence between the two states was the Argentine
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security forces during the Desaparecidos incident, where an estimated 20,000 or more
persons were taken from their homes from 1976-1983; their whereabouts remain
unknown. The Argentine actors learned from observing the Brazilian experience of
political repression. However, during this time, Brazil and Argentina were able to
cooperate on nuclear research and the resolution of border disputes.
More recently, the relations between Argentina and Brazil have advanced to allow
for an expansion of relations between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of
Nations (ACN). These ties have progressed to allow for greater coordination on
economic and noneconomic issues. Points from UNASUR members pledge to promote
economic development, industrial and financial integration, trade cooperation, and
communication.286 Mares helps point out the noneconomic elements that will make up
the relationship within the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).287 These are
related to closer security cooperation, short of an alliance structure. However, these
relationships are outside the dynamics of the Organization of American States (OAS) and
specifically the United States.
Authors like Gilbert Le Gras288 are optimistic about the commercial opportunities
from the union of the two trade groups. Nevertheless, his enthusiasm for a regional
common currency in 2002 would likely be tempered by the Greek debt crisis and related
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challenges experienced in the EU. Adam Zaretsky echoes this thinking while asserting a
unified currency within MERCOSUR would help, “bring further economic stability to the
region.”289 Tying the fates of the various states too closely together, as would happen
with a common currency, would certainly be a risky proposition given the contemporary
and distant history of debt crises. It is no surprise that the economic integration process
for this region has been incremental and intentional. Others, including The Economist,
have been critical, pointing out MERCOSUR, "has not evolved into the seamless single
market its founders dreamed of."290
Also, within Brazil and Argentina, since the middle of the 1980s, there has been a
transition to democratic institutions. This democratization trend reverberated throughout
this period, as the power center moved from military to civilian leadership. This was due,
in part, to the shortcomings of the military government as well as the civilian reforms
within the military organizations. Those reforms fostered internal political competition
within the military, instead of a focus on external civilian politics. Larry Diamond agrees
and provides an outline of a series of steps necessary to transfer from military to civilian
power, including control of mass communication, business, and surveillance. He also
believes it is important for the evolution to go in the direction where power transitions,
reduced military budgets, and military training and advancement focus on organizational
growth and not political goals. Diamond illustrates how each state is not a perfect image
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of democracy, with Argentina’s diminished level of civil liberties and the corruption in
Brazil.291 Using the ideal image of what a system should be is not just for criticism, but
using the ideal serves as an indicator of the position and direction of reforms.
In 1985, members of the Organization of American States affirmed and amended
the protocol to declare that democracy was fundamental for peace and stability in the
region.292 Argentina and Brazil ratified the agreement in 1988.293 Further, this supports
the earlier assertion that not only does joining multiple outside organizations allow Brazil
and Argentina flexibility within the institutions, but also a stronger position relative to
potential military rivals who would have to consider external costs to intervene. Peter
Smith points out, “Mercosur provides civilian democrats throughout the subregion with
regular opportunities for consultation and mutual support, thus offsetting the longestablished conclaves for chieftains of the armed forces.”294 He describes the decision by
civilian leaders in the 1990s to not challenge the military on issues related to human
rights abuses. He concludes, “a long agenda for reform of civil-military relations
remains.” This influence of institutions reflects the work of Félix Martín, who shows
how common bonds within the military aided the region's stability.295 However, these
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bonds did not seem to facilitate any direct commercial relationship between states until
more recent times, with the advent of more democratized systems within Latin America.
Therefore, the common institutional bonds helped temper conflict but did not facilitate
commercial interaction among the Latin American states.
Conventional logic would argue that agreements among states come at the cost of
states and their pursuit of absolute security and autonomy. However, for some actors in a
state, the greatest challenges to security and autonomy are not from external sources but
are more internal. Therefore, appealing to outside institutions and general norms (global
and those accepted locally) can provide a mechanism for the political elements of a state
to challenge the legitimacy of the military elements. If applying the Mares example of
the military providing internal security, external security, and the mechanism for
diplomatic negotiations, some political actors within a state may seek to wrestle this
influence away from the military.296 This is accomplished through direct state
coordination as well as through institutions that in time develop new practices to help
attain policy objectives.
When considering Latin America, there are differing characterizations from
scholars inside and outside the region. Keohane does not consider South America a
regional subsystem in the global system.297 However, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver
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assert that for South America the security concerns are “mostly regional.”298 These
differences in characterization are not uncommon for those who engage with the region.
George Kennan’s assessment that Latin America needs the United States more than the
U.S. needs Latin America does not seem to resonate.299 The behavior through much of
Argentina's history and some of Brazilian history shows cooperation with the U.S. was
infrequent. Part of the impetus behind the Andean and MERCOSUR agreements was to
counter the Free Trade of the Americas initiative, of which the U.S. would have been a
member.
In a U.S. State Department report in 1950, Kennan, who was known for not
parsing words, quoted John Quincy Adams, who had described Latin America as an,
“Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, is stamped upon their education, upon their
habits, and upon all their institutions.”300 Furthermore, a review of the literature seems to
show a perception within Latin America that the rest of the world considers the region an
afterthought and rarely at the forefront. Western writers’ simplification and bias of
persons and places in the former colonial world has been noted by Said and others as a
means of reinforcing power structures, thereby erasing identity and, as a result, creating
normative and epistemic problems.301
A broader examination of Miguel Centeno’s work, Blood and Debt, indicates that
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each part of these economic and domestic violence cycles helps define the continent.302
Like Enrique Arias and Daniel Goldstein, the view is that these problems are
structural.303 At the same time, Centeno, along with Arias and Goldstein, have
highlighted times when violence was most prevalent, and they have observed times of
change in economic systems. These incidents indicate when conditions may be
somewhat malleable, but not easy to alter. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder disagree
with this assumption. They assert, in the short run, a change in systems may create or
make internal and external violence harder to control. In fact, since the process of
democratization began domestic violence has not declined.304 Perhaps Todd Landman
makes the best point that under democratization, state violence has declined throughout
the region, while criminal violence increased.305 For many of these states, including
Brazil and Argentina, incomplete data makes it difficult to reach a conclusive
determination of causality when viewing issues involving internal violence, economic
growth, military strength, and state capacity.
Centeno, Arias, and Mares all point to the military as the great organizing and
socializing force within Latin American history. Arias describes the military as a
component of a vicious cycle within a violent pluralism that is pervasive throughout all
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elements of Latin American society. 306 Arias stresses that it functions like a language
that has rules and shared understanding. Mares says, “The militarization of disputes is
part of a strategy of inter-state bargaining.”307
Charles Tilly asserts that “War made the state, and the state made war” and
similarly, Centeno emphasizes the molding force of the state whereby, “armies make
citizens and nations.”308 Centeno’s focus on the interaction of military and economic
factors provides a guidepost for the remainder of the chapter, which emphasizes both
elements. Gianluca Gardini asserts the history between Brazil and Argentina, before the
beginning of bilateral relations, was a mixture of competition, conflict, and
cooperation.309 It seems likely the ideas of Locke, Hobbes, and Kant will interact
between Argentina and Brazil, as well as their relations within the region, through
MERCOSUR, UNASUR, or some other institution. Next, a framework will examine
how these factors (balance of power, political, and economic) interact to explain more
fully the relationship between Brazil and Argentina.
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Framework:
Employing a framework will assist in answering the hypothesis regarding the
factors behind the formation of MERCOSUR. The framework will facilitate
comprehension of each of the factors and illustrate why the balance of power factor
played a significant, but not solitary, role in the formation of MERCOSUR. Again, to
only consider a single factor would result in sacrificing the influence of the interaction of
the parts that more closely resembles complex, real-world events. By formalizing this
practice, the factors illustrate more clearly the political, economic, and balance of power
influences.
Broadly, what this chapter hopes to address is the misplaced overemphasis within
the discipline of International Political Economy on institutions and the liberal definition
of interdependence. This excess emphasis sacrifices an understanding of interactions and
interests that construct these temporal bonds that manifest in the balance of power
system. When examining a deal like MERCOSUR, the institution’s formation is not as
significant as the transactions that conditioned its formation. Also, those who want to
quantify the transactions miss the point of the underlying influence of these transactions.
To aid in understanding these relationships, inferences are drawn from the ideational
concepts democracy, interdependence, and influence that are no less present but are
understandably difficult to quantify. For purposes of this project, ideational change in
this period is occurring along with the physical shifts within the conditioning forces that
inform the relations between Brazil and Argentina. In addition to these variables the
work shows how the neglected influence of the balance of power helps to more
completely explain the formation of this trade agreement.

125

To operationalize these points, the variables will help to encapsulate the key
factors of the balance of power, politics, and economics. The author understands the
limitations of quantifying some behavior when the available data is not perfectly
explanatory. However, despite the difficulty of measuring intermittently available data,
numbers are extrapolated from what is known. Nevertheless, in these factors, there are
distinct quantifiable changes. Therefore, a general picture forms. However, as Bartels
warns, this framework seeks explanation while not forcing data and inference into a
Procrustean bed310 of fixed assumptions. This approach considers multiple factors that
lead to the event of the trade agreement.
As a result, this framework is likely unsatisfying for those who seek a broad
understanding of subjects outside the confines of examining these factors. Those who
prefer parsimonious models may be unsatisfied with the vagaries related to drawing
inference from these social interactions. However, this framework more accurately
reflects the rigidity and opaqueness of the social world, where the force of the structure is
not always easy to see, and the intentions of individuals are not easy to understand.
Therefore, the following framework helps capture distinct data points of conditions
leading up to and after the time frame the states negotiated MERCOSUR.

Economic Factors:
When examining economic behavior, a few variables will be considered,
including trade flows between Argentina and Brazil. The benefit of this measure is that it
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shows the exchanges between the two states and allows for crossing the paradigm of
inside–out or outside–in, to assist in considering both perspectives and how each interacts
within the trade mechanism. As members of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
Argentina and Brazil, like the rest of the region, agree to a lowered international tariff
system. Like other areas of governance where institutions and norms exist, the behavior
may not strictly adhere to expected norms. However, as this chapter will explain, the
behavior closely resembles the goals of the actors involved in the system. This measure
is similar to David Ricardo’s thinking that states make comparative gains through trade
by focusing on specialization and efficiency.311 Argentina derives more economic benefit
from the relationship as a share of total trade compared to its neighbor, Brazil, which has
rapidly expanded into the global market. This increase in trade share reflects both the
recent shifts and expectations for this trade relationship to continue in similar form.
The interest rate for each state is more of an internal measure, but it reflects on
state and economic stability. These are critical elements for a prolonged exchange of
goods. If the conditions within a state are in flux, commerce is more expensive, which
may shift trade to another customer in another state. This indicator of state stability may
also reflect on the general health of internal economic and political systems. High
interest rates are often a result of high government spending that cannot be sustained by
expected future economic growth and revenue. High interest rates may also reflect
greater volatility that is expected to be internalized by a state’s economy. These rates
impose costs on borrowing and production. Therefore, it reflects a general risk profile of
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a national economy that can dissuade both investment and trade.
As a result, there is generally a negative relationship between high interest rates
and economic activity, including trade. Therefore, this inside–out measure has a
significant influence on how others decide to exchange in the international marketplace.
Among the economic factors there is a decrease in interest rates for Brazil and Argentina,
as well as an increase in trade volume. This shift in phenomena is important in
understanding the factors within to explain the occurrence of MERCOSUR. It also
illustrates the interaction of the political/security measures, as well as the influence of the
balance of power.
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The measure of interest rates also reflects upon the state’s ability to tax and
dissuade illicit behavior within the domestic economic system. (Figure: Brazil and
Argentina Interest Rates) As Hernando De Soto points out, “since the government
persists in its efforts to obtain more revenue, it increases the taxes levied on formal
activity and creates a vicious circle: increased informality,” in the economy.312 An
inability to service a national debt can be the result of weak revenue collection policies
which are often considered necessary for a viable state. As with the above variable, both
absolute value and the rate of change will be considered. Recent work from Arnaud
Costinot and Dave Donaldson313 re-examines Ricardo’s thinking on comparative
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advantage and finds state factors have the greatest explanatory power. Therefore, in
order to fully understand agreements like MERCOSUR and Ricardo’s concept, the
balance of power system, Economic, and Political factors must be examined to see where
they most influence the incidence of this agreement.

Security/Political Factors:
When examining the security parameters, two elements will be measured to
consider the depth of the relations between these two states. First, it should be
considered why in this model political elements are overlayed with security. As the
literature highlights for both Argentina and Brazil, security forces have played a
formative role in creating or pushing government policy. In addition, the variable
incorporates significant forces for stability and instability relative to the domestic
situation and military elites' position. This assumption should be taken into account
when examining the factors, while considering where the dividing point is between the
political and security elements. Perhaps the perspective that history can provide will give
clarity to this point. This chapter does not assume that change never happens, only that it
is difficult. To measure the strength of the military in Brazil and Argentina, we can
measure a similar shift from the number of military personnel size to that of the total
civilian population.314 (Figure: Brazil and Argentina Population) The authors contend
this change in state capacity and the influence of the military is what is transforming in an
age of democratization within Latin America.
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Also, within the security measure is an examination of speeches and statements
made by each state’s leadership as it relates to the other state. These exchanges are made
within the bilateral relationship, within MERCOSUR, or some other venue. Quantifying
words is more difficult than goods or finances. Also, adding value to certain words over
other words incorporates additional biases. As the framework will display, the weight of
the words will still change as the relations do, because it will reflect the intensity and
therefore the durability of the relationship. Similar methods were employed by
Kaltenthaler and Mora315 when they examine MERCOSUR in the previous decade,
applying similar methodology aids in comparison of outcomes. An analysis of the ties
between the two states shows a relationship short of an alliance. Argentina and Brazil are
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open with doctrine, strategy, collaboration, procurement, and even coordinate votes in the
UN Security Council when one has a seat.
When Argentina’s former President Kirchner died, there were three declared days
of mourning in Brazil, in addition to continued support within Brazil for Argentina’s
claim on the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Also, during the beginning of the advancement
of improved relations between Brazil and Argentina, each withdrew military forces and
fortifications from borders. Unilateral signals of intentions evolved into bilateral trust.
However, perhaps because there is little conflict within the region, there is also no
formalized security treaty between Argentina and Brazil. Treaties both influence
relations and reflect perceptions. Still, in the 1980s, a measurable shift occurred, where
the perceptions among the states were less unfavorable. Similarly, in the middle of the
1980s, there was a noticeable shift in the number of military personnel as a share of the
total population.
As noted in the opening, the democracy clause within MERCOSUR that allows
for members to exclude states who are considered to be undemocratic can be a source of
strength for civilian leaders. Recently, changes in membership include the suspension of
Venezuela in 2016. However, as reported, the “suspension will not affect trade and
migration policies.”316 While the suspension of membership is an example of external
pressure acting against a state, the reverse can also happen. These provisions enhance the
domestic political bargaining position of civilian leaders relative to the military. Military
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officers would have to consider the costs of not being in the trade area in addition to other
burdens inherited under the responsibilities of governing from a coup or similar
scenarios.

Balance of Power Dynamics:
Furthermore, the chapter contributes to the literature by incorporating Waltz’s
concept of the third image, the International State System and emphasis on the
importance of the balance of power system.317 Often, trade agreements are examined by
looking inside out, which enriches our understanding of the dynamics within the state that
propel an agreement. Also, bilateral and multilateral factors are considered, but it is
essential to measure the influence of the balance of power system on trade agreements.
As is commonly known, trade volume and agreements have greatly expanded throughout
the international economic world in recent decades. As the following graph shows, there
has been a significant increase in the number of trade agreements in the Post-Cold War
era. Between 1990 and 2014 there have been about ten agreements annually, whereas
between 1960-1989 there were 0.5 average agreements annually. Therefore, this research
argues that the balance of power system and the influence of polarities imposes itself on
the incidence of trade agreements.
The trade literature has focused on trade volume, while a dataset comparing the
occurrences of trade agreements linked to global inflation rates is incorporated into this
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research framework.318 The finding includes a measure of the correlation of world
inflation rates, and the frequency of trade agreements is -0.589 throughout 30 years. This
system-level influence is a statistically significant factor. This is possible because low
inflation may encourage trade due to less uncertainty from the possibility of inflation
imposing additional unknown costs on contractual agreements. Economists like Elhanan
Helpman and Assaf Razin seek to account for uncertainty by broadly theorizing its effect
without identifying specific forces that influence uncertainty.319
Nevertheless, uncertainty, regardless of source, is generally considered to be a
subtractive force in relations and productivity. This loss is due in part to risk aversion, as
explained by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.320 Therefore, this dissertation claims
that risk aversion among economic and political actors, seems to become systematized
internationally. Risk increases throughout the international state system as the number of
polarities increases, which has a negative effect on trade activity, including trade
agreements.
Also, low inflation can be considered a statement of international order (or at least
less disorder) in the international system, which would stabilize prices and foster an
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environment for trade. At the same time, Philip Lane321 debates the interaction of trade
and inflation. (Figure: Polarity and Trade Agreements)
Polarity and Trade Agreements

Also, the United States is frequently mentioned in the literature as an exogenous
factor that has contributed to the states coordinating more closely on trade issues. Since
the 1990s, the United States has made overtures to South America to develop a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). While the United States has trade agreements with
Mexico, Central America, Columbia, Chile, and Peru, the remaining states, including
Brazil and Argentina, remain reluctant to enter into trade relations with the US. In effect,
this opposition provides grounds for coordination between the existing states that have, as
previously illustrated, complicated relations with the United States. These unit-level
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reasons for coordinating exclusionary practices of a hegemon are an interesting way to
accept the established order while pushing back against the one guaranteeing the order.322
Narizny argues that powers distinguish strategic economic policymaking between the
core and the periphery of interests. 323 These interests have the effect of influencing the
formulation and internal momentum within Latin America and the perspective of external
power forces and the tendency to focus infrequently on the continental space south of
North America.

Intersection:
This framework shows the intersection of the security/political, economic, and
balance of power influences. For example, in 1991, world inflation rates were nine
percent and facilitated some trade agreements early in the decade. This, in addition to the
shift in global polarity, molded the trade environment. If inflation rates had been much
higher, there would have been a lower likelihood of a trade agreement forming.
Also, the chart shows changes to economic conditions related to increased trade,
lower interest rates, and lower global inflation, which facilitated the establishment of
MERCOSUR. Within this trade agreement, these changes are modeled from the
perspective of the leading states, Argentina and Brazil.
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Conclusion:
This analysis does not intend to limit the influence of other endogenous and
exogenous factors that may contribute, but does contend these are the principal variables
that influence the trade relationship between Brazil and Argentina. It is proper to
consider security, the balance of power system, and economic issues on a coequal
epistemic plane. While they are inherently different, the elements are often intertwined
and influence one another.
When revisiting the balance of power mechanisms, as discussed in the
introduction of the dissertation, this case reflects these favorable indicators. The choice
to adopt this agreement is at least in part due to the reaction to changes in the global
market and the expansion of trade agreements. This adoption of an agreement was an
effort to apply the trade agreement norm toward efforts to continue restrictive practices
involving trade activity. Also, this agreement was aided by the distinct shift in relations
between Argentina and Brazil which is an important facilitating condition. However,
even though there is lower enmity among the states, the provisions of the agreement seek
to favor specific industries and their position domestically and regionally as part of
mechanism three. Also, the states involved displayed an awareness of international
power competition, market competition, and domestic interests when negotiating the
agreement. As a result, they favor conditions that protect domestic sectors while
embracing this form of international agreement. This effort to grapple with the
coexistence of these three forces shows why it took nearly three decades for
MERCOSUR and the EU to reach a trade agreement.
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There are further questions in need of examination. Are there epistemological and
theory-related problems within International Political Economy literature that preclude
frameworks of this type due to the differing disciplinary assumptions regarding human
nature? Thus, while there are clear examples of interaction between the areas, there is not
a cohesive theory within IPE. Within all of these acts, there is a theoretical, but not
behavioral, contradiction. Leaders sometimes say and do things that are not theoretically
coherent but are no less politically shrewd. It seems this practice is a puzzle to political
scientists when political actors are more comfortable with contradictions.
This research sought to give equal weight to economic and security/political
factors, as well as to incorporate the influence of the balance of power through a
framework. While the analysis and measures point to a favorable relationship between
the parts, in order to be certain this model is useful, more examples are needed. Also, the
focus will need to be on historic and contemporary events (and a non-event) to determine
the influences to help answer the overreaching question. Future rigorous quantitative
methods will be needed to measure the response to types of change that can be organized
with Computable General Equilibrium models.324
Unfortunately, there are also limitations from available data regarding the
relations between Argentina and Brazil, as well as internal activity that complicates the
distinction of when the states each reached a position where they would be more inclined
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to trade with one another. For example, GDP data from both states shows the conditions
when MERCOSUR was adopted. However, due to incomplete data, it is difficult to
measure previous decades, in order to understand the earlier conditions. Therefore, for
measurement purposes, the degree of shift is not known, although the shift did happen. A
review of other trade agreements of this nature will aid in research similar to this
dissertation.
The next chapter examines the energy relationship between Russia and China.
This relationship comprises the 2014 natural gas agreement between the two states during
a period of unipolarity.
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CHAPTER 5: RUSSIA AND CHINA ENERGY RELATIONSHIP

“Changes in relative power, which ultimately derive from long-run variations in
economic growth, are a mainspring of international political conflict. Economic change
redistributes relative power over time, creating a natural tendency for divergences to
emerge between power and privilege in world politics, which encourages rising states to
challenge the status quo.” 325 Jonathan Kirshner

Introduction:
On May 20, 2014, the international press, including the New York Times,
announced that a natural gas deal between Russia and China had failed to materialize.
The report said, “commercial concerns continued to dominate—specifically, the price of
the gas, which China and Russia have been haggling over for nearly a decade.”326 The
outlook changed on the next day, when both states agreed to a $400 billion, thirty-year,
natural gas deal. According to the reported terms, Russia agreed to provide China with
38 billion cubic meters of gas annually at a price of about $350 per thousand cubic
meters.
The press exchange is just one illustration of the complexities of the energy
relationship between Russia and China. This chapter explores the nuances of the China
and Russia trade agreement involving natural gas. To elucidate this energy relationship a
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research perspective will be employed to consider the intersection of economic, political,
and balance of power system perspectives. Examining through each of these lenses
allows for research to highlight how the absence of the balance of power factor makes the
analysis incomplete. This process will reveal that intersecting factors influenced this
trade agreement. When examining the recent energy relationship between Russia and
China, what economic, political, and balance of power factors contributed to the 2014
natural gas deal?
In November 2014, Russian and Chinese stakeholders signed an additional nonbinding accord during a time when petroleum and natural gas prices were low. The
parties also agreed the natural gas would be purchased in Chinese Renminbi. This
arrangement is particularly important because, it is believed that the terms of the
agreement assess the value of the Russian natural gas relative to global petroleum prices.
The gas will flow from Siberian natural gas fields across the eastern route, as agreed to
from the previous terms, and along the western route under the new accord. The pipeline,
which is expected to take years to complete, will only take longer with the delays that
seem likely because of lower revenue for Russia. With lower natural gas prices, Russia
may be less motivated, while China may be even more motivated to buy natural gas.
This circumstance will possibly accelerate China’s relative shift from petroleum to
natural gas, which in the long-run may make China still dependent on Russia. Also, the
price is likely to influence how China decides to develop its shale reserves, which may
have a more lasting influence in the Russia–China energy relationship.
Historically and more recently, Russia and China were involved in other
significant energy exchanges, including petroleum, coal, and hydroelectric. The nature of
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the agreement involves a prolonged commitment between the two sides. Therefore, it
will be useful to develop an understanding of the context of the energy relationship,
which is imperative to contextualize the dynamics to determine its origins and durability.
Also, to understand why this agreement occurred it will be necessary to consider the
influence of the balance of power system. For example, many analysts have pointed to
the EU–US sanctions on Russia in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea as part
of the impetus for the agreement.
In addition to these changed conditions that resulted in the agreement, the gas sold
to China will have lower transport costs than to other sites because of its source in
Siberia. The means of transport also creates another layer of complexities, as routes pass
through the territory of disaffected peoples. These peoples include the Uighurs, as well
as the intersections of other politically contested territories in the Pacific. As this
dissertation will continue to theoretically develop, measure, and illustrate, the domestic
political conditions and constraints played a role in influencing decision makers in Russia
and China.
The prices in the energy market may also slow China’s interest in developing
extraction capabilities, if doing so is less financially viable. It would be useful to
understand the forces behind the agreement. Doing so will help determine what direction
it will follow and to weigh the costs and benefits of self-sufficiency versus efficiency for
China. If China picks efficiency, it will help illuminate the level of trust between the two
states. Also, under these lower prices, it will be important to consider how Russia will
act, since sanctions have already proven costly. States can respond in a multitude of
ways depending on conditions, but resources can often constrain some, but not all of
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those options.
These considerations of change influencing other changes in markets and political
relations are all second and third-degree calculations that are subject to error. Therefore,
the time horizon of these changes covered in this chapter is limited. No doubt, Russian
and Chinese leaders will be thinking along similar lines, in part due to the temporal
element of the arrangement. As with most long-term projections, large variations in
outcomes are possible for Russia and China. These developments will be occurring as
they develop intertwined relations involving natural gas. Also, this will happen as they
simultaneously hedge against anticipated and unanticipated challenges inside and outside
the evolving bilateral relations.
Accordingly, long-term delays in the project may jeopardize its status with China
looking to Central Asia, especially the Caspian Sea, and coastal drilling in the South
China Sea. For Russia, with these circumstances in mind, building the necessary
infrastructure will be critical. Russia’s financial resources are tighter, because there are
few alternatives available for an economy that sustains itself on fuel exports. Part of
Russia’s difficulty is the liquidity preference,327 where firms or states have a desire to
hold resources during times of turbulence and uncertainty. However, at the same time
Russia has more significant needs that draw on these funds.
Russia faced difficulties, especially when leaders in November 2014 decided to
stop allocating resources to support the Ruble. Therefore, this situation shows
diminished financial resources in an environment where the state would desire liquidity
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for flexibility to address numerous obligations, including military spending and pensions.
Russia’s reserve was tested to determine if public finances could be sustained for over
two years without robust revenue from natural gas and petroleum.328 Therefore, in those
circumstances, it was more difficult for Russia to invest in gas delivery infrastructure.
However, from a state power system perspective, as will be examined more closely,
Russia may have few alternatives, other than to invest in the natural gas infrastructure.
Therefore, China, as seen in the natural gas deal, has stronger leverage, but because of its
own energy needs, there is an asymmetric reliance within the energy relationship between
the two states. Before examining this relationship in detail, it is important to look at how
natural gas as an energy source has risen in prominence so quickly and how this
influences political and market forces in China as well as Russia.

Natural Gas Trends:
To advance a clearer understanding of the development of current natural gas
technologies an examination of Chinese experience with extracting the resource will be
helpful. As Mark Kurlansky explains, since second century China water has been forced
beneath the earth surface to extract natural gas.329 This practice was a precursor to a
contemporary energy revolution driven by directing pressurized water beneath the surface
to draw out pockets of another resource: natural gas. This account provides a helpful
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illustration of self-sufficiency as well as the influence of the invisible hand, which is
pushing the current global demand for natural gas.
Global natural gas production from 2007 to 2012 grew by 16% to 3,354 billion
cubic meters for 2012.330 In the same period, the United States saw an increase in
production by 20%.331 Much of this expanded production is from hydraulic fractured
drilling. In this practice, drilling goes thousands of feet vertically and horizontally below
the surface. Water, with a mix of chemicals and sand, is pressurized beneath the surface
to expose pockets of gas, which are released and rise to the surface. This hydraulic
fracturing process has resulted in an energy revolution in the production of petroleum and
natural gas. Also, it should be noted China, Argentina, Algeria, United States, and
Canada are the leading potential producers of shale gas, according to a report from June
2013, by the United States Energy Information Administration.332
These innovations, along with the continued growth of pipelines across the
Eurasian continent and developments a few years earlier in liquidized natural gas (LNG),
have resulted in two effects. Both increased the global supply of natural gas as well as
the avenues to reach various customers. When natural gas is liquefied, it takes up about
1/600 the size, thus allowing greater transport of gas and less sole reliance on pipelines.
The natural gas system interacts and overlays the International State System, notably
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where each state is drawing resources internally and externally. However, in an anarchic
system, a state’s future growth depends on resources. This dynamic can complicate
conditions where there is greater demand for the resource and the resulting increase in the
state’s influence. Simultaneously, though, these interests among the states can become
intertwined where influence and interactions increase. These points form a system,
which is of interest to academics and policymakers. Many Liberal scholars would
conclude that this interconnectedness of economies means the interests would intersect as
well. The following content will assert this assumption may not always be the case.
Continuing with an examination of the nature of natural gas, Mathias Reymond
believes that the relatively low cost of natural gas from 1985 to 2000 spurred long-term
contracts and pipelines, thus providing much of the global natural gas infrastructure.333
The natural gas boom has benefited from the reality that some states have disfavored
other energy sources such as petroleum, nuclear, and coal. “Australia is emerging as a
new LNG powerhouse,”334 in response to many Asian states possessing regasification
terminals, including China with 11, Taiwan with two, South Korea with four, and Japan
with 32.335 As regularly portrayed in the news, natural gas is prominent in European–
Russian relations, United States–Canada relations, Latin America dynamics, issues in
North Africa, changes in politics between and within the Middle East and the world, and
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Russia and China. These regional dynamics underscore the point from Bobo Lo,
“Energy, perhaps more than any other single factor, has come to symbolize the new
geopolitics of the twenty-first century.”336
Kumar, Kwon, Choi, Cho, Lim, and Moon in their work in Energy Policy
estimate that the global gas demand will increase by 1.4% annually from 2008 to 2035.337
The natural gas explosion in development due to technological change leads to questions
about whether natural gas politics are similar to the politics that surround other resources.
If the demand and supply curves are similar to historic points for petroleum, global
circumstances may turn out similarly, or the political environment may produce a
different outcome. Next, we examine the recent energy relationship between China and
Russia within the context of a framework that examines why the parties agreed to the
natural gas deal. Also, through this case, the concepts and measures will be further
developed to show the interaction of factors as part of the broader ideas of the
dissertation.

A Conceptual Framework:
China’s demand for natural gas is growing more rapidly than that of other sources
of energy, and natural gas is expected to grow from 2% of China’s energy consumption
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in 1996 to 11 percent in 2020.338 Also, according to Daniel Yergin, “As China continues
to grow, so will its oil demand. Sometime around 2020 it could pull ahead of the United
States as the world’s largest oil consumer.”339 Russia emerged from its lost decade, the
1990s, with a new leader, Vladimir Putin, who sought to utilize its natural assets through
exports of petroleum and natural gas. During this lost decade, energy sales from Russia
to China and the broader trade of goods were negligible, with an uptick in the latter part
of the final decade of the twentieth century.
Around the same time, during Putin’s tenure in the Mayor’s office in St.
Petersburg, he learned about the influence of resources. He also recognized the need for
controlling, “business networks and physical infrastructure needed to purchase, transport
and sell.”340 By 2003, Russian and Chinese companies endorsed an oil pipeline
agreement to link the East Siberian to the Pacific Oil pipeline. Months after the
agreement was developing, leadership started a shift as Putin asserted dominance over
Yukos by arresting the CEO, Khodorkovsky. The final breaking point for Putin’s
involvement in the energy economy came when Japan offered a counterproposal. The
terms would allow Russia to diversify its suppliers, including Japan, as well as granting
access to Asian markets due to the pipeline's coastal endpoint. Putin’s move also further
consolidated his position against the oligarchs who learned by example not to challenge
him directly.
By the completion of the 2014 natural gas deal both parties, Xi Jinping and
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Vladimir Putin, were in much stronger domestic political positions to negotiate
internationally than their predecessors. For both parties, long-term deals seem more
likely in environments where other sources or lines of supply are less stable. This
includes China’s efforts to diversify access to Middle East energy. To help understand
the agreement there will be an examination of the constituent parts of the deal and a
conceptual framework. This outline assumes that Russia and China are self-interested
actors, and the framework will examine elements of the deal while recognizing, like most
models, it is not sufficiently explanatory.
The more dependent a state is on a resource, the more often the good’s demand is
less responsive to changes in price, and the more instability of sources and routes that
exist: the likelihood of international agreements and contracts increases. The following
text will explain how the negotiations between China and Russia illustrate the framework
of economic and political elements that converged in order for this deal to happen. In
addition, the text will show how the balance of power variable enhances the explanations
behind the occurrence of this agreement. China’s demand for resources has continued in
efforts to fuel and support its expansive economy in recent decades. As a result, China
draws energy from coal, petroleum, nuclear, hydroelectric, and increasingly natural gas
as well as expansion in wind and solar.
With strong national demand for energy, economists341 have measured energy
demand as inelastic and therefore increasing the likelihood China would seek a natural
gas deal. Importantly, China’s demand for energy, including natural gas, is highly
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inelastic.342 In many states this demand-driven condition where goods are more difficult
to substitute like energy, health care, and transportation, there is often more state
involvement in these sectors. In 2014, China responded to these demand pressures by
implementing price controls on goods including tobacco and natural gas.343 As a result,
there is a closer relationship between economic and political actors decision-making.
The actors are responding to the respective conditions related to their distinct factors.
Not only are the perceptions an influence on the present, but China likely
incorporated its expectations of future natural gas prices into its thinking.
Simultaneously, China, like all states, desires a stable environment for accessing
resources. When there are no certainties of reliability or unexpected events, a deal helps
mitigate, but not fully alleviate, this uncertainty. Furthermore, the risk of interrupting
supply along various access routes for natural gas is increasingly possible. As the
volatility of these two elements increases, China would be more inclined to reach a longterm commitment. Keohane also talks about the costs of uncertainty being a motivator
for agreements, “since general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states
more predictable.”344
These factors meet to help explain the formation of this natural gas deal. With
hindsight, this approach shows the convergence of political, economic, and balance of
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power components to help understand the factors that led to the deal. International
Political Economy scholars like Robert Gilpin believe it is appropriate to bring these key
points together. Gilpin argues, “both economic and political analyses are necessary for
an understanding of the workings of the international economy.”345 This conceptual
framework helps explain the natural gas deal, but it faces some limitations. It may not be
perfectly explanatory due to the nuances of politics, markets, and the elements of the
deal, which may not be known.
Secrecy is a common factor in international events. However, International
Relations scholars face the task of seeking to understand the International State System
and its complexity as well as actors’ behavior involving secrecy. “In Russia everything is
a secret, but there is no secrecy.” 346 Massie’s quote could apply to many state
agreements throughout history. It is also appropriate to match the intersecting factors in
this chart. This is because while China and Russia have different economic systems, the
principal actors creating the deal have a strong command over both the economic and
political factors in each state.
When applying a similar framework for looking at Russia’s perspective for the
natural gas deal, it is useful to examine the resource supply factors within Russia.
Russia’s supply of natural gas is also inelastic. As previously explained, Russia’s
economy is heavily reliant on energy production. In other words, regardless of the global
price of energy, Russia is in a precarious position that forces it to produce even when it is
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less profitable to do so. A recent example of this can be seen in decisions by Russia (and
OPEC states who accepted independently) to continue petroleum production even though
global prices fell in 2014 to, “40 percent since June.”347
These economic factors explain part of Russia’s decision to reach the natural gas
deal. Therefore, it is essential to incorporate the political elements of this agreement,
because when just considering China’s demand Russia may have had more leverage in
the deal-making. However, with lower energy prices Russia faced more profound
constraints. As a report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration outlined, “Oil
and gas revenues accounted for 52% of federal budget revenues and over 70% of total
exports in 2012.”348 In the political sphere, two crucial elements are at play: the increase
of available competitors to Russian natural gas and the expected frequency of adverse
events like sanctions that could constrain Russia. These elements meet where a
probability of the deal is conceptualized and, in this case, realized. This example shows,
as the price of natural gas increased and supply was constrained, both parties, for their
reasons, concluded that an agreement was beneficial.
In this circumstance where the interests intersected, a deal occurred in May 2014.
Applying this conceptual model indicates how, in previous negotiating rounds, neither
party found the right convergence of economic and political factors to compromise. For
example, China was in a political position to agree to a natural gas deal, but the price
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Russia was probably offering may have been too expensive. Likewise, Russia, as
explained, likely reacted due to political factors that marginalized its access to markets.
Given these factors and the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to conclude this deal
was a foregone conclusion. However, it was, in fact, complicated and there were factors
which kept a deal from being reached for years. Can we be sure, knowing we never can
be certain in a counterfactual framework, that the needs for both states would have been
met by the other at some point? This is likely the case, especially when considering
China’s energy demand. This framework, though, assumes there are some constants in a
dynamic world. Throughout the twentieth century, natural gas was not a major energy
source, but this changed as a result of the expansion of new resource extraction
technologies. As this text will further examine, there are important factors that may
complicate the implementation of the agreement. If Russia shifts to a much more passive
posture as interpreted by its neighbors, especially in Europe, it may have less interest in
upholding the agreement with China. Also, the possibility of China’s economy slowing
down from 8% growth, and the resulting decrease in energy demand, could complicate
the relationship and the 2014 agreement. Next, an examination of each state's position
that propelled them to support this agreement, as well as factors that could influence the
implementation of the natural gas deal.
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China:
According to Robert Sutter, “China today depends fundamentally on a healthy
world economy in which Chinese entrepreneurs promote economic development.”349
This reliance invites recurring friction and cooperation, depending on China’s economic
need. As a result, this is all derived from what political commentators have asserted is
China’s principal political concern: domestic stability. As China shifts from a ChineseMarxist economic system to a Chinese-market economic system, this change can create
instability. In both cases, to maintain stability, Chinese nationalism is a constant, though
troubling element, to its neighbors. To aid in this transition, Sutter points to efforts to
build, “cooperation and partnerships with all states around China’s periphery.”350
One area of note is the need for energy resources to support the transition from
foreign to domestic consumption of goods. Many Chinese view natural gas as a way to
diversify and therefore are prepared for supply shocks to ensure energy security, or at
least lessen exposure to instability. This determination is made because, “domestic
resources will not be able to meet China’s rising demand for energy.”351
China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, which accounts for
about 70% of its energy supply.352 This large energy share has sparked interest in
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developing clean coal technologies. China continues to seek increases in energy sources
and increases in available energy, while also focusing on environmental concerns. These
stresses have contributed to domestic unrest, which has increased in recent years and
become a top issue for the Chinese population and the government.353 One possible
solution for China is to shift toward consuming more natural gas. As Yu, Zheng, and
Han point out; China has been increasing its natural gas demand in recent years. They
note that China’s natural gas demand increased by 15% between 2010 and 2011.354
China’s reliance on external sources is shown in one, “key variable in the world
economy that the Chinese leadership does not control, including the scarcity of
energy.”355 Also, China’s leaders cannot be certain of other states' trade policies and the
global environment. As a result, China’s leaders, “eschew major risks.”356 Taking this
approach is no easy task, as China’s economy remains enmeshed with the rest of the
globe. China’s use of direct resource contracts shows an uneasiness with commodity
markets and a desire for greater certainty for China and trading partners.
China, like some developing states, has solved this dependency dilemma before
by inviting new technology and quickly adopting it in a manner that is efficient, and
equally important, self-sufficient. Therefore, this approach follows Deng Xiaoping’s
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interest in, “economic interchange with the outside world.”357 Interestingly, Russia has
played a major role in supporting the development of oil for China, and the technology
was quickly adopted. Also, in the 1950s, Russia helped finance the advancement of dam
building technology. In retrospect, this transfer, while not the top item in the 1950 SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, was of greatest lasting influence. Under follow
on agreements, China agreed to assist with dam and water construction projects including
on the Amur River in Eastern Russia.
Contemporary observers have noticed China is the largest builder of dams in the
world. China has constructed the largest dam in the world, Three Gorges, but has even
built more dams than all of the other states of the world combined.358 What is equally
amazing is that hydroelectricity only accounts for 6% of China’s energy consumption.
Also, this shows the magnitude of China’s energy needs at a time when China’s current
oil fields have matured. As a result, this is linked to domestic stability as, “Experts say
that the electricity crisis of 2003-2004, during which areas of China suffered from
shortages and blackouts, surprised Beijing and drove a new approach to managing
China’s energy security.”359 To satiate this demand, China is aiming to expand the
number of nuclear energy reactors to 40 by 2020.360
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Before China can get to a stage of self-sufficiency, it needs partners to provide for
its near-term energy needs and long-term goals. A key objective is the development of
new technology to extract shale, particularly from Tarim, Yangtze, and the area where
natural gas was accidentally discovered in the second century, Sichuan. A Rand study
from 2000 said China’s infrastructure for well development and reserves was
insufficient.361 As a result, in recent decades, China has signed agreements with Central
Asian states to boost its supply of energy. China and Kazakhstan have signed agreements
worth nearly $10 billion to develop two oil and gas fields, as well as the construction of
pipelines in Kazakhstan.
Rail is also an important link in the regional agreements that can be utilized for
energy transport when necessary. Relations with Central Asia are part of a broader
strategy to demilitarize borders and encourage regional stability through energy trade.
China receives a share of its gas from the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border through
Kazakhstan and into the Xinjiang province. With the cultural ties of Uighurs, which
accounts for a significant minority population in western China, the deals draw the
Uighurs in neighboring states closer to China, thus tempering the potential for domestic
unrest. The Central Asian states therefore now have a stake in not encouraging Uighur
dissent because of the energy ties. Russia and China have a shared stake through the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization of increasing communication between each other and
the Central Asian partners, allowing China to make better decisions with more
information. It is also more difficult for the Central Asian states to play the major powers

361

Downs, 2000. 34.

157

off each other, which lowers costs for China and Russia. Also, the contemporary
disputes over islands in the South China Sea are part of a broader effort for China to get
natural gas and petroleum reserves. Estimates show the South China Sea as energy-rich,
with a possible eleven billion barrels of petroleum and natural gas expected to be 190
trillion cubic feet.362
China is also looking beyond its periphery as it seeks to meet its energy demand.
As Daniel Yergin has noted, “Chinese companies have negotiated, at least on paper, tens
of billions of dollars of contracts for investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry that
would provide access to substantial oil and gas resources, but they are not moving
fast.”363 The China–Iran gas relationship through the 2010s is fueled by a $3 billion deal
to develop a natural gas field, and this may explain the reluctance of China and Russia to
impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. Chinese ports and gas pipelines from
Kyaukpyu, Burma are also a reflection of China’s concerns about access. Unforeseen
events could lead to the blocking of naval choke points like the Straits of Malacca, which
would disrupt China’s access to raw materials and energy. China is not immune from the
influence of global events and crises.
China also saw a stronger recovery to the 2008 Financial Crisis, though the events
highlighted China’s dependence on international exports. The Chinese leadership has
worked to insulate the state by encouraging increased domestic demand, therefore
developing a deeper form of self-sufficiency. Of course, whether the consumers of
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Chinese products are domestic or foreign, energy will be of great concern for modes of
production and the shift to consumption needs. In the 2013 paper from Pritchett and
Summers, “Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean,”364 the authors expect growth for
China to slow in the future due to the concept of regression to the mean.
While no doubt a state’s economic growth moving to an average number is
compelling, it is not clear when this may happen or what the average long term economic
growth is for China. In the paper, the authors give a broad timeframe for this change to
happen and acknowledge it is, “on very weak scientific footing.”365 Though they do
expect growth to slow to 6.3%366 by the end of the decade, consumption of energy will
still be very significant. As shown by Jin Zeng,367 localized decisions in Chinese firms
may allow for more flexibility. As a result, this approach provides a more
accommodating environment, which would allow for more robust economic growth rates
than accounted for by Summers and Pritchett.
Nevertheless, to promote domestic growth and deeper international ties, China
announced the establishment of a $40 billion Silk Road infrastructure fund.368 It will be
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important to consider if this development is a challenge to the World Bank or more of a
rejection of the BRICS bank where two of the states are struggling economically.
Reymond pointed out in 2007 that Russia possessed 27% of the world’s natural gas
reserves and sought a market in Asia. The Eastern Siberia field’s proximity to China
would be a natural connection.369 Furthermore, if Russia continues to face challenges
due to lower natural gas prices and liquidity strains, they may find themselves visiting the
Chinese Bank for a loan with natural gas as collateral with terms possibly similar to loans
between China and Venezuela.

Russia:
In Axis of Convenience, Lo illustrates how Russia focuses on the security of
demand due to its dependence on energy exports, and China is concerned with the
security of supply, as it is increasingly dependent on outside sources of energy.370
Furthermore, Khudoley and Tkachenko point out that Russia’s share of the global
economy has dropped from 10% to 1%.371 In the mid-1960s, natural gas was discovered
in Northwestern Siberia, thus making permanent Russia’s interests in the region. Despite
its vast territorial presence in Asia, little more than a quarter of Russia’s population
resides in Asia.
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Around the middle of the last decade, a shift occurred internationally when many
developing and developed states could not meet internal needs through domestic
production; at this point Russian natural gas filled much of the global demand. For
example, in 2009, 26% of primary energy consumption for Europe was from natural gas.
“Europe’s growing dependency on natural gas from more distant sources may also impact
its future policies to ensure security of energy supplies,”372 says Kumar et al. Russia,
while a leading energy-producing state, has to be concerned with the political flexibility
other states possess through liquidized natural gas technology. More Western European
states including Italy, Spain, and France are significant users of LNG. This share alone
diminishes Russian leverage and may have contributed to Putin and Russia’s leader’s
constraints in its arrangement with China.
Gvosdev and Marsh have characterized Russian foreign policy interests as
intertwined with business to form a, “state capitalist”373 system. Hill and Gaddy in Mr.
Putin often characterize the Russian leader as a Survivalist who, in understanding
positive power, actively prepares for various cataclysmic events.374 They contrast this
with a survivor who is passive and subject to exogenous conditions. No doubt, he has
developed the skills of a survivor by learning from his own and others’ mistakes in
informing his major energy dealings. His first two presidential terms focused on oil, but
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his current, and possibly successive, terms will be more driven by natural gas. According
to Gvosdev and Marsh, for Russia, it is, “through economic means that foreign policy
objectives can be met.”375
Putin borrowed liberally from a business book by King and Cleland, Strategic
Planning and Policy, in writing his dissertation on resource development and the
elements of state power. Gaddy and Hill explain how the business text influenced Putin
through concepts like the hierarchy of decision-making, market share percentage, time of
development, costs, and goals.376 King and Cleland also explain how all these concepts
intersect and interact. By Putin’s behavior, it seems he prefers to be the point of
intersection for economic and political decisions. Putin’s dissertation377 focuses on
Russia’s economic growth as a source of its national power. Therefore, a vital role for
the state is the development of its natural resources. He also believes that when the state
played a passive role in natural resource development, it resulted in a low point for the
Russian economic system.
Furthermore, Putin’s elimination of rival businesses is a way to control for agency
costs where the business may not have behaved as he wished. In addition, due to the high
price of oil and natural gas, Russia was able to capitalize on, “rents generated by oil and
gas [that] were leveraged by other Russian economic sectors.”378 Nevertheless, Kaplan
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believes Russia’s future empire will be weaker due to the relative increase in the strength
of its neighbors.379
The Russo–German relationship, a key determinant in Russo–European relations,
declined under Schröder. Under the previous chancellor, there was closer coordination
including pipeline routes that would bypass Central and Eastern Europe through the Nord
Stream pipeline. Also, the Russian South Stream project went forward with support from
Italy, Germany, and France. One event that may have influenced Russian decisionmaking and contributed to the deal with China is the natural gas pipeline that bypasses
Russia and runs through the Caucuses and Anatolia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline
connects the natural gas-rich Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea with the possibility of
the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline extending to Europe.
Furthermore, Russia objects to a proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline that would
allow the West greater access to non-Russian natural gas. There continues to be a
standoff, on drilling rights in which Russia plays a part, between the states bordering the
Caspian. This dispute serves to magnify Russia’s comparative advantage. This happens
through marginalizing competitors, extracting political concessions from neighbors, and
keeping the global supply of natural gas and petroleum down, thus keeping the market
price higher. This region should get renewed recognition as Mackinder’s Pivot Area. It
is inaccessible to sea power and this area around the Caspian and Central Asia will alter

379

Kaplan, Robert D. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the
Battle against Fate. New York: Random House, 2012. 184.

163

power arrangements via, as Colin Gray points out, “railroads and air routes.”380 No
doubt, natural resources will fuel this transition.
Russia is also seeking to create certainty with its long-term contracts, and its
pipeline plans, including the completion of the Norway Barents Sea gas deal. In addition,
the EU is working to collectively negotiate natural gas deals with Russia to try to get a
lower price and minimize Russia’s political influence over Eastern European states.
Russia also faces sanctions from the United States and European Union that are in
response to the Russian annexation of Crimea, direct Russian involvement in Ukraine,
and the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by pro-Russian separatists. In July
2014, U.S. President Obama announced sanctions on Russian finances, and energy
sectors that have incrementally expanded in response to Russian action. According to
Rebecca Nelson with the Congressional Research Service, in, “2013, just 0.71% of U.S.
exports of goods went to Russia and 1.19% of U.S. imports of goods came from Russia.
Less than 0.5% of U.S. overseas investment was in Russia in 2012. At the end of 2013,
Russia accounted for 1.1% of outstanding U.S. bank loans overseas.”381 The effects
throughout Europe may be more significant, “In 2013, more than 50% of Russia's exports
of goods went to EU countries, and Russia purchased 46% of its imports of goods from
EU countries.”382
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Of particular concern in the Russian economy is the financial sector, which is
linked to European banks. It is also one of the areas of the targeted sanctions. These
sanctions, though, have not fully hindered Russia’s access to the European continent as
the continued work on the pipeline through Turkey and recent Russian natural gas
contracts with Greece show. As a result, the commercial relationship with Turkey will
complicate initiatives from some figures in Washington who want to sell LNG to
Ukraine. Turkey may be less inclined to allow passage through the Bosporus if that
would influence relations with Moscow and affect the pipeline. Russia may have less
flexibility since the annexation of Crimea, but the global demand for energy ensures
Russia has a market, although a portion of that market is shrinking. As Lo explains,
“While political agendas are important, the Russian government and major energy
concerns,” are, “aware of profit for its own sake.”383
Profit and international politics also motived the actors within the joint
consortium in the Sakhalin I energy enterprise. The arrangement involving multiple
partners from Russia, India, and Japan, shows some durability of such ventures. Under
the agreement, natural gas goes to Russia’s market while also selling petroleum on Asian
markets. By extension, the Sakhalin II agreement allowed Russia to create its first LNG
port, where Japan, South Korea, and the United States are customers. While the
enterprise is interesting to examine, it is important to consider the larger share of gas
within Russia. Much of Russia’s natural gas comes from the Kovykta field in the eastern
Siberian region of Irkutsk. Some estimates of Siberia’s natural gas reserves are 1,680
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trillion cubic feet, while for comparison the Sakhalin Island project is about 96 trillion
cubic feet. The estimated Siberian reserves are 17 times the size of Sakhalin.

Balance of Power:
Russia and China each have extensive, notable periods where they had a
preponderance of power and global influence. Their respective memories also have eras
of decline that each experienced separately, as explained by Gilbert Rozman.384 Perhaps
due to this history, there is a record of agreement and distrust between Russia and China.
Rozman asserts that the two states have been more in agreement when their national
identities are similar. There are contemporary examples where this is not the case.385
They shared similar economic/political systems and adopted a Treaty of Friendship.
In the 1970s, the United States exploited deep distrust between these neighbors
and opened relations with China. Since then China has undergone a market economic
transformation. As of the writing of this text, China’s emergence, as fueled by its
economy, is leading some academics to discuss a shift from a world of unipolarity to one
of bipolarity. To a different degree, Russia is also projecting significant influence in its
region. This shift means that, if bipolarity happens, it will be China supplanting the role
of Russia in the international order that characterized the Cold War.
While both states centralized domestic power in previous eras through the politics
of famine, this research highlights how the balance of power system conditions
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outcomes.386 This work looks at factors in addition to points from Rozman as well as
Wemheuer’s observations on endogenous factors molding politics. Specifically, future
research can explore if unipolarity is the least restrictive arrangement for trade among
states. This is because the adverse effects from the magnitude of state power competition
increases with each addition of a polar unit.
This period of unipolarity has seen more agreements between Russia and China.
While not discarding a legacy of enmity, the two states have reached agreements based
on opportunities and not bound by liberal concepts. This reflects political activity,
defense procurement, the development and commitment to SCO, and the natural gas deal.
These areas of agreement never aligned during bipolarity even with shared revolutionary
Marxist ideas (with caveats). However, under unipolarity these agreements did happen
without revolutionary or similar ideational ties. The reaction to this development comes
in the form of Russia seeking a market for its goods and China learning from Russia’s
experience with reform and the conditions that led to the unraveling of the U.S.S.R.
Mandelbaum argues that Russia, China, Japan, and the U.S. constitute a distinct
sub-system of competition.387 Through this lens Japan is added to his concept of the
triangle of critical relations between Russia, China, and the US, Legvold explains how
the four powers each have, “compelling stakes in its relations with the remaining three,
stakes that coexist with, complicate, and, in good measure, counter balance.”388
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As this case has explained for both Russia and China, energy issues immediately
intersect with the balance of power. This is evident in China’s energy policy in the
Middle East as well as Russia’s response to events in Ukraine and its need to find
alternative customers in China. These conditions help demonstrate why the costs and
challenges of global power competition make engaging through natural gas the practical
choice.389 The following balance of power dynamics also condition the rationale behind
the natural gas deal between Russia and China.
Russia and China are readily aware of the relative position they have, compared
with the United States. Even during the period of disagreements between the two states
in the 1990s, there was consensus that the United States was a great power, and they each
sought to change this dynamic. However, it seems evident through these declarations and
behavior that neither state saw itself as sufficient to conceive of the power system. The
balance of power system was not a fungible concept that can quickly alter through
definition. However, it was a signal to all states that the intent to change the order was
very apparent.
The complex history for each state was played out through the Zemin and Yeltsin
agreement, which opposed unipolarity.390 It reflected the respective aspirations for each
state as they tried to move away from contemporary turbulence and toward a more
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favorable polar status. The agreement was veiled so neither state was rejecting the status
of the other state or even the U.S. This was a relative shift. However, in a zero-sum
sense this was received unfavorably in Washington. This shared statement, while not
immediately attained by Russia or China, reflects the salient influence on the balance of
power in relations within and outside the polarity system.
Zemin and Yeltsin overtly discussed the significance of this power position in
state relations. Also, this agreement was influenced by the expansion efforts of NATO as
opposed by Russia, and U.S. relations with Taiwan, as opposed by China. Though this is
not the only time, the U.S. power competition with these states did play a role. China is
deeply affected by the legacy of the open-door policy. Also, the enmity within Russia
and U.S. relations can be traced back to when US forces stayed in the U.S.S.R. after
WWI.391 Meanwhile, much of the U.S. Cold War history had a cultural assumption that
the Soviet Union and China were in concert due to the states sharing a similar ideology.
While both Russia and China engage in natural gas trade it is increasingly
apparent that Japan is asserting a foreign policymaking posture that is more autonomous
from the U.S. Japan is not in profound disagreement, but is no longer in step entirely
with the U.S. Both China and Russia engage in energy endeavors with Japan. However,
Japan is concerned with China’s rise and is responding by coordinating with other
regional actors, including India, to balance against China. India was a leader of the
nonalignment movement during the Cold War. India’s position has shifted toward being
a primary balancing partner, with Japan, against China. As a result, they have worked
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with Russia and the United States. On the other hand, Russia was exploring opportunities
for alternative customers rather than Europe while simultaneously, China is focusing on
Europe.
Dynamics in the Middle East and Central Asia are also grounded in energy
economics and politics, which states in those regions seek to manage through regional
groups. However, as an energy provider, Russia views these dynamics in a
fundamentally different manner than China, which is an energy consumer. Therefore,
through this natural gas agreement with Russia, China gains the value of predictability of
the price within the agreement and will not be exposed to exogenous price shocks.
Russia gains the predictability of sales with fewer shocks and less turbulence.
Furthermore, expectations about production and possible interruptions in the Middle East
contribute to these calculations. So, this agreement is a means to account for this recent
history and the dynamics from balance of power competition.

Conclusion:
This pact between Russia and China was one of the final steps in the journey to
the natural gas agreement of 2014. Further questions deserving exploration include how
this deal will affect non-energy elements of the Russia-China relationship. Under the
Carter Doctrine, U.S. interests were expanded to include stability in the Persian Gulf.392
Access to petroleum was of paramount importance and was accepted as U.S. policy for
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decades. Could a similar framing of interests and ties occur between Russia and China?
Is the level of dependence as great? As Keohane notes the, “economic interests of liberal
states make them vulnerable to threats to their access to raw materials and to markets.”393
Are states that partially adopt tenants of Capitalism, like Russia and China, as susceptible
to market shocks? It would seem this deal is an effort to make each less susceptible to
shocks. Therefore, this reflects the conditions under mechanism one that the states are
responding to changing market environments.
While this text shows how there has been a history of cooperation regarding
energy matters, Lorenz Luthi in The Sino-Soviet Split reveals the divisions between
Russia and China because of ideological, national interest, and personal differences.394
No doubt, this was the case, but examining a different relationship at a different time
reveals similar divisions. It could be argued that the past elements of shared political and
economic ideology and the common perception of Western threats would have
galvanized a relationship in previous decades. Tracing this relationship between Russia
and China through the lens of energy reveals a business relationship at the strongest
points of intersection, which seems to deviate when examining other subjects. As
explained, this energy relationship may not be as enduring as the terms of the agreement
indicate. Also, the agreement would likely not have advanced without the conditioning
influence of the balance of power system. Because of this dynamic of state power
competition, both Russia and China had few alternatives other than embracing this
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energy initiative that required significant investment. These conditions reflect
mechanism two, where diminished enmity exists between the two states.
It is decidedly probable that China will find alternative energy sources,
domestically and regionally, which would be a significant loss to Russia. Russia was the
party at the negotiating table that had a strong hand but not enough high cards. Current
events, which are subject to change, only make Russia’s position worse and therefore
China’s relative position better. According to the conceptual framework presented in this
paper, many more interceding events would have to occur to undermine the agreement in
order to outweigh the considerable investment each has made in this deal. Russia desires
an environment with greater certainty and China strives for greater self-sufficiency.
There will be points of convergence, as was the case with the 2014 natural gas
agreement, and possible divergence in energy relations in the future. While the archival
records involving these negotiations are not available, the emphasis on this good and the
timed response to changes in their environment made an economically unfeasible project
viable due to changes in state power relations. These realizations are expected to reflect
the relations and negotiating posture that resulted in the agreement. These observations
reflect the points in mechanisms three and four.
The final chapter considers these cases as well as theory to discern patterns for
future theory development. The chapter will conclude with a summation of observations
on the influence the balance of power has on the incidence of trade agreements.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This dissertation employs cases to examine how the balance of power influences
the incidence of international trade agreements. It shows the existence of factors that
influenced the trade agreements that represent contributions from the disciplines of
Economics, Politics, and the generally neglected International Relations. As a result, it
shows the influence of the specific variable of the balance of power and how it conditions
outcomes. This system interacts primarily through a form of nonverbal interaction, that
conditions the formation of trade agreements. Agents may or may not be aware, but this
force influences the incidence of trade agreements nonetheless.
The dissertation examines three cases and considers existing theoretical claims to
help understand the phenomena of international trade agreements and the influence of the
balance of power. Also, the work considers related questions to examine the possibility
of alternative explanations. Through that process, initial conjectures are provided in this
chapter to explain these phenomena. Precisely through these outlined methods, the
research examines the factors that contribute to the formation of trade agreements.
This dissertation shows that the balance of power plays a measurable role in
causing the incidence of international trade agreements. Existing research within
International Political Economy focuses on explanations ranging from institutions to the
influence of hegemony. This dissertation instead considers how the dynamics within the
balance of power system condition the incidence of international trade agreements. The
influence of the balance of power enhances explanations involving the incidence of trade
agreements where the variables absence would render the case analysis incomplete.
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The cases of Cobden and Chevalier, MERCOSUR, and the Russia-China natural
gas deal show the influence of the balance of power as a salient force on the incidence of
international trade agreements. This method is not parsimonious though it challenges the
existing discipline derived paradigms. Other research tends to emphasize one discipline
informed perspective over different perspectives. That approach has contributed to the
under-representation of the balance of power variable when explaining events in the
discipline of International Political Economy.
Due to temporal differences related to the case selection as well as the types of
states involved, research material was more abundant on Cobden-Chevalier than with the
negotiations between Russia and China. However, crucial elements of both deals are
available as well as the important international conditions each of the agreements are
operating within. As a result, the Cobden-Chevalier examination of the leading actors is
based both on their expressed sentiments as well as the conditions they operate within.
The Russia and China case emphasizes the conditions for Xi and Putin, along with their
general backgrounds. MERCOSUR has the benefit of robust contemporary analysis and
data that contextualized the agreement.

Comparison:
This section will examine the multiple dimensions of the agreements to isolate
patterns learned. The following comparisons emphasize, through cases and theory, the
influence of the balance of power on the incidence of bilateral trade agreements.
In every case, there is an element of time and idea development that preceded the
formation of the agreement. For these cases, the idea that there are gains from trade
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activity and agreements is an a priori condition for negotiations to occur. The theoretical
foundation from Ricardo and Smith influenced Cobden and the negotiators in the British
and French talks. The influence of idea construction also features within the decades of
intellectual discussion in South America around the deliberation on creating a common
market. In the first case, the idea began in Great Britain, and in MERCOSUR, the
inspiration was from the experience of the European Common Market and its successor,
the European Community. However, in both cases, while these ideas germinated, they
were not forced either due to British hegemony or European power.
As the cases show, the states in these circumstances, while influenced by ideas,
exert considerable leverage in determining terms of agreements. The Russia and China
Natural Gas deal also involved the development of a specific concept of trade involving
this resource. Also, there was a general disposition where Russia favored the idea of
exporting its abundant resource. Furthermore, China’s favorable position toward trade
had evolved over the years from a rejection of the Open-Door policy toward a policy of
being an integral component of global supply chains. Also, all of these states operate
within specific systemic norms of behavior. These are institutional norms as well as
conditional effects from other states. Norms can often fuse with the overt influence of
reciprocity.
In addition to the ideas around trade, there is also the international norm of
challenging violators of trade agreements, as applied in these cases. While each state has
some degree of autonomy of decision making, they choose to adhere to norms with the
expectation that others will also comply with the norm and find the whole set of norms
more beneficial. However, certain norms take precedence over others and can be
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contested differently, depending on the agreement. This may explain the minimal nature
of agreements between China and Russia. At the same time the interaction between
France and Britain, and to a different degree, Brazil and Argentina incentivizes a
continuity of this minimal form of agreement norm. Adhering to an agreement helps
maintain other agreements, which are sufficient to bind the other state as well. This
enhances the predictability of relations, as emphasized by Keohane.
Domestic political systems in all cases varied in function and influence.
Negotiators like Napoleon III, Putin, and Xi had higher authority and autonomy while
negotiating. On the opposite side, Cobden and the British had to respond to a divided
parliament and Brazil and Argentina had influential leaders who were experiencing
significant domestic transition. In Cobden-Chevalier and MERCOSUR the leaders were
seeking domestic legitimacy.
The discussion of power and leverage in the Cobden and Chevalier negotiations
are also playing out in the other research cases. It can be deceptive to assume that power
presents an absolute edge in negotiating. There are circumstances during negotiations
were displaying a selective absence of power (called tying hands) has the virtue of
gaining concessions from the other state.
In Cobden-Chevalier, there are elements of hand-tying by political actors when
Napoleon III promoted the passage of commerce treaty authority. Also, the Most
Favored Nation status is a provision that, once adopted, commits the state to future tariff
changes outside of those negotiated. Hand tying also is seen in MERCOSUR where the
member states exclude nondemocratic members with the intent of binding hands to
dissuade coups. States within the agreement can face suspension if a coup occurs. In
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these cases, leaders cede some degree of autonomy and authority to minimize more
immediate challenges. Even the terms of the Sino-Russian gas deal saw some contractual
hand-tying among the parties to ensure delivery of the natural gas.
Because of the unique demand for natural gas, both Russia and China drew from
elements of leverage. China’s economy is considerably larger. However, China’s size
did not guarantee the most favorable outcomes for Beijing. Instead, Russia’s production
of a resource in high demand from China gave Russia influence in the negotiations. This
framework of examining the interaction can be studied in the future with archival
materials on the negotiations and price expectations as well as projected demand.
Also, in the leverage analysis of MERCOSUR, the differences in respective
economies and relative dependence on exports outside of Latin America are apparent.
Therefore, there was less power or leverage the two negotiating states held over each
other because of the export focus. So, why did they reach the agreement at all? Part of
the answer may be more about diminishing the leverage outside powers (particularly
those with a colonial legacy) have in purchasing goods. This may explain the restrictive
provisions in the agreement on trade with non-MERCOSUR members and the fact that it
took nearly three decades for the EU and MERCOSUR to reach a trade agreement. This
approach also complements the regional institutional norms that are more apparent than
in most other regions of the globe. The parties agree on the elementary principle of
keeping other powers at bay.
While these cases focus on the conditioning influence of systems, the distinct role
agents play in the trade agreement should be noted. This influence relates to the third
mechanism that leaders while negotiating trade agreements are affected by state power
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competition. Leaders like Napoleon III and Xi are aware of their respective power and
how the populace perceives it. In fact, in each of these cases leaders played a distinct
role in seeking the agreement or another agent persuaded them. Often this was in
response to conditions and opportunities for each of the states possessing distinct political
systems. However, it is important to acknowledge in these cases the role the leaders
played in perceiving the domestic and international political environment. While not
entirely assessed in each case, leaders focused intently on these issues whether that be Xi
and Putin’s and the natural gas deal or Napoleon III’s negotiations with Cobden. This
also relates to Napoleon III’s active engagement and awareness of competing demands.
This agency dynamic transpires in the personalized shift in Brazil-Argentina relations.
Also, importantly, agents in these deals show an awareness of balance of power
dynamics. All of the cases involve the interaction between the interested parties, but also
reflect the influence of other states as outlined in mechanism four. This is a system
dynamic where multiple states influence and condition the bilateral negotiations. These
interactions become consequential when looking at the influence of a specific state, and
through this process, additional states also come into perspective.
For example, the influence of France’s relations with Austria (both diplomatic and
conflictual) spurred Napoleon III’s interest in the trade agreement. However, when
examining this dynamic it is noticed that this is related also to Napoleon III’s designs to
annex Italian territory, a move Britain opposed. Furthermore, unbeknownst to Napoleon
III, while Britain was opposed to annexation it was unwilling to push the point to
conflict. This dynamic minimized, unbeknownst to Napoleon III, the purpose of
negotiating the treaty of commerce.
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When looking at Brazil and Argentina’s relations with the U.S., a similar pattern
can emerge highlighting the dynamic with UNASUR states and the EU. However, this
does not suggest that one state specifically will prove the image. Instead it is about
broadening the perspective of relational influences. Even though there may be two states
at a negotiating table, the members of the system of states are along the perimeter
conditioning the discussion, as these cases show.

International Conditions and Trade Agreement Negotiations:
None of these analyzed agreements are born from a genesis of alliances. There
were no security guarantees among any of the states involved. In fact, within these cases
the bilateral relations facilitated the agreement but would not be classified as distinctly
harmonious. Brazil and Argentina were on the best terms, but there had been a
significant shift in relations a few years earlier. China and Russia have better relations
than during the Cold War. They partner in endeavors like the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, but the bonds appear mostly transactional.
For the Cobden-Chevalier agreement, while Napoleon III had a positive
perception of Britain, these sentiments were not reciprocated by the British. Specifically,
some in the British Parliament feared the French navy – especially one led by Napoleon.
Centuries earlier, power competition was involved in the Auld Alliance between Scotland
and France out of concern about England. This agreement lasted until the Treaty of
Edinburgh of 1560, and Paul Jennings argues the alliance was cemented by wine trade.395
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Also, it would be difficult to extrapolate that security alliances develop as a result
of any of these trade agreements. There are stable relations between Brazil and
Argentina but no security guarantees. Although the case is recent there have not been
tangible relational gains for Russia-China relations since the natural gas deal. The
exception to the pattern is the interactions between France and Britain. The relationship
across the English Channel continued to progress, but it took four decades until it
solidified with the Entente Cordiale. Also, an alliance did not form until World War I.
Therefore, the relational effect on trade activity was distinct, though not uniform,
across the cases. Trade among the states involved has not distinctly changed between
Russia and China. However, over time trade increased between Brazil and Argentina, but
there was a drastic change in trade between France and Britain after their agreement.
Geography alone cannot explain this variation. While trade activity may be more
difficult between population centers in China and Russia due to distance, Brazilian and
Argentine population centers are also not as intertwined. Economic geography theories
focus on the importance of proximity, though that is not a guarantee of more significant
trade, as these variations show.
Also complimentary with balance of power dynamics are variables that intervene
among neighbors. These impact relations where there are robust patterns on display. In
the same way there is a reason of state that realists use to explain behavior there is also a
reason of system. States find it in their interest to preserve a system which exists to the
benefit of the state. There is also an in-between space of interactions involved within
reason of neighbor. In reason of neighbor the relations are constant and often
intertwined and constitute the most frequently observed influences within state relations.
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Linking multiple reason of neighbor dynamics can reveal the components of a
system. A balance of power system is composed of all of these state relations. This is
because balance of power dynamics often capitalize on influencing states through
neighbor relations. For example, this concept becomes operational when State A has a
struggle with their neighbor, State B. State A will often look toward State C, who is also
a neighbor of State B, to agree to balance against State B. These relational dynamics
among neighbors also relates to the points in mechanism two that reflects these cases that
show diminished enmity among trading partners.
For example, the argument within the cases shows a shift in system dynamics in
Europe that condition Cobden-Chevalier. Some of this is a result of changes in neighbor
relations. This includes regional animosity toward France for the Napoleonic wars, the
unifying efforts by Bismarck in Prussia, and the decline of Austria, which facilitated the
unification of Italy. All of these types of factors conditioned how the actors in the system
saw their respective interests and how they responded. This concept is similar to the
arguments provided by Narizny regarding how great powers differentiate priorities in the
system. For the Cobden-Chevalier treaty this shift in conditions, in addition to prolonged
economic depression, contributed to the unraveling of the trade agreement era at the end
of the nineteenth century.
A system exists that influences Russia and China which includes Japan, India, and
the EU. A neighbor’s actions are expected to feature prominently in state’s
considerations. This is due in part to political, economic, and cultural ties, but also to the
ability of power projection. While generally only great powers can sustain a projection
of power globally, a neighbor who is a major power may be able to do so locally. Also,
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each case operated within a distinct regional subsystem where many of the interactions
and influences transpired. Cobden-Chevalier operated within a European system
simultaneously with a western European system. For MERCOSUR, the negotiators
worked within a South American subsystem as well as the global system. Similarly, in
the case of Russia and China they operate in the regional Asia system and also in a global
system.
Some theorists may anticipate that there would be relational factors involving
security among the negotiating states. However, that was not the case in the three
agreements examined in this dissertation. Russia and China had decades of distrust
including the Sino-Soviet rift and post-Cold War divisions. Also, Brazil and Argentina
had exhibited decades of enmity, and Britain was suspicious of a France led by a
Napoleon. Each case saw a similar relational outcome. The Shanghai Cooperative,
improved dialogue between Argentina and Brazil, and lower tensions between France and
Britain did not result in alliances. However, relations also did not worsen.
So, it would be incorrect to suggest that relations among these states involved in
the respective agreements resulted in harmonious relations. It would also be incorrect to
say the relations were conflictual because of the trade agreements. This presents a
challenge to the theory that assumes political relations change as a result of trade
relations. Within the confines of this study, there seems to be some continuity of
relations that are neither acutely conflictual nor harmonious among states that reach a
trade agreement. This relates to the previous assertion that there is an epistemological
and methodological over-reliance on considering change when continuity of state
relations is also prevalent. Barbieri and Levy along with Gowa argue trade continues
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among states even when they are at war. Similarly, trade transpires among these case
countries also when they are not at war.

Effects of the Balance of Power:
As the respective analysis shows, each of the cases saw influences on states and
leaders from international conditions. Furthermore, each case is representative of a
different characteristic of the balance of power system, since each occurred under a
different classification of polarity.
The Cobden-Chevalier commerce treaty is one example of a trade agreement that
happened during a multipolar balance of power system. This dissertation argues that
trade agreements negotiated during multipolarity are more challenging to attain.
However, one of the first and norm influencing trade agreements occurred during a
period of multipolarity. Within these cases this is a principle criticism of the logic of this
dissertation research. However, this agreement and those that followed in this period also
eventually unraveled. Among the three cases it is also the only agreement to have ended
prematurely. As the analysis in the case suggests, the pressures of alliances and rising
tensions (in addition to the economic depression in Europe) contributed to the unraveling
of the agreement.
Multipolarity makes trade agreements more difficult but not impossible, in the
same sense that unipolarity improves the probability of trade agreements but does not
make each agreement a foregone conclusion. Part of this is the impact of multiple
intervening variables within the cases as well as the conditioning influence of the balance
of power. It is impossible, and inappropriate, to argue that the balance of power is the
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only causal factor in explaining the incidence of international trade agreements.
However, as shown in the cases, identifying a variable that enhances the understanding of
a social phenomenon deserves attention.
Overall the agreements reached in the bipolar era have been durable agreements
which lasted longer than those formed under the multipolar order. Overall trade
agreements adopted under unipolarity and bipolarity have been durable compared to
agreements under multipolarity. Also, the general trade activity under multipolarity is the
lowest of the balance of power orders in contemporary measures. An example of a
durable trade agreement case under bipolarity is MERCOSUR. This agreement runs
contrary to Krasner’s argument that small and medium states are unlikely to favor trade
unless induced by the hegemon. Instead, this pact placed restrictions on other states,
including major and great powers in the system.
Krasner’s characterization of state size and policy preferences does not help
explain the narrow focus of trade between Russia and China, as it relates to size. Russia
is comparatively smaller but is equally concerned with China about the feedback effects
of being exposed to market cycles and the possible influence on political instability.
However, the reactions from Russia and China show the balance of power variable is a
more robust explanation for why trade agreements occur. Furthermore, this agreement
seems not to be fostered by the polar leader of the system, the US, and its NATO allies.
Instead, the agreement occurred despite the US and its NATO allies, which are major
trading partners of China.
It should be noted that polarity could shift a few years after the end of the RussiaChina natural gas agreement as well as after MERCOSUR. Specifically, MERCOSUR’s
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environment saw few macro, material, military, or alliance factors that would indicate the
implosion of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there is considerable discussion
related to state power competition between the United States and China and the
probability of a bipolar system evolving in the near future.
While power competition among states played a significant role in explaining the
incidence of trade agreements, these are only preliminary observations, because each
polarity represents only one case. Therefore, considering the challenge these cases seem
to present to theory, it presents an opportunity to consider other cases.
Copeland argues that change and expectations play a role in state relations. This
pattern repeats in MERCOSUR, Cobden-Chevalier, and the Sino-Russia natural gas deal.
There were significant, though unexpected, changes in the bilateral relations, particularly
between Brazil and Argentina, but also between France and Britain. However, the
agreements were each also influenced by other changes in state relations, but none of the
cases speak directly to Copeland’s consideration of how interruptions to trade
expectations influence an increase in conflict.
In this dissertation, the only case where the agreement disintegrated was CobdenChevalier. In fairness, the other agreements were more recent, and all of these deserve
thorough future analysis. However, the multipolar system found no mechanism to
resolve economic turbulence and its effect on trade beginning in 1873. Meanwhile, in
bipolar and unipolar systems, there seem to have been better methods to resolve issues
around trade agreements. Some have argued this is a result of hegemony. However, it
may be more due to the inverse relationship that multipolar relations have a higher
number of unresolvable tensions than would exist in a unipolar system. Hegemonic
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theories from Kindleberger, Gilpin, and Keohane argue that a solitary great power can
play an oversized role in the international order.396
The ideas of hegemonic stability assert that, through the existence of international
hegemonic systems, the behaviors of states (including trade agreements) are easier to
manage. If being the hegemon affords states the chance to set up economic systems, why
did Britain, with the greatest opportunity, choose not to exert its hegemony over wardamaged Europe? Instead, it did the opposite and approved restrictive corn laws, and let
45 years pass until it signed trade agreements.
Furthermore, other states often sought trade agreements throughout Europe
without British direction.397 The argument that a hegemon helps organize the
international order and often bends the order to its will was not the case when considering
British trade policy in Europe in this era. Therefore, it is useful to consider alternative
explanations for these events, including the possible influence of polarity on these cases.
It is possible that a hegemon acts and does not act in a system, but it seems more likely
that, under multipolarity, taking action on durable trade agreements is more complicated.
Therefore, there may be an observation bias in overemphasizing what a hegemon does in
a system over what is more challenging to observe in multipolarity, the nonevent.

A “hegemonic power is both able and willing to establish and maintain the norms and rule of a liberal
economic order.” Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University
Press, 2016. 72.
396

McKeown also argues, “if as Krasner argues Britain was not yet at the peak of her hegemony when she
allegedly secured the opening of the trading system in the early 1860s, are we then to conclude that nearhegemonic states can achieve the same sorts of successes as truly hegemonic states? If so, how can we
reconcile British success in the near-hegemonic period of the 1860s with British failure to maintain an open
system in the near-hegemonic period of the 1880s?” McKeown, Timothy J. "Hegemonic Stability Theory
and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe." International Organization 37, no. 1 1983: 73-91.
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This approach allows for the agency of individual states and their policy choices
while suggesting its choices are subject to constraints based on the number of great
powers in the system. In other words, unipolarity is consequential in its influence.
However, multipolarity makes reaching agreement in multilateral binding terms more
challenging. There can be an overemphasis on the power of one hegemon and the
influence it exerts within a system, compared to the alliances and power competition that
are characteristic of a multipolar system. The influence of causal actors in a multipolar
system would be more diffuse, but the overall influence that the states are imposing on
one another is expected to be more substantial than under unipolarity. This challenge is
especially the case when the system is confronted with resolving collective action
problems.398 Under hegemony, states have less relative power to the hegemon but have
more freedom to act and solve collective action problems that may or may not entail freeriding on the hegemon. However, there is no formal or informal system to resolve this
degree of multipolar power competition that bleeds into the realm of trade agreements.
This observation also compliments the general point from Mansfield regarding the
nonlinear effects of power distribution on trade activity.
The one period in history where several trade agreements occurred under
multipolarity is also the only period where trade agreements quickly unraveled. While
the Concert of Europe facilitated issues related to the Balance of Power, there was no
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Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge,
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ability to resolve these deteriorating interactions on the economic front. Lampe argues
the elements of most favored nation clause in many agreements created a problem that
was, “inherent in this decentralized system.”399
While the Balance of Power system is complex in its interactions, it operates
under a core principle that it is in an individual state’s interest to act in a collective to
prevent another state from rising in disproportionate power. It is challenging to overlay
this with economic trade agreements like those adopted in this period, which were
inflexible during economic turbulence. It is not so much about a hegemon doing (which
may happen), but that tensions in a multipolar system occur more frequently, and
differences are harder to resolve. Under multipolarity, states have less freedom of action
during economic or systemic stress. That freedom of action is necessary for resolving
collective action problems and negotiations in general. Bipolarity and unipolarity are
positions where states may find it more permissible to operate internationally. This is
due to different interlocking relations and the complexity assessment determined by the
number of poles in the balance of power system.400 Therefore, what seems to
characterize these cases is not hegemonic stability but rather, multipolar inflexibility
which influences relations including trade agreements. Even though Waltz contends it is
not very useful to precisely measure systemic variables; further research can show a path

Lampe, Markus. "Explaining Nineteenth‐Century Bilateralism: Economic and Political Determinants of
the Cobden-Chevalier Network." The Economic History Review 64, no. 2. 2011: 644-668.
Lampe further argues, “This development can be seen as an instance when the desire to liberalize faded,
especially due to the incentive to free-ride on the unconditional MFN clause.”
399
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Chapter 2 outlines this discussion on complexity and the inferences related to the number of polar units
and how that influences system stability.
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to examine the balance of power’s influence on the incidence of international trade
agreements.

Future Research:
Goods that continue to be in relatively strong demand (though not absolute), even
with increases in price, seem to be the focus of the cases within these trade agreements.
Just as Adam Smith was interested in the price of corn to help understand economic and
political dynamics, this research points to additional goods for consideration to help
understand the nexus of trade relations. While corn is a staple good that generally has
demand even when the price increases, there are similar key items involved in trade
which share that characteristic. As Alfred Marshall points out, “the case of necessaries is
exceptional. When the price of wheat is very high, and again when it is very low, the
demand has very little elasticity.”401

Types of Goods Involved in the Trade Agreements
MERCOSUR: Agricultural and Machine
Sino-Russian: Natural Gas
Cobden-Chevalier: Iron, Coal, Wine, and Linens

In these cases, because of the type of demand for iron, energy, agricultural
staples, and the rest of the goods above (Figure: Types of Goods Involved in the Trade
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Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics: Unabridged Eighth Edition. Cosimo, Inc., 2009. 89.
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Agreements) someone purchases only a slightly lower quantity of the good even when
the price increases significantly. As a result, the percentage change in the quantity
obtained is considerably less than the percentage increase in the price of the good. For
example, Russia knows in its European relations that if there is an increase in natural gas
prices Europe will only consume slightly less natural gas. That pattern also occurs in the
robust British demand for French wine.
This is particularly interesting when the overwhelming share of WTO complaints
involve goods with this type of demand.402 Also goods with this type of demand
constitute a high proportion of the percentage of trade volume. This is also interesting,
considering that the volume of economic activity in domestic markets includes these
types of goods, but also goods where the demand is more responsive to changes in price.
Is there something distinct about the balance of power that explains this difference, where
the goods purchased in international trade are disproportionately the types of goods that
are less responsive to changes in prices?
It seems possible that the risks and costs associated with the variations of the
balance of power can be more easily passed on to consumers if their demand for a
specific good is less responsive to changes in price. Whereas firms that engage with
products where the change in price more acutely affects demand would be subject to
more downside risks from international events. Alternatively, it may be that the demand
for these goods is so significant the profit motive pushes firms to engage in activity
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According to an analysis of WTO disputes the most frequently contested goods in decending order are:
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beyond their borders. On the other hand, it could be that consumers are aware of their
strong demand for certain goods and the difficulty of lowering the price and are engaging
in a type of arbitrage. That would explain why there is considerable trade activity of
comparable goods across states with similar factors of production and other parallel
attributes. These patterns of trade have complicated the explanations provided by
comparative advantage theories.
These cases and many references to history consider the significance and
interplay of power and wealth. It seems that an examination of these two factors can be
conceptualized in parallel with the above observation that the preponderance of demand
for certain goods is simultaneously about wealth and power.
Also are there factors within the study of international relations, as well as
political science, that infrequently change and are therefore conditioning the environment
where trade agreements begin? There seems to be a methodological and ontological bias
in favor of observing activity. Those behaviors that are not subject to observation can be
confused for systems.
Also, it is useful to further consider the interplay between the conditioning
dynamics of the international system and Most Favored Nation status. The CobdenChevalier case covers the MFN status factor, but it would be worthwhile to consider the
interplay of trade agreements under unipolarity. The Russia-China agreement was not
about trade beyond a specific energy resource and did not address MFN status. Because
of spillover effects, MFN status discourages states from adopting selective tariffs in order
to appeal to domestic sectors, because doing so would have across the board
ramifications.
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Conclusion:
This dissertation shows through analysis of three cases, the conditioning influence
of the balance of power on the incidence of trade agreements. The cases explain how
agent decisions are influenced by power competition among states and how that affects
international trade relations. The significance of this dissertation is that it emphasizes the
influence of the balance of power, which is under-represented in International Political
Economy literature as a means to explain trade agreements. In the process, findings from
the cases challenged some existing assertions involving state relations and how trade
agreements happen. The cases themselves do not lead directly to new theoretical claims,
only preliminary conjectures. The analysis of these cases shines a light for future
research that considers more broadly the role the balance of power has in conditioning a
range of social interactions.
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